A distraught MDC official reported that Zanu PF thugs were raiding the homes of MDC supporters and taking their livestock – goats, cattle and chickens – while threatening to come back and “fight you, because you want to support the new Constitution”.  On behalf of the villagers, he begged for protection from the government.

Villagers are struggling to survive in this area, where scant rainfall has caused crops to fail. The families now face the terrible prospect of starvation. In the past, when the MDC-supporting householders attempt to protect themselves or their property by fighting back, armed forces are sent in to arrest the “perpetrators of unrest”, who always turn out to be the MDC plaintiffs. This has been the Zanu-PF regime’s modus operandi since the first violent land invasions on commercial farms in 2000. Every report made to Police either resulted in the complainant becoming the accused, or complete inaction – the response being “we cannot get involved, because it is political”. Police officers who ‘interfere’ in these cases lose their jobs and pensions.

Mudzi, in Mashonaland East province, suffered greatly from intensive Zanu-PF perpetrated violence in 2008-09. In Mashonaland East from Jan 2008 to Dec 2009, 60 men and 11 women were brutally murdered for being MDC supporters or officials. Two Zanu-PF Members of Parliament from this province, who can be identified by hundreds of witnesses, are known to have been involved in at least three of the most brutal and sadistic of these murders.

Escalating political terrorism is the very reason that SADC and or AU Peacekeepers should be deployed here immediately in Zimbabwe, to pre-empt and possibly prevent the nationwide spread violence that is imminent. Both Genocide Watch and Amnesty International have raised the level of their ‘genocide warning’ index for Zimbabwe in the past few months.

This does not bode well for for South Africa, which is hoping to stage a successful and peaceful Soccer World Cup in just three months’ time.

Refugees in different countries in Africa face similar problems to what we face here in South Africa. In South Africa, refugees have been faced by the problems of xenophobia, unlawful arrest and detention in various police stations and a repatriation centre called Lindela. Lindela is one of the biggest jails in South Africa, if not in Africa, that is supposed to hold eleven thousand people but the officials overcrowd it with fourteen thousand refugees. This is something that one cannot find in countries abroad. A recent study revealed that refugees in Britain, Canada and the United States of America receive better treatment than us in our mother continent Africa. Why do Africans treat their brothers and sisters in this manner?

Botswana, just like any other country in Africa, is faced with high levels of unemployment, high risks of HIV infection among citizens, and a large number of African refugees, dominated by Zimbabweans. The biggest problems faced by refugees in Botswana, especially those from Zimbabwe, is no free medical assistance at the government hospitals and a difficulty in obtaining refugee status. The working permit is also very expensive and cannot be processed easily. The refugees also face a high level of hatred from the Botswana nationals, usually because the Botswana nationals think the Zimbabweans are taking more space and jobs meant for them. Zimbabweans are believed to be the hard workers so they attract the employer’s confidence and that has hugely affected the people of Botswana. Education also plays a big role, as most Botswana people are not as educated as Zimbabweans.

All these factors of hatred, lack of medical assistance and employment, and failing to get better documentation leads to refugees committing crimes. But Botswana has zero tolerance on crime, so they all end up in jails. Now they enter the jails sick and most will be suffering from the deadly disease HIV. Since the law in Botswana does not allow people from other countries to get medical attention, these refugees do not receive anti-retroviral drugs from the government of Botswana. I think the law must be revisited because it is unlawful and it violates the rights of the prisoners. How can you arrest someone and not give him/her medication but at the same time not allow him/her to go free and access the medication. This is murder and the government of Botswana must be held accountable.

How do they feel when their people are given medication when visiting other countries but they do not offer the same in their own country? Can’t they copy what South Africa is doing for the visitors who are coming for the World Cup? Many African students used to learn in Zimbabwe in the early nineties and they were given free medication. It is time our African brothers and sisters pay us back by doing the same.

Rumour and street-news is a favourite national pastime in Zimbabwe and we think it deserves it’s own space. Because there is no smoke without fire!

Readers, too are invited to contribute their own scandalous or shocking news in the Comments section hereunder. Tell us what you’ve been hearing recently! You can keep it anonymous.

10 March 2010

• Jawet Kazangarare, a Zanu-PF Councillor on the Urungwe District council was positively identified for his involvement in 91 assaults, 5 murders and 6 rapes. He is still the Councillor and continues to try to intimidate people. We hope the ngozis are giving him sleepless nights.

• ZNA Colonel Beta has become well known for his being involved and directing the violent operations against defenceless civilians in 2008/9.

• At the recent violent disruption of a constitution outreach meeting being (legally) held by MDC in Epworth just outside Harare, the press reports failed to mention that Zanu-PF senior Politburo member Amos Midzi, his wife, son and daughter (each driving their own trucks) ferried the ZPF youths to the scene and were present while the beatings took place.

• Obert Mpofu (Zanu-PF Minister of Mine-looting) recently went to Victoria Falls and purchased 25 properties there in just 3 days. Paid for with the proceeds of Chiadzwa diamonds, one wonders!

11 March 2010

• Remember the rumour that an SA-registered helicopter airlifts the Marange diamonds? Not quite correct. Eyewitnesses say it’s a Zimbabwe Airforce chopper and it flies off from Chiadzwa airfield in the direction of Mocambique every day…

• Grace Mugabe is hoping that her husband wins another 5-year term as president, because apparently she has ambitions for her eldest son, who will be just about old enough in 2015 to take over, like Kabila Jnr. did in the DRC….

• The MDC on Sunday said it was seeking SADC intervention to help resolve outstanding issues in the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The decision will be passed to the party’s national council, due to meet in Harare on March 12.

• In a government gazette issued on Friday, President Robert Mugabe reassigned powers from the Ministry of Information and Technology and the Ministry of Labor, both allocated to the MDC, to ministers loyal to Zanu-PF. Finance Minister Tendai Biti condemned the reassignments, saying it was not “the unilateral right” of the president. Mugabe also re-allocated the Interception of Communications Act to the president’s office, which houses the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO).

• In a similarly provocative move, Mugabe also transferred responsibility for Zimbabwe’s Human Rights Act and Electoral Commission Act to the Justice Ministry controlled by one of his top advisers, Patrick Chinamasa.

• The United States on Tuesday extended targeted sanctions against Zanu-PF elite for another year, stating the political crisis remains unresolved, President Barack Obama announced.

• SA President Jacob Zuma attracted criticism during his state visit to the UK last week for campaigning for the removal of EU sanctions against Mugabe and his cronies. A crowd of angry demonstrators greeted Zuma outside the South African High Commission in London, urging him to take a tougher stance against Mugabe and to urge early elections in Zimbabwe.  British Prime Minister Gordon Brown however declared that the sanctions would remain in place until the GPA was fully implemented. Winding up his visit, Zuma said on Friday he was satisfied that he had put his point across.

• South Africa’s main opposition party the Democratic Alliance (DA) last week lashed out at Zuma, accusing him of failing to take a principled stand against Mugabe.

• Neighbouring Botswana, which is negatively affected by fallout from the Zimbabwean crisis, last Tuesday called for the West to lift sanctions against Zanu-PF elite, saying they are impeding efforts by the unity government to bring stability to the country.

• Mugabe last week said fresh elections would be held next year “with or without a new constitution”. He said the GPA has a two-year lifespan, and said he would stand for re-election.

• Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai on Sunday called for an African Union (AU) and SADC peacekeeping force during the forthcoming elections to ensure a “free and fair environment.”

• First Lady Grace Mugabe has ordered the destruction of 100 households in a Mazowe suburb to make way for the expansion of an orphanage her aides claim she is building in the area. The households have been promised land elsewhere, but angry residents say they are being unjustly removed, and don’t believe she plans on building an orphanage.

• The MDC has released a code of ethics to govern the behavior of its members elected to public office. The party’s ‘Real Change Code of Ethics and Values’ seeks to promote and entrench accountability by its top officials.  This is the first of its kind to be crafted and implemented by a political party in southern Africa.

• According to his officials, Tsvangirai narrowly escaped death last month when his official vehicle burst a rear tire during a trip to Matabeleland where he had gone to assess the food security situation in the region. Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) chief Happiton Bonyongwe has ordered a probe into allegations that Tsvangirai was issued with a defective vehicle.  The vehicle importer, a German expert who examined the car afterwards, reported evidence which suggested the vehicle had been tampered with.

Governance

• An ultimatum issued by striking civil servants expired without a response from the government in the four-week-long industrial strike. The workers insist the government could afford their requested quadruple wage increase if it tapped the revenue from Marange diamond sales. The Apex Council representing the civil servants will meet early this week to review the situation.

Business

• Industry Minister Welshman Ncube said Indigenisation Minister Saviour Kasukuwere had prematurely pushed through the regulations of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act without Cabinet’s legal committee’s approval or input.  He said the government was now revising the regulations.

• Trading on Zimbabwe’s stock exchange has plummeted from a daily average of US$2 million to US$500 000 since the controversial indigenisation law was published.

• Zimbabwe’s House of Assembly on Thursday ratified the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) signed by Zimbabwean and South African officials last November. The move means that South African firms would likely be exempt from the indigenisation law.

• Kasukuwere ordered foreign banks operating in Zimbabwe to start financing black businesses or leave, in remarks that are likely to further unsettle foreign investors. As locals do not possess the capital to participate in the new indigenisation programme, the government may force banks to fund the buy-in transactions.

• Government is planning to raise mining taxes amid projections of growth in the sector this year. Mines Minister Obert Mpofu said the country was not capitalising on the “vast mineral deposits” being exploited by foreign firms. The revelations are likely to further unsettle investors.

• ArcelorMittal’s bid for Ziscosteel may be withdrawn after the steel giant expressed major concern over Zimbabwe’s new indigenisation law. A globally diversified steel company with its headquarters in Luxembourg, ArcelorMittal, through its South Africa subsidiary, is one of the two firms short-listed by the government to take over a significant part of its interest Ziscosteel.

• The Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) has urged the repeal of the National Incomes and Pricing Act as it deters investors seeking a free-market economy. The Price Control Act is blamed for hastening the collapse of the economy.

Economy

• The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) is set to retrench 2 157 “idle” workers countrywide due to viability problems and the liberalisation of the grain market.

• Six ageing and faulty generation units at the Hwange thermal power station may be decommissioned as repairs become non-viable.  This is despite the fact that Namibia pumped US$40 million into the refurbishment of the plant three years ago.

Agriculture

• The landmark South African High Court ruling in February, which upholds the 2008 SADC Tribunal ruling and allows dispossessed farmers in Zimbabwe to attach Zimbabwe government-owned property in South Africa as compensation for lost farms has paved the way for justice.

• Lawyers for commercial farmers who were dispossessed of their Zimbabwean farms are planning to start using the law to seize houses in Cape Town that are owned by the Zimbabwean government.

• In an about turn on Saturday 6 March, Lands Minister Herbert Murerwa (Zanu-PF) announced that the Zimbabwe government was setting up a Compensation Fund to assist commercial farmers who had lost their farms in the “resettlement programme”. However, he stressed that this would apply to “genuine cases” and that the farmers would not be compensated for their land.

• After several court battles initiated by parents through the Association of Trust Schools (ATS), Mugabe has barred Presidential Affairs and former Lands Minister Didymus Mutasa’s lawyer, Gerald Mlotshwa, from taking over Enthorpe farm in the Karoi district where Rydings Primary School is situated.  Mugabe told journalists that the farm allocation by Mutasa was “an abuse of power” and that the offer letter given to Mlotshwa should be withdrawn.

• More than 200 000 hectares of the current maize crop in Zimbabwe has failed after a dry spell during December and January.

• Zimbabwe’s state-owned Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) plans to lease out to private companies all its estates that lie derelict after years of mismanagement. ARDA owns land totaling more than 450 000 hectares, which agriculture experts say could produce half of Zimbabwe’s grain needs on a commercial scale.

Law

• A High Court judge on Monday dismissed last week’s bid by Deputy Agriculture Minister (designate) Roy Bennett’s lawyers to bar state witness Forgive Munyeki, allegedly a telecommunications expert, from presenting evidence in court. The ruling allows the State to call upon the TelOne employee to give his testimony.

Constitution

• In its latest report on Zimbabwe released on March 3, the International Crisis Group (ICG) listed public consultations on a new constitution as one of the key areas blocking the progress of the GPA.  Additional blocks included a land audit, appointment of MDC governors, an end of arbitrary detentions and arrests, regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations Command (JOC) and preparation for elections. http://www.zimbabwedemocracynow.com/2010/03/05/

• An opinion piece published by the Zimbabwe Independent on Friday March 5 noted that, while Zanu-PF, the MDC-T and the National Constitutional Assembly agree on many aspects of what should be in the new constitution, the three disagree on fundamental areas to do with the executive, commissions, land, systems of government and on how the bill of rights should be expanded.

Violence

• Three teachers in Masvingo were severely beaten by Zanu-PF youths for refusing to demonstrate against Tsvangirai for failing to end targeted sanctions on Zanu-PF elite. The teachers were on Saturday still recovering at Gunikuni clinic.

• Civil society organisations warned that in the last three months there has been an escalation in the number of threats and incidences of intimidation and harassment against its members at the hands of state security agents. The warning was made during a press conference in Harare on Wednesday, convened by the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights).

• High profile union leader Gertrude Hambira, Secretary-General of the General Agriculture and Plantation Workers’ Union (GAPWUZ), remains in hiding in neighbouring South Africa because of  “fears for her life,” after repeated raids by the police on her offices.

Education

• National University of Science and Technology (NUST) authorities have expelled student leaders, banned student activism on campus and imposed a curfew over the university. Armed youth militias from the Border Gezi training camps are allegedly being deployed every evening to arrest and beat up any students seen out at night.

Humanitarian

• Matabeleland South and North provinces will require urgent food aid in the next two months owing to the failed crop season. 1.3 million people are in need of food aid, with Matabeleland South being the most affected as 700 000 face starvation. Angeline Masuku, the Matabeleland South governor, on Thursday said the province had only 600 tons of maize for drought relief.

• About ten families were left marooned after flash floods swept across the low-lying Mbire rural District in Mashonaland Central near Zimbabwe’s border post with Zambia and Mozambique. Three of the families were trapped in trees before being rescued. The floods could worsen when floodgates at Kariba Dam are opened next week, March 15.

Diamonds

• An independent monitor appointed by the Kimberley Process (KP) arrived in Zimbabwe. Abbey Chikane, the head of the South African Diamond Board and a former Chairman of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, is expected to visit the Marange fields.

• The Zimbabwean government has hired Namibian consultants to train locals and help clean up its diamond industry to meet KP requirements, Secretary for Mines Thankful Musukutwa told members of parliament. Musukutwa said Marange has produced 2 million carats of diamonds so far this year.  However, Finance Minister Tendai Biti (MDC-T) said that the fiscus has not received any revenue from Marange.

• The government has accused mining giant De Beers of looting tons of diamonds from Marange over a period of fifteen years, keeping its discovery of the gems quiet. The government is alleging that it could have lost billions of dollars in revenue as a result. Mines Minister Obert Mpofu said the government at the time believed De Beers was only prospecting, but in reality the company was carrying out covert mining activities.

Diaspora

• The UK is holding at least 209 Zimbabweans at its immigration centres and prisons, according to the British government, which has over the years suspended deportations to Zimbabwe due to the ongoing human rights abuses in the country.

• The influx of refugees from Zimbabwe is placing “significant strain” on South Africa’s capacity and resources, President Jacob Zuma told British parliamentarians in London on Thursday.

Media

• In a surprising rebuke to Media, Information and Publicity Secretary and Zanu-PF spin doctor George Charamba, Mugabe told the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) to get on with its duty of expanding the industry.

• Andrison Shadreck Manyere, an award-winning photojournalist, was arrested for the third time in five weeks. The constant harassment of Manyere has sparked anger from New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Manyere was freed after spending a night in police custody.

The Good News

• “Music by Prudence,” a film about singer/songwriter Prudence Mabhena and seven other disabled young musicians in Zimbabwe, won the Academy Award on Sunday for best short documentary.

• Human rights activist Jestina Mukoko, who in 2008 was abducted and tortured by state security agents, is one of ten winners of the 2010 International Women of Courage (IWOC) Award. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will present the award.

• A massive commemoration rally was held for the late Susan Tsvangirai in Harare. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai announced the launch of a new charity foundation in her name.  Mrs Tsvangirai died in a controversial car crash on March 6 last year.

• The Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA) has partnered with the Zimbabwe Football Association (ZIFA) to launch the ‘Fan Park’ concept to promote tourism during this year’s FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Fan Parks are places where the public can gather to watch matches during the tournament.

Source:  Zimbabwe Democracy Now

www.zimbabwedemocracynow.com

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Rules for our Rulers [16:47m]: Download

MR GARETH THOMAS MP, MR MARK LOWCOCK and MR JOHN DENNIS

Evidence heard in Public Questions 50 – 135

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

1.This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee, and copies have been made available by the Vote Office for the use of Members and others.

2.Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither witnesses nor Members have had the opportunity to correct the record. The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings.

3.Members who receive this for the purpose of correcting questions addressed by them to witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Committee Assistant.

4.Prospective witnesses may receive this in preparation for any written or oral evidence they may in due course give to the Committee.

5. Transcribed by the Official Shorthand Writers to the Houses of Parliament: W B Gurney & Sons LLP, Hope House, 45 Great Peter Street, London, SW1P 3LT Telephone Number: 020 7233 1935

Oral Evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee on Tuesday 23 February 2010

Members present

Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair

John Battle

Hugh Bayley

Richard Burden

Mr Nigel Evans

Mr Mark Lancaster

Andrew Stunell

_______________

Memorandum submitted by Department for International Development

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr Gareth Thomas MP, Minister of State, Mr Mark Lowcock, Director General, Country Programmes, Department for International Development, and Mr John Dennis, Head of Zimbabwe Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q50 Chairman: Thank you, Minister, for coming to give evidence. This is the final session on our inquiry into the situation in Zimbabwe. Would you. for the record. introduce your team?

Mr Thomas: Mark Lowcock, who is the Director General for Country Programmes, is on my left, and on my right is John Dennis, who is the Head of the Zimbabwe Desk at the Foreign Office.

Q51 Chairman: Thank you for that. As you know, we visited Zimbabwe a couple or so weeks ago. I will start by saying that we have an extract from an Economist article saying that, since we left, things have deteriorated with strikes. It says things like: the unity government is “as good as dead” and that Harare is “abuzz” with talk of early elections and so forth. What is the political situation? Has it changed that dramatically in the last couple of weeks? Perhaps that would be the first question to ask, and then a couple more will arise from it.

Mr Thomas: I do not think the political situation in Zimbabwe can ever have been described as easy. We have always expected that there would be difficult periods between the formation of the Inclusive Government and eventually free and fair elections taking place. You are obviously aware that there have been reports of both strike action over salaries and of other tensions within the Inclusive Government. Whether or not it leads to elections sooner rather than later, I am not in a position to make that judgment, frankly, and I do not think any of us are in a position to make that judgment. We knew that the period between the formation of the government and elections would be a protracted and difficult period, and events are bearing that out.

Q52 Chairman: Have you seen this article from The Economist?

Mr Thomas: I have not seen that article.

Q53 Chairman: Is that an accurate reflection of the current situation? That is worse than the situation we would have observed three weeks ago. Saying things like the Government of National Unity is “as good as dead.” and “Mr Zuma appears to agree that the unity government has become a sham” but that he does not want any trouble before the World Cup. It says that Mr Tsvangirai has given up all his demands, other than to try to see if he can get space for free and fair elections. There is then this “indigenisation” rule, saying that every company worth more than half a million dollars needs to provide a 51% stake to black Zimbabweans – which is a blatantly racist policy. That, even in relation to three weeks ago, appears to be a serious degradation of the situation.

Mr Thomas: I have no sense that the President of South Africa has given up on the mediation process that SADC have in place and have under way. Our sense, certainly, is that the key players in the Inclusive Government have not given up the sense of the work programme to which the government is committed. As I say, there are tensions at the heart of the Inclusive Government. As we all recognise, political power continues to be very contested. Inevitably, when you have a situation like that there are going to be moments of high tension as well as moments where tensions are relatively lessened. I think we are probably in one of the tenser periods at the moment.

Q54 Chairman: We will explore this in more detail, but for the ordinary people, some of whom at least were getting access to education and health and other services, has the position changed significantly in the last few weeks? Or, in spite of those background difficulties and the strikes, are those services still being delivered?

Mr Thomas: There has been an improvement in the delivery of basic services, as I think you had the chance to see for yourselves when you were in Zimbabwe. Having said that, there are huge challenges still in terms of the delivery of those services. The crisis in terms of access to healthcare which was at the heart of the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe has not gone away, albeit there are more health workers in place. In terms of your specific question, our sense is that basic services are still in place, but they are very basic, and there is still a much longer transition to more recognisable, good quality health, education and other services to take place. The Department staff in Zimbabwe continue to look at what else we can do to improve the quality of those basic services, but that is very much a job in hand, as I suspect you will have seen for yourself when you were there.

Q55 Chairman: The final political point: a call for early elections. That was in the air when we were there. The counter-argument was that you could not possibly have free and fair elections if they were early because the register does not exist – and to the extent that it does exist, it is completely stacked to the benefit of ZANU-PF. Is this call for early elections a realistic call? Is it achievable? Is it desirable?

Mr Thomas: It is difficult to believe that free and fair elections would take place if they took place in the short term. As you say, there are substantial changes that are required, in terms of thinking through issues around voter education, constituency boundaries, the behaviour of the security forces, the role of the diaspora in getting the right to vote. It is difficult to see how free and fair elections could take place in the short term, certainly.

Q56 Chairman: That would imply that you think more time is needed to get those issues straight.

Mr Thomas: Certainly, our view is that what was included in the Global Political Agreement in terms of changes that were going to be needed has not happened as yet. The Electoral Commission is not up and functioning yet, albeit its head has been appointed – although not, I believe, formally confirmed. We would want to see the Electoral Commission being able to go about its work, completing the process of reform that everybody recognises is necessary if free and fair elections are going to take place.

Q57 Chairman: Mr Dennis, do you want to add any comments?

Mr Dennis: I have no comments to add, thank you.

Chairman: Richard Burden.

Q58 Richard Burden: One of the pots of support that DFID has been providing has been to the Office of the Prime Minister. We understand that the purpose of that funding is around enabling that as an office to fulfil its role under the GPA. When we met Prime Minister Tsvangirai over there, he felt that that DFID funding had been particularly useful in fulfilling the obligation to the GPA but he felt more could be done and extra support to his office would be well used, in particular, on the same sort of areas: helping the Prime Minister’s role to lead executive business in parliament and so on. Are there any plans to increase that support?

Mr Thomas: Certainly, if further approaches for assistance were made to us, be it by the Prime Minister or indeed any other ministry that is committed to reform and to a pro-poor agenda, then we would look at them very sympathetically. As you say, our support is designed to enable the Office of the Prime Minister to carry out the sort of normal functions that a head of state’s office would, including oversight of the budget, making sure that the different ministries are following through on the government’s agreed work plan, and helping to resolve disputes between government departments were they to happen. Certainly, that has been the purpose behind granting the assistance that we have done. We also, as you may be aware, granted assistance to a number of other departments to help them carry out the basic functions of their ministries, not least the Ministry of Finance to help them with the budgeting process.

Q59 Richard Burden: In terms of the level of that support, if a case were made that increases in that would be consistent with the objectives, would that be something that we would be prepared to look at?

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We have increased our aid programme to Zimbabwe over the last 12 months from £49 million to £60 million. Of course, we are looking for the measures that can have most impact most quickly in terms of helping the Zimbabweans get access to better services. Clearly, helping key ministries be better functioning so that they can drive that process, is sensible. When a prime minister or other key minister asks for assistance, of course we always look at that sympathetically. We would have to make a judgment about its relative merit as against other programme asks, but we certainly would not rule it out by any means.

Q60 Richard Burden: What kind of conditionality would be applied if funding were to be extended?

Mr Thomas: We would want to make sure that the assistance that is offered is being used to help promote reform, is being used to help deliver pro-poor services. Those would be the key conditions, as such. “Conditions” is probably the wrong phraseology to use in that sense, in that it has a resonance of the bad old days of Structural Adjustment Programmes. “Conditions” is not a term we would use, in that sense. Certainly, in terms of the decisions we might take about how we allocate aid in future, be it by a minister’s office or for a big programme of humanitarian assistance, we would want to be convinced that it was helping to deliver a pro-poor agenda, that it was going to lead to significant reforms in the way services are delivered. Those would be, if you like, the guiding principles for the decisions we might take.

Q61 Hugh Bayley: I want to ask a question about support for a free and independent media. I should preface my remark by saying that, if any government anywhere in the world funds the media, you need to ensure that that there is editorial independence and no control from the funder, as, for instance, with the BBC World Service. I recall in the run-up to liberation in both Namibia and South Africa there was British funding for the Namibian newspaper, possibly for The Sowetan, and it was seen as important to have some forums which were not under state control disseminating information. The print media in Zimbabwe is very strongly controlled by the state. I wonder what thought both of your Departments have given to ensure that, in the run-up between now and elections, whenever they come, there is fair and unbiased information about electoral registration, about the platforms of relative parties, the achievements of ministers and their ministries. Is that something which your Department should be funding or possibly the Foreign Office should be funding, or both?

Mr Thomas: First, there is no doubt that we would want to see reforms in the way the media operate and are organised to allow more independent activity by different media operations of one sort of another. The return of the BBC is undoubtedly a positive step. Key to wider change in how the media sector operates is the establishment of the media commission as heralded in the GPA. Again, like the Electoral Commission, it has not yet started doing its work, and that will be a key issue for the international community to continue to watch. It is certainly a key issue set out in the GPA where progress is needed. In terms of the run-up to free and fair elections, absolutely. A substantial programme of voter education would be required, the media clearly would have an important role in that. If we were asked to be part of a multi-donor group supporting an election process, of course we would want to consider doing that. Again, where we have been asked to enable elections to take place in a free and fair way, we have provided support in other countries to election funding arrangements. As I say, we would be happy to look at that, if we were asked, when the time came.

Q62 Hugh Bayley: Given that the barriers to the dissemination of information and the history of intimidation are probably greater in rural areas than in urban areas, I would have thought radio was a particularly important medium. Are you satisfied that there is wide access to radio giving independent and unbiased news across the country?

Mr Thomas: It is not just radio where there is an issue; it is the media in general. There is not free and fair access to the media in any way in which any of us in the room would recognise. That is clearly one of the areas, as set out in the GPA, where substantial reform is necessary. Like others in the international community, we would want to see progress in that area, not just so that elections can take place but, also, so that the executive can be held to account regardless of their political affiliation in that sense.

Hugh Bayley: One final question on culture. DFID does not normally make the promotion of culture a priority: you would defer, I suppose, to the British Council or others. We held a reception at the Bookshop Café and that seemed to me to be an oasis of free expression.

Chairman: From time to time. When it was not being disrupted.

Q63 Hugh Bayley: Relative free expression, yes. There is a strong tradition throughout Africa of music – I think of Fela Kuti and Miriam Makeba – permitting things to be said which could not be published in a manifesto. Would either of your Departments – yours through the British Council, Mr Dennis, or DFID – think about providing unusually and atypically support for freedom of expression through culture or arts?

Mr Thomas: I do not know where the Foreign Secretary is on music. In terms of DFID, again it is about the balance and the opportunity cost of providing funding in one particular way as against others. You are right that freedom of expression is hugely important, whether it is through music, through media, through other sources of activity.

Q64 Hugh Bayley: We were given a couple of booklets published by the British Council, which I thought was quite a courageous bit of work.

Mr Thomas: Do not get me wrong, I think the British Council does hugely important work. We are contributing, along with others, in helping to promote freedom of expression through the constitution review process, where UNDP, with our support, have started to fund work that we hope will allow civil society to engage in thinking about the type of constitution and the type of state that Zimbabwe should have in the future. That is one of the few ways at the moment – though it is very imperfect, as you will, I am sure, have had a sense – in which civil society and Zimbabwean citizens can begin to air views and bounce ideas around about the future of their country. In that sense, it is a hugely important process. It is not just us who are funding it – it is being led, as I say, by UNDP – but it is one way in which we are beginning to see some signs of growing freedom of expression.

Chairman: Mark Lancaster.

Q65 Mr Lancaster: Thank you, Chairman. I want to explore slightly beyond Zimbabwe’s boundaries and its relationship with other countries in the region. Of course historically, before 1994, when we saw the end of apartheid, Zimbabwe was very much the centre for the region, but relationships with surrounding countries have deteriorated to a degree, particularly those with South Africa and Botswana because of the Zimbabwe diaspora. What do you think surrounding countries can do to help in assisting the development of Zimbabwe, not least when it comes to finding a permanent political solution?

Mr Thomas: SADC, in that sense, the group of Zimbabwe’s neighbours, has a key role to play and has accepted that role in terms of acting as guarantors of the Global Political Agreement. It is encouraging that there is a mediation process underway. It is a process I welcome but it is very much a process that we need to respect, as SADC leading on that process and fulfilling the role that it has. You asked me specifically about South Africa. South Africa is probably the country that has seen most migration of Zimbabweans who have fled the country or have left the country into South Africa. Zimbabwe is very much a domestic issue for President Zuma and the South African government, as it is an international or a regional issue. You are right to flag the continuing importance of the region for resolving the political tensions in Zimbabwe. It is a process that we are obviously monitoring closely, but SADC is very much in the lead in that process.

Q66 Mr Lancaster: I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I think SADC do have a key role to play, but, given the Chairman’s opening questions and the deterioration at the moment, and notwithstanding that it is right that SADC should take the lead, what more can we do in supporting SADC to try to resolve some of these situations? Or should we not do anything?

Mr Thomas: First, we have to respect the mediation process that President Zuma has put in place. He has appointed a high-level team with significant reputations themselves to lead on that mediation process and, despite moments of high tension, which we all recognise will occur as the GPA process moves forward, we have to respect that mediation effort that President Zuma’s team on behalf of SADC is leading. The other ways in which we can help are more direct, frankly, and that is through our development programme. It is important for the people of Zimbabwe that there has been economic progress, and I think the economic progress is beginning to throw the spotlight on to the lack of political progress that has taken place in Zimbabwe. Through some of the assistance to the Ministry of Finance and through our humanitarian programmes we have played a small role, but an important role, along with others in the international community, in helping the stabilisation of the economy, and in that sense allowing the issues around the political process and the lack of sufficient political reform to be further highlighted, both for SADC to continue to deal with and also for the government to continue to have to deal with.

Q67 Mr Lancaster: Is it quite a difficult tightrope to walk really? For example, when we were there, you will be aware from all the talk in the papers that they had seized on comments that the Foreign Secretary had made in the chamber and they were being spun one way by one party and the other way by the other. Is it quite a difficult tightrope to walk, where on the one hand, everybody in this room, I am sure, wants to see development and progression within Zimbabwe in helping to secure that political process, but, as soon as we are vocal, it can sometimes be counterproductive whilst at the same time trying to support this process? Is that tricky? How do we find that balance between the two?

Mr Thomas: That is not true just of Zimbabwe, it is true of a whole series of relationships that we have with countries. Sometimes, you are right, there is a tightrope to walk.

Q68 Mr Lancaster: Are we getting it right, I suppose is what I am asking?

Mr Thomas: Are we getting it right? I think we are getting the balance right. We have a rising development programme. We do continue to deliver tough messages to all members of the Zimbabwean government, regardless of their political affiliation, and we continue to look to the leadership of both South Africa and SADC more generally to provide that on-the-spot mediation work that they are doing.

Q69 Chairman: Taking The Economist article, it describes SADC as a fairly spineless 15-member regional group. Zimbabwe has already defied their court rulings. They have just adopted another racist agenda which presumably would fall foul of the South Africans. Mr Mugabe’s attitude seems to be: “I don’t recognise SADC. It doesn’t bother me. If it suits me, I will pray them in aid, otherwise I will ignore them.” What can we do to persuade SADC to stand up for what it says it believes in?

Mr Thomas: If SADC was not prepared to play the role that it is playing, we would not have seen President Zuma set up a high-level mediation group, and we would not have seen that mediation group engaging in the very direct way in which it has done. I do think we have to be careful not to respond to some of the bluster from particular politicians in Zimbabwe at the moment and allow the SADC mediation process to continue. On occasion, we deliver blunt messages to all the members of the Zimbabwe government when it is required, and we provide direct assistance to help the journey of reform where it is appropriate to do so. There is also this international effort through SADC, and we have to allow it to continue to do its work and not be put off, if you will forgive me for saying so, by particular articles or particular comments by particular leaders in Zimbabwe.

Chairman: Nigel Evans.

Q70 Mr Evans: Thank you, Chairman. President Zuma is in London next week for a State Visit. Do I assume that yourself and the Foreign Secretary will be meeting with him and, if so, that you will raise the mediation process?

Mr Thomas: It would be pretty odd if he came to the UK and there were not conversations with the Foreign Secretary and the Development Secretary. I am sure there will be a whole series of conversations about affairs in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe will inevitably be one of those areas that gets discussed, but there is a broad agenda for the State Visit, so it is not the only issue that will come up by any means.

Q71 Mr Evans: No, I assume that other things will be spoken about as well, but clearly his important role in Zimbabwe is fully recognised by the world community.

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We recognise that he is playing a key role and we respect that. The decision that he took to set up a three-member mediation team and to include in that team some people who are extremely well respected in southern African politics was a sign of the seriousness with which he views the situation in Zimbabwe, but those were decisions that he took and we have to respect his leadership, given the importance of South Africa to SADC. Obviously, as I say, we will talk inevitably about Zimbabwe. It is one of the issues that will be on the agenda, but there will be a whole series of other issues that we have to talk through as well.

Q72 Mr Evans: I want to touch on land reform, but before I do that the Chairman referred to The Economist piece about businesses having a 51% stake by black Zimbabweans. Does the Government see that as a racist policy?

Mr Thomas: With all decisions in South Africa, the key test is avoiding explosive language. The concern we would have is more about the impact of particular policies on the economy and on the people of Zimbabwe, so if it makes investment in Zimbabwe less likely, if it reduces the chance of jobs being made available, then of course it has to be a considerable concern. One of the issues, as the Committee will recognise, as to why so many people have left South Africa is the lack of job opportunities, so anything that prevents the private sector from beginning to develop, anything that further discourages private sector investment, is clearly going to be a major concern, but in the end this has to be a decision that Zimbabwe takes for itself.

Q73 Mr Evans: But clearly it is a racist policy. If you say that there are a lot of white Zimbabweans living there and people who are not black Zimbabweans living there, surely they should have an opportunity to be able to be a major partner in whatever businesses exist within a country. If any other country did this sort of thing, we would be banging the table and saying, “This is racist.”

Mr Thomas: We want everybody in Zimbabwe to have equal economic opportunities in that sense, quite clearly, but sometimes there is a way of recognising that a whole series of reforms are required. I appreciate, Mr Evans, that you might want me to use particular phrases to describe a particular set of policies but, with respect, I am not going to do that. The broad message is that there has been progress in terms of the economy. We do not want that progress put at risk. We want the economy to stabilise still further. That is going to require a whole series of political reforms now to take place to create the conditions for longer-term private sector investment to take place.

Q74 Mr Evans: That leads me on to land reform, which is part of the reforms that clearly are essential to get some sort of progress and stability within Zimbabwe. Have you seen the documentary Mugabe and the White African?

Mr Thomas: I have not, no.

Q75 Mr Evans: I would heartily recommend it because our Committee has had an opportunity to see it. It is quite startling exactly what pressures clearly are on white farmers who exist within Zimbabwe. It is an incredible and very moving documentary. Clearly a number of people have had their lands grabbed, basically in a way that is not helping Zimbabwe. One can understand the reason for reform – we talked to the Commercial Farmers Union when we were in Zimbabwe and they can understand the sense for reform too – but something that is not orderly, something that is not structured, and something that leads to so much farmland being taken out of production and, indeed, then handed over to the cronies of politicians or friends within Zimbabwe, clearly is not doing Zimbabwe any favours.

Mr Thomas: I would agree with that. I would go further and say that not only do we condemn the huge number of farm invasions that have taken place, but we have seen terrible human rights abuses committed as part of those invasions which are completely unacceptable, both on an individual basis, the individual rights of the people affected, but also, as you quite rightly describe it, in terms of the devastating impact it has had particularly on the rural agricultural economy. Frankly, “economic madness” would be an appropriate phrase to use to describe that. I hope that that situation will desist. We will continue to make that clear in our comments to the politicians in Zimbabwe. It is clear that we do need to see a land policy that is fair, that is pro-poor, that is transparent, because that will, as you say, help to revive the economy, particularly in rural areas. It would help to revive the agriculture sector. We are a long way from that point at the moment, but we would stand ready, as part of a wider donor group, to help in that process if the political conditions were right. I suspect, frankly, the first step would be for some sort of land audit to take place, if the Inclusive Government were so minded, but, at the moment, we are not seeing signs that there is a willingness by all the parties to the Inclusive Government for a fairer land policy to take place.

Q76 Mr Evans: They seem to be dragging their feet on doing anything about a land audit, but clearly that looks like being a necessary forerunner to making some real progress in that area. You have just mentioned the international community doing its bit, along with the United Kingdom, in trying to bring some sort of commonsense solution to this issue. What do you think the international community and Britain specifically can do in this area?

Mr Thomas: As I have said, we do stand ready to provide assistance, as part of a wider donor group, if we are asked to. As I have said, the first thing would be to conduct an audit of land. Frankly, we would only see a merit in such an audit taking place if we had confidence that the information that such an audit gleaned would be used to promote the type of pro-poor, sensible, transparent land reform policy that most people independent of some of those in Zimbabwe recognise as being necessary to revive the rural economy there. We stand ready to help as part of a wider international effort if the conditions are right. They are not right at the moment.

Q77 Mr Evans: Even with the hyperinflation that the country has gone through, a lot of white farmers have gone to neighbouring African countries, as I understand it, and set up businesses there and are doing rather well. I suspect that Zimbabwe is importing some of the produce now of the former white Zimbabwean farmers – which is clearly insane. Do you think we are getting any closer to the political reality within Zimbabwe that a solution should be found? Or do you think that the mentality is still: no, we wish to right the wrongs of many generations and we do not care about economic or humane consequences of what the policy is that we are now doing in Zimbabwe?

Mr Thomas: Unfortunately, land is one of those issues around which the political power continues to be very heavily contested. As I described in my comments earlier, whilst we have seen some progress in terms of the stabilisation of the economy in Zimbabwe, we have not yet seen the major political changes which the GPA has set out as being necessary. One of the areas where we are continuing to see (to use a diplomatic phrase) “unfortunate activity” is around land. I hope, as the economy has begun to stabilise, that there will be recognition in all parts of the Inclusive Government of a series of further steps that need to be taken to help that economic progress. If those political realities kick in, then perhaps we will get closer to the situation that you describe.

Q78 Hugh Bayley: Do you not think it would be helpful if the British Government were to acknowledge that the terms on which white settlers, many from this country, obtained land at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was not fair and did not follow the rule of law, and that the consequence for many indigenous people was that they were forced on to marginal land and suffered enormously? If we were to say that, then perhaps we would be in a better position to oppose the wrongs of fast-track land reform and to move the debate on to a position you were talking about, of pro-poor, rural development – which is what Zimbabwe clearly needs – rather than a return to settler plantations.

Mr Thomas: With respect, Mr Bayley, I am not sure it would be helpful. I think I should take responsibility for what we as a party have done since we took power in terms of our aid programmes and our foreign policy since 1997. I am not sure we should try to reach back all the time into history to look at what happened a very long time ago. We need to deal – forgive me for saying so – with the realities on the ground at the moment. In that sense, the report that your party group produced was very helpful in trying to put to bed some of the misnomers that have existed around what happened in 1980, but, despite the importance of that report, we should rather think ahead. We should recognise, as Mr Evans has described, the continuing adverse implications of the land policy which particular elements in the government are pursuing from time to time and recognise that there needs to be a comprehensive change in terms of land policy at some time which needs to be led by the government in Zimbabwe, but which, if the conditions were right, we would stand ready to support.

Q79 Hugh Bayley: I think you are right to want to see a land audit, but if British money alongside money from other donors is to go towards establishing land title for poor landless Zimbabweans, how would you see that process unfolding? In other words, how would you select the landless poor? Who would get land? Who would you compensate?

Mr Thomas: Mr Bayley, with respect, I am not going to go down that particular route. That is a process that the government of Zimbabwe has to lead, and I hope it is a government that would be elected in free and fair elections so that it had a clear mandate. I have said that we would be ready to help as part of a series of donors with such an audit if we could be convinced that the information from that audit was going to be used properly. We do not have those conditions at the moment. We do stand ready to help, as I say, but we are not going to put money on the table when, frankly, we know that there is a series of other priorities where we can have a sense that our money were to achieve good outcomes for the poor in Zimbabwe more immediately. But we recognise the importance of the land issue and staff and ministers will be ready to respond if the political conditions changed.

Q80 Chairman: We agreed, anyway, that, whilst we would refer to the land issue, it was not going to be central to our report because it is such a major issue, but I think Mr Bayley has put his finger on some of the background to it. You just mentioned about effective DFID programmes. Indeed, DFID is doing a lot of the co-ordination on the ground and that seems to be welcomed by a number of the NGOs and charities. Two things were said to us: one was that if things improve a lot more donors are likely to come in and it is important that co-ordination is established in advance, otherwise it could get chaotic. That, on the other hand, may be too optimistic in terms of what is likely to happen. But you cannot give the funding directly to the government in most cases. Does that make it much more difficult to co-ordinate? Clearly other donors may not be very keen to hand it over to one lead donor, so what mechanisms do you need to have in place, or what could you do to ensure that the relationship between donors and the government is more direct than it is now? What are the criteria that would need to be met?

Mr Thomas: We are a long way away from having confidence in the systems of the government of Zimbabwe, so it is a long way off before we would want to be putting money directly into the government of Zimbabwe’s budget. Nevertheless, there are a number of ministries which are developing plans which are pro-poor, which are designed to help all communities across Zimbabwe and behind which we feel we can align some of our support, so there are discussions with government about their future plans and we are trying, as you say, to work with other donors where we have confidence in those plans or in the merits of those plans to put our financial assistance to support the achievement of those plans. In terms of the broader issue about donor co-ordination, you are right that donors are co-ordinating in general fairly well, particularly those which are traditional OECD Development Assistance Committee donors. There could still be better co-ordination with the World Bank and others within the UN system. In the longer term, if we can draw some of the non-traditional donors into the donor co-ordination process, players like China, like South Africa, like Brazil, that would clearly be an aspiration that we would want to have, not just in the Zimbabwe context but in a whole series of other developing country contexts too. Also, the donor co-ordination mechanisms are relatively informal at the moment. As you say, if conditions continue to improve and other donors were to come in, then we would need perhaps to formalise some of the donor co-ordination structures that are there at the moment, but, in general, relations between the main donors are very positive, as you describe.

Q81 Chairman: You have increased the programme in recent years in difficult situations. If you were going to put more money in, are you satisfied that the mechanisms you have in place would be effective, or would you need to find different or better ways of delivering it?

Mr Thomas: We are comfortable that the mechanisms we have available at the moment are strong enough and robust enough to ensure that the money that we are spending in Zimbabwe is going to where it should go. Clearly, if you increase your aid programme into a country, you have to think through what implications that has for the particular funding instruments that you use. We work, as you know, with UN agencies and NGOs but also with a number of private sector organisations which manage particular programmes of aid for us. As I say, we have a strong process for monitoring how our money operates. Thus far, we are confident that we have managed to make a significant difference with our money. If we were to increase funding substantially, then clearly we would look at the mechanisms we had available to us.

Chairman: If we are moving on to that, I will bring in John Battle.

Q82 John Battle: In a sense, the real issue is governance, from my experience of the visit we did, in particular the field visit. I would like to express gratitude to the staff at DFID who took us out of Harare to Bulawayo. I went with some of our colleagues to Tsholotsho and I was very encouraged and impressed by work on the ground, not least around the Protracted Relief Programme. All these things have great titles, but I found a programme there to reach to people who were poor, the poorest of the poor, the people who were landless, to try to get back their livelihoods, with a whole range of activities from home care right the way through. I was very, very impressed by that programme. I just want to ask you a couple of questions about it. If that has gone in the right direction, can it be amplified and done elsewhere? The programme has two phases, as I understand it, and we have just entered Phase II. Phase I was going for a few years. I am lost at the scale of it. As I stood in a field in Tsholotsho with those older women, trying out new cultivation techniques for getting more water into their plants so that their fields of maize and cowpeas would look rather healthier than the ones across the way, I asked whether there was just one field or thousands of fields like that. In the DFID letter it says that the programme is reaching over two million poor and vulnerable people, but the plan for Phase II is to reach two million people, and sometimes we include the two million that we have not quite yet reached. I want to know the extent of the programme. Is it really being disseminated across? Do you have just one field in Tsholotsho or do you have programmes elsewhere in the country? Can it be scaled up? I know the programme is working with other donors as well, but is the scaling up happening and is it possible for it to happen? Can you find the land? Can the people respond to it? Can it be a much more mobile programme than just one or two little pivotal projects?

Mr Thomas: I will bring in Mr Lowcock in just a minute, but, first, thank you for your comments about DFID staff in Zimbabwe. If I may, I will to put on record my appreciation for the work they do. They have had to operate in some extremely difficult circumstances in the past.

Q83 John Battle: Indeed.

Mr Thomas: As Members will recognise, we have some of our most talented staff deployed in Zimbabwe, given the importance of the work we are doing there. The Protracted Relief Programme has expanded. It is not just that one field that you were sent to, but let me bring Mr Lowcock in to amplify on that.

Mr Lowcock: It is a long time since I have been in Tsholotsho, so I am glad to hear that particular report. The programme covers 300,000 households, which is about two million people, which is probably 20%.

Q84 John Battle: At present?

Mr Lowcock: At present, yes.

Q85 John Battle: The target for Phase II was to reach two million people.

Mr Lowcock: I think that is the current coverage.

Q86 John Battle: So you are already well ahead.

Mr Lowcock: I think that is the case, Mr Battle, yes.

Q87 John Battle: Good. What about the range of activities? Many of the NGOs praise the programme for its innovation in reaching from home care, and quite personal support, to innovative agricultural techniques, including community participation. While we sometimes focus on, as I said, governance at the government level, the new engagement of the people is the real innovative work that DFID and other NGOs are leading internationally. Is that integration being extended? Is that development of those kinds of participatory tools able to take place? I felt the local officials were not resisting it at the local level, which augured well for the future of Zimbabwe if it could be scaled up from the bottom. Is that the view of the Department in the work that is going on at field level, at floor level?

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We would want to continue to see that programme scaled up. There is a series of developing countries – and I think of Afghanistan – where we have similar grassroots programmes. We are particularly fortunate in Zimbabwe to have very many committed civil society organisations which are playing, as you describe, a crucial role in helping to identify who needs the support that the PRP programme can give in communities most. As you say, the range of support we are able to give is a particularly important feature of the programme, from the very direct assistance, be it seeds and fertilizers or home care, to some of the more technical assistance, to help NGOs help the individual farmers understand what they have to do to increase their yields. As you say, it is an innovative programme and we have been encouraged by the international community’s response to that programme. As you know, Phase I was very much a programme that DFID initiated. Phase II has had much broader donor support and in that sense has become a proper multi-donor programme.

Q88 John Battle: What struck me as well was that perhaps with the word “farmer” in English we think of some strapping young man who is ultra-fit out there in the fields, but there were women who were older than I am and what impressed me immensely was they have not had the benefit of my education but their knowledge of agriculture and agricultural techniques was incredible. I was quite excited by this new conservation agriculture method and I wonder whether your Department is able to feed that into DFID and some of the climate change discussions and see if those methods can be tested out elsewhere in Africa and South East Asia so that the learning from innovation can be passed on? I thought as well as the process of engagement with the people there may be some good agricultural science in there that could be very helpful as well.

Mr Thomas: Far be it from me to suggest recommendations to the Committee but drawing that particular point out would certainly help us continue to spread some of the lessons from the Zimbabwe programme across our other country programmes. As you quite rightly said, the lessons in terms of climate change, in terms of the particular farming environment, if you like, in which our programme operates does potentially give information that would be useful in a whole series of other developing countries – Sedex – particularly in the climate change context. As you know, one of the priorities that the Secretary of State set out in last year’s White Paper was for us to do more on climate change in developing countries. Learning the lessons from successful programmes such as the PRP where there is a climate element is exactly the type of thing that we need to continue to spread across the Department.

Q89 John Battle: It was noticeable that we were speaking directly with the women, the farmers themselves, not through an intermediary, an agent, the NGO’s leader or even the DFID person. DFID is actually involved in the programming. If I can put it to you this way: I understand DFID now uses managing agents and some of the conversations suggest that using agents can become bureaucratic and can tie up resources of the partner NGOs having to fill in analyses and sometimes the direct link with DFID is not quite there, as it were. Although we had the experience of talking to someone in the field, when the process is taking place on a daily programme basis is the use of managing agents causing delays in the transaction between DFID and the work on the ground? Is it sometimes holding up the provision of DFID support?

Mr Thomas: We need to recognise that there was a substantial difference between Phase 1 of the PRP and Phase 2. Phase 2 is inevitably much more ambitious and involves a series of other donors. In a sense, what you want from your staff is that they make things happen on the ground in terms of developing countries. Our staff initiated this programme and as others come onboard the pressures on those staff and their ability to do other things would inevitably have been much more constricted if they had continued to run the programme direct, so we took the decision to bring in a private sector operator and there was an international tender, as I understand. Inevitably, when you have that sort of change there are one or two bumps along the process. What the head of the DFID office in Zimbabwe is making sure happens is that there are regular, I believe quarterly, meetings with the heads of civil society groups in Zimbabwe to make sure that we continue to have good coordination with civil society. That will clearly be of importance, not just in terms of the PRP programme but also in terms of the other programmes that we have.

Q90 John Battle: I will pass to Andrew in a second. It was expressed to us that there could be a distancing built in. What would worry me is that what seems to be really radical – to use a word, I think it is connected to the word “roots” – about DFID’s work is that ability to reconnect at the ground floor level and get the pro-poor development going on there and then feed it back up through. If you build a layer in that cuts them off again it could undermine some of the good work that has been done. I think Andrew wanted to follow through on this.

Mr Thomas: May I just pick that point up and bring Mr Lowcock in in a second. I think if there was not regular communication with civil society then, you are right, that would be a concern. In order specifically to avoid any suggestion that we are getting remote we wanted to set up a proper process for communicating with key players in civil society, and that is what we have now initiated.

Mr Lowcock: I would just like to put on the record that we have three members of staff in the Harare office who still work primarily on this programme and they are spending less of their time on the routine administration and more of it on the strategic dialogue and, indeed, at least once a month going out to regions like Tsholotsho and seeing what is happening. In terms of the objectives of making sure we stay in touch with the goals and the delivery of those goals, the way we have organised the work is an improvement on the past arrangement.

Q91 Andrew Stunell: If I could just pick up where John finished. First of all I want to say that we saw some excellent on the ground projects which will be the anecdotes and illustrations of my presentation about the work the Department does for a long time. They were very good projects.

Mr Thomas: But.

Q92 Andrew Stunell: The “but” is that there are so many levels between the money going in from the office in Harare to the wheelchair-bound lady with her four chickens in the compound outside Bulawayo that we have paid for. There is the managing agent, there is the Zimbabwe-wide NGO and there is civic society. When we pour £100 in at the top in Harare, how much goes out and buys chickens at the bottom, where does the other money stop on the way and what is the value of that other money on the way in terms of the investment in civic society and so on?

Mr Thomas: I would have to get you the exact breakdown in terms of the portion of what we put into the PRP programme that is taken up, if you like, as administration costs. We need to be careful and to recognise that those different layers, as you have described them, also play a key function in helping us to account for how the money is spent, making sure that money goes to the most needy people in Zimbabwe but also that we have proper accounting processes in place. I can see that as the programme has got bigger certainly one or two people have raised concerns, but I do think it is important that we have that administration element in there so that we do have proper checks and balances. We will very happily provide for the Committee, Mr Stunell, a more detailed explanation of what portion of the PRP programme goes as administrative costs if that would be helpful.

Mr Lowcock: May I make an additional point? As well as the cost of delivering the programme we need to think about what the returns and benefits of the programme are. It costs about $70 per household to provide the assistance we provide under the PRP and the value of the production that is generated by that $70 is about $140, it is a very high rate of return. The alternative to providing some of the inputs that we have provided would be in many cases to provide food aid which would cost us between $700 and $1,000. The opportunity saving of this programme is very high and the rate of return on the programme is also very high. The numbers I have given you reflect the administration costs as well as the costs of the inputs. We honestly think that in terms of value for money this is a very effective programme.

Q93 Chairman: I think it is a very important question that Mr Stunell is asking. As you will know, Minister, we are up against rather tight timetables. The constitutional requirements tell us that we have to have this report done in a very short space of time, so if you are able to give us that breakdown we need it very soon. I think it would be very helpful.

Mr Thomas: Okay. We will see if we can do that.

Q94 Andrew Stunell: I just want to underline that point. To give us real confidence that Mr Lowcock’s presentation is resilient, it would be helpful to have an additional report and note from you.

Mr Thomas: Okay. We will get that to you even quicker than usual.

Q95 Richard Burden: This is really on the same subject. From what we saw, I think we do understand why managing agents are used and the good pressures that lead DFID to go down that road. It is also fair to say that in terms of the projects we saw in Tsholotsho and the engagement of the women from GRM there it appeared to be good. However, I think the uncertainty that some of us still feel is whether we will get to a stage where the tail starts to wag the dog. If the need to have those managing agents is because of their expertise and they get such expertise that they are used not just by DFID but other partners as well, the danger is that they could then become intermediaries that start determining what happens rather than intermediaries that do what is required from the grassroots or reflecting policy. I do not think we are saying that is what is happening but we see there is a danger that could happen. The question really is, is it right that could be a danger and, if so, how do you guard against it?

Mr Thomas: Let me bring Mr Lowcock in in a second. When we take a decision that we want to contract out, if you like, the management of a particular programme there are a whole series of well-established processes which we follow. We are very happy to provide some further information to the Committee if that is what you need to give you some confidence that the tail will not wag the dog in this particular context. There is good donor coordination in Zimbabwe and, as I say, we have some very experienced staff operating in our office, so I do not believe, if you like, the worst case scenario that you are posing would happen. Let me bring Mr Lowcock in to give you some further detail.

Mr Lowcock: I think you are exactly right, Mr Burden, that in principle the problem you have described could be one we face. We have tried to describe how we are mitigating it in this case. The Committee knows very well the staff of the Department is quite stretched. If we had more staff available to us in Zimbabwe my own view would be that are were other things I would rather they did next before more administration and more detailed monitoring and engagement on the PRP. I am satisfied with the approach that we have to the management of the PRP at the moment.

Mr Thomas: Just one other point to make. It is not just us as one donor who plays a role in this, there are a series of other donors who also are funders of the PRP. In a sense, it is a shared process for looking at the administrative cost element and taking decisions about tenders, et cetera, which in that sense I hope gives further confidence and further checks into the system.

Q96 Andrew Stunell: I would like to hear from Mr Lowcock that if he did have those extra staff and it is not what Mr Burden was postulating, what would it be that the extra staff would be dedicated to?

Mr Lowcock: One of the issues that came up in discussions yesterday with the finance minister in Harare was follow-up to a discussion he had in Washington last week when the board of the IMF restored Zimbabwe’s voting rights. He had some discussions with the staff of the IMF about what it would take for Zimbabwe to move towards fuller normalisation of its relations with the international financial institutions, including potentially debt relief. We have a very good economist, who I am sure you met, in our office in Harare, who is one of a rather small number – I think I could count them on my fingers, excluding the thumb, of one hand – of international macroeconomists in Harare at the moment. That is a big prize for Zimbabwe to normalise its relations to that degree, an awful lot has to be done to secure that prize, but that would certainly be an area where it would be worth putting additional professional resources in. We will find ways to do that. That is one example I would give in answer to your question.

Q97 Mr Lancaster: We will move on to health, if we may. The Committee visited two hospitals, the Mpilo Hospital in Bulawayo and a hospital in Harare. We saw the maternity unit and we saw programmes associated with HIV/AIDS which Mr Evans will ask questions about in a moment. What we saw was very good. One of the key points that was put across to us, and perhaps we should not be surprised at this given the diaspora and the migration, was that there is a real shortage of skilled health workers, many of whom have gone abroad. For example, in the hospital in Bulawayo they had only recruited approximately 50% of midwives, although there is a midwife shortage in the UK so perhaps that is a bad example. What are we doing to try and recruit and retain health specialist staff in Zimbabwe?

Mr Thomas: One of the things, as I suspect the Committee will be aware of, that has, if you like, continued to focus our attention on the health sector was the cholera crisis in 2008/09 where the crisis was sparked by a long-term lack of investment in water and sanitation, but also the substantial deterioration in the health sector which was caused by many health workers wanting to migrate or simply not coming into work because they were not being paid. What we have done is to ensure that there is an allowance paid directly into health workers’ bank accounts to provide that direct incentive for them to turn up to work and to go about their business. We can provide direct assistance in that way, but in the end there has got to be further economic stabilisation and a further reduction in the political instability that exists in Zimbabwe. We can make a difference in terms of public services, but to get anything like the type of public services that we would recognise here in the UK those broader economic and political changes are going to have to happen. As I say, we are making a difference in terms of the allowances we fund directly into health workers’ bank accounts which has helped recruitment to pick up. We are also helping to fund the supply of crucial drugs. If you look at the government of Zimbabwe’s budget, they simply cannot afford to pay all the salaries of health workers that are required or all the needs for drugs, so it is the donor community which has to plug that gap. It is not just us, it is a number of other donors too that are playing a role.

Q98 Mr Lancaster: You say the government cannot really afford to pay the wages, so given that we have strikes at the moment in Zimbabwe, and I think they are currently paid $200 a month and they are demanding $500, is that realistic? What effect would that have? What can we do?

Mr Thomas: One of the things we can do is not to get involved in what is a conversation that has to take place between those workers themselves with their own government. What we can do, as I have said, is to respond to the requests that we have had from the government, the Inclusive Government, to provide support to the health sector, and through the continuation of these allowances that is what we are doing and by making further money available to target, for example, maternal health and to continue our different aid programmes.

Q99 Mr Lancaster: Workers’ pay and drugs to one side, I suppose the other key element to try to improve the health structure in Zimbabwe will be infrastructure. I know that we are investing in six hospitals in Zimbabwe at the moment. Can you perhaps outline what the aims of that programme are and whether or not you intend to increase it, or how you see it us moving forward in that area?

Mr Thomas: Obviously we want to move from, if you like, the crisis phase of the health support to getting a longer term plan in place for the health sector, one that can tackle all the different health challenges that the people of Zimbabwe face. I would not want to underestimate to you the scale of the challenge that there still is, we are still in a situation where I think substantial humanitarian assistance will have to be provided for Zimbabwe. The scope to dramatically expand our health programme, whilst I think it is there, is perhaps more limited than we would like. You are right, we have to continue to invest in infrastructure but continue to make sure there are health workers in place and that those health workers are being paid and, crucially, that the basic drugs and other supplies that they need to go about their business are in place. If you like, the next ambition that we have is to try to reduce maternal and child mortality where there has been a substantial deterioration in Zimbabwe more recently. We have recently committed some £25 million over the next five years to help people continue to get better access to family planning services, to antenatal care, to obstetric services and newborn care services. If you like, that is the next iteration of our support to the health sector.

Q100 Mr Evans: Another health subject is HIV/AIDS, which you have already touched on. We all had an opportunity to see some of the projects involved with that and I think we were all impressed with what we saw. It is tremendous if one considers that in parts of Zimbabwe some of the aid is somewhat thin. Certainly where we were in Bulawayo and Harare we saw some tremendous projects, so I was very pleased with that, but still last year 140,000 people died in Zimbabwe of AIDS. Compared to other countries, Zambia for instance, where the amount of money spent is way above, I think it is US$187 per person as opposed to Zimbabwe where it is $4, why is there such a staggering disparity?

Mr Thomas: I think often the disparity, frankly, relates to the political situation in Zimbabwe and the ability for the international community to spend money effectively to tackle HIV/AIDS. With our programmes on the health sector we have wanted to get to a stage where other players in the international donor community would support it. The Global Fund are now funding the health workers’ support programme. As I say, I think as the economic situation stabilises there will be more opportunities to do more on healthcare, of which HIV/AIDS will continue to be a priority for ministers. Nevertheless, I think the UK can take some pride in the success that there has been, notwithstanding the significant levels of death because of AIDS that there is in Zimbabwe, for the fact that it has not been even higher. HIV prevalence has come down, it has halved over the last ten years, and our aid into the sector over that period has been absolutely pivotal to helping those who wanted to make a difference in this area in Zimbabwe be able to do so.

Q101 Mr Evans: I have got no doubts about that whatsoever. We went to see one of the hospitals there where the storeroom had eight months’ worth of supply whereas two years ago they would have had nothing.

Mr Thomas: That is right.

Q102 Mr Evans: Getting the capacity and getting those drugs out into the villages and into the more rural areas is clearly something that needs to be done. Within the infrastructure that exists there, are we able to target some of the high risk groups like sex workers, children and, indeed, gays and lesbians?

Mr Thomas: We have a behaviour change communications programme which is run by an organisation, Population Services International, who are very well established in this field who are doing hugely important work in terms of getting those prevention messages out on AIDS. There is a whole programme of work around voluntary counselling and testing which has also been very important in making a difference. I am sure the Committee will be familiar with the way in which those who have migrated from Zimbabwe potentially would not get access to information about how to avoid becoming HIV positive, but through funding we give to the International Organisation on Migration we have been able to provide support for them to get help and information to those migrating from Zimbabwe to avoid the obvious risks at transit points, et cetera. One of the keys in terms of preventing the spread of AIDS and HIV infection is making sure there is good access to condoms and that is something we have continued to be in the lead on in the provision in Zimbabwe.

Q103 Mr Evans: One other area which helps greatly is male circumcision which apparently improves the rate of protection to 60%. The target is to circumcise 80% of the males within Zimbabwe as soon as they possibly can. Apparently the cost of that will be around $140 million but they will save over $3 billion if that could be achieved. We visited one of the clinics and talked to a couple of people who had gone through it, so they were acting as peers to encourage other males to go through the procedure. Do you envisage upping the amount of money that we will be directing towards male circumcision within Zimbabwe over the coming months?

Mr Thomas: Rather than just focusing on one specific intervention in response to one specific disease, however important that disease is, and I have a longstanding interest in HIV/AIDS, I think the challenge for us, both in DFID and the wider donor community, is how do we get more support more generally into the health sector in Zimbabwe and get a clear coordinated plan that looks at maternal health, that looks at HIV/AIDS, that looks at a range of other diseases too. Many of the responses that you need to tackle HIV/AIDS or to tackle maternal health are common across the piece in terms of having good health workers and good infrastructure in place. The challenge is to continue that process of coordination under good leadership from the government of Zimbabwe to get a series of clear health priorities in place which the international community could get behind. That is certainly what our ambition would be to support. Whether it has to be just DFID upping our funding levels on healthcare or whether there are other players in the international community, such as the Global Fund, who can take up that extra financial need is something that we need to continue to review. Health is certainly one of the areas that we watch very closely.

Q104 Mr Evans: Clearly all the donor organisations talk to one another anyway and that is important to make sure there is no duplication or people working against one another. When we visited the clinics we saw a number of posters with famous Zimbabwean footballers who were saying that they were getting this procedure and encouraging others to do so. It does seem to me to be economic commonsense, never mind humane commonsense, to ensure that as many people as possible have this particular procedure to better protect the nation, particularly when you look at the colossal number of deaths. This is a bit of a lobbying plea really. All I would ask is that you look at this again and make absolutely certain that not for the want of directing the money there, which as I say will pay dividends in the short and medium-term, we support this procedure as much as we possibly can.

Mr Thomas: I recognise both the lobbying plea and I fear one of the specific recommendations that will emerge from your report, and will obviously respond to the report in the usual way and no doubt faster than we would normally.

Q105 Chairman: I think it might be the next government that has to deal with that.

Mr Thomas: Mr Evans, I think your point in general about support for HIV/AIDS is well made, not only in the context of Zimbabwe but actually in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. We are five years on from Gleneagles where that commitment to try to deliver universal access to anti-retroviral drugs was one of the pivotal elements of the Gleneagles Agreement. We are probably two-thirds of the way towards achieving that commitment, so massive progress has been made but the target has not yet been reached. One of the issues that ministers in DFID are looking at is how we can use the international meetings that are taking place this year to refocus attention on that commitment to universal access, to look at what has worked in Sub-Saharan Africa, what has not worked perhaps, and what else the donor community needs to do. There will be an international meeting that takes place in London very shortly that looks at exactly that question.

Q106 Mr Evans: Hopefully when President Zuma comes as well on South Africa, maybe pushing him a little bit more on that area.

Mr Thomas: I hear your message, Mr Evans.

Q107 Richard Burden: One of the other major health areas, and you have alluded to it yourself, is the issue of water and sanitation. Six million people still have not got access to clean water and sanitation and obviously there was the bad cholera outbreak just a little while ago. When we met the Mayor of Bulawayo during our visit, if there was one priority that he wanted to identify it was the issue of the water system in the city. He said it was close to collapse and that was not unique in Bulawayo and his plea was for donors to concentrate on trying to address that as an issue. Where would you see the issue of investing in the water and sanitation infrastructure to rank compared to other priorities in terms of health and so on?

Mr Thomas: That is a very difficult question to answer. In the longer term there is no doubt that for a series of economic and social reasons as well as health reasons we need to see more investment in water and sanitation in Zimbabwe. That is absolutely clear. Through some of the programmes that we already have, not least the Protracted Relief Programme, there is work taking place on water and sanitation, but I would not want to give you the sense that there is a clear long-term sector-wide plan on water and sanitation which we are leading. This is one of the issues where as the humanitarian situation stabilises and as hopefully too we see progress on the politics in Zimbabwe the donor community with the government can start to put together a plan for beginning to see much longer-term, more sustained investment in water and sanitation going forward. It might be one of the areas potentially that the Multi Donor Fund that we are in the process of trying to establish under the leadership of the World Bank can look at. In the same way that water and sanitation is a key long-term issue, so is investment in the road network in Zimbabwe and investment in access to electricity. These are long-term issues which we will have to address. However, given the humanitarian need that still exists, and I think will exist for at least another couple of years, the balance of our programme focusing on the delivery of basic services plus, where we can, targeted assistance to support reforms in key ministries is broadly right for the moment, but we have got to keep in view those longer term issues like the Mayor of Bulawayo has identified, I think that is absolutely right.

Q108 Richard Burden: When you mention the Multi Donor Trust Fund, are you saying that this is an issue they could look at?

Mr Thomas: Possibly, yes.

Q109 Richard Burden: Or that they are looking at?

Mr Thomas: The Multi Donor Fund is not up and running yet, there is still a series of preparatory meetings that are taking place to sort out how the fund will operate and what it will focus on. Exactly what it does we are still in discussion on, but it certainly could look at water and sanitation issues. Frankly, if you are looking at a series of other longer term issues, such as infrastructure, roads, et cetera, you have got to think about water and sanitation issues to some extent anyway.

Q110 Hugh Bayley: Could I come in on the issue of the diaspora before we move on to a different subject. There are many thousands of Zimbabweans in this country and they tend to be relatively better educated because the better educated migrants migrate longer distances. They are very committed to their country and because of human rights abuses or political or economic pressures they do not want to be there at the moment, but might well return if there was political change. When the Government is talking next week to President Zuma, will you be talking about the issue of a right to vote given particularly that South African citizens in this country are entitled to vote in South African elections?

Mr Thomas: I think the point you make about the issue of the right to vote for the diaspora has been recognised as one of the issues that the Electoral Commission when it gets on to do its work will have to address. We all want to see progress on those political parts of the GPA where progress has been much slower. I think the big ticket items are getting the Electoral Commission established so that it is in a position to do its work, of which looking at the voter roll and the issues around the diaspora is one of a series of issues that are key to getting free and fair elections to take place.

Q111 Hugh Bayley: One other thing I wanted to raise that affects the diaspora is this: there are circumstances, as you are acutely aware, where money from the UK may appear politically tainted in Zimbabwe. The diaspora traditionally sent a lot of money back through remittances which has played a vitally important part in allowing Zimbabwe to survive an economic collapse. When I met the Institute of Migration’s director of programmes in Zimbabwe, she talked about imaginative schemes that operate in other countries of the world whereby the government of the country in question from which the migrants have migrated and donors match dollar for dollar, pound for pound remittances that are sent back. Given that remittances tend to be spent locally, not by government agencies but by families on essential services, would your Department look at the feasibility of setting up a scheme both to encourage Zimbabwean citizens living in this country to remit money and to find a good channel for transmitting money from your Department? Is that something you would examine?

Mr Thomas: I am not sure we would want to look at a programme that matches exactly what one particular Zimbabwean living in the UK or elsewhere donates to his or her family as such. There are a whole series of obvious technical difficulties with such a scheme. We certainly do want to make it easier for remittances to get back. I would go along with the director-general of IOM in this regard: there are a whole series of innovative programmes around remittances and the use of technology making it easier and cheaper for people to get remittances back which are being deployed in other countries. One thinks of Kenya’s M-PESA programme, for example, where remittances are being sent using mobile phones from a whole series of countries, as I understand it, to the individual recipient in-country. We are looking at a programme of work to try and spread the benefits of that technological innovation around remittances. I would hope Zimbabwe would be a beneficiary in that regard. As you may be aware, we have tried to get much more information into the public sphere about the different rates of interest and different types of financial product that are available for people who want to remit money to be able to do so to try and create much greater competition and, as a result, drive the administrative costs, commissions, down for those sending money back.

Q112 Andrew Stunell: Children have certainly been victims of the current difficulties and it could be said probably that Zimbabwe used to have the best educational system in southern Africa, it has now probably got the worst, yet DFID is still only contributing about 2% of aid to education. I wondered if you could give us some account of how that priority was set and whether you feel it should be a greater contribution in the future.

Mr Thomas: We have a couple of programmes that are supporting the education sector. One is a programme of support to orphans and vulnerable children, which is managed by UNICEF which helps to pay the school fees of a number of the most vulnerable children in Zimbabwe. We estimate that we have helped almost 250,000 schoolchildren through that process and we are hoping that the programme will expand this year to reach almost 600,000 children directly. Some of the other benefits of that programme include better access to nutrition, to healthcare, to welfare and to psychosocial support services for those young people so that in turn they can benefit better from the education that is available to them. The other source of funding for the education sector is an Education Transition Fund which we launched the idea of back in June last year and pledged £1 million to it. Our interest has generated pledges now worth a total of $50 million and we are in the process of sorting out the procurement process to enable the purchase of substantial textbooks for schools in Zimbabwe. One of the problems in the education sector, as I suspect you will have seen, is as a result of the political instability there has been a substantial loss of good quality materials for teachers to use. We hope that this fund will be one opportunity to begin to restore that damage.

Mr Lowcock: Can I just clarify the point on your 2% figure, which I suspect we gave you.

Q113 Andrew Stunell: You did, yes.

Mr Lowcock: I think that refers to the £1 million towards the wider Multi Donor Fund programme the Minister has just described for textbooks in particular. Probably what we should also have explained is that the programme of support for orphans and vulnerable children, which again the Minister has described, is also that education dimension, so to give a fair overall summary of how much we are putting into education we should include that as well. I apologise that we did not do that the first time. I just wanted to correct that on the record.

Q114 Chairman: How much is that?

Mr Lowcock: I will have to calculate that for you, Chairman. It is significant, and we can do it quickly.

Q115 Andrew Stunell: Can I just pull out a couple of points from your two replies, if I may. The underlying problem is that a lot of schools have been lost to use and a lot of teachers have emigrated or fled from the country. Are there any specific plans that DFID is developing or working with the Zimbabwean government on to get the restoration of school buildings and bringing back teachers?

Mr Thomas: One of the things that the Inclusive Government did when they came to power was to offer a $100 allowance to all civil servants, including teachers, which has helped to see a series of teachers returning to post and in that sense has made a difference.

Mr Lowcock: The biggest issue in our opinion is teachers. I am afraid it is going to be a significant challenge for Zimbabwe to attract back many of the best teachers who have left the country. The thing that will attract them back over time is an improvement in the political and economic situation and confidence in the future of their country, so it all turns back on what the Minister was describing about the overall political situation. Clearly there is also a school infrastructure problem and textbook issue, but we think first teachers, second textbooks and probably third infrastructure would be the order of priorities.

Q116 Andrew Stunell: Can I just ask a question about textbooks? I asked a number of questions in Zimbabwe and we received representations from some of the witnesses there. My impression was that we had gone for a big bang solution to getting textbooks in which was leading to a substantial delay in getting any textbooks in, when it might have been better or more appropriate to have gone for a small-scale solution with more rapid results. We were told by an official from the Department of Education, I think, that they were still waiting for textbooks which were supposed to have been ready at the beginning of the school year, et cetera. I would be interested in your commentary on that situation and for some assurance about how the textbook programme, for which we appear to have set aside funds, is actually going to be delivered to a sensible timetable.

Mr Thomas: I think the first thing is that our initial interest back in June in making money available for the supply of textbooks has sparked considerable interest from the wider donor community, perhaps more than certainly I had expected. What we are trying to do is to make sure that money collectively is well spent by having a central procurement programme. We believe that will deliver substantial economies of scale. There has been a process by which the Zimbabwe Ministry of Education has been looking at trying to prioritise a particular core set of textbooks to be delivered across the country. I recognise the appetite inevitably for teachers to want to have access to those books, but it is right that we get the procurement process right and it is right that we try to deliver economies of scale. Given the size of the pot and the increase in the size of the pot it has clearly taken some time to get that right, but we hope we are close to achieving that and getting the textbooks out.

Mr Lowcock: I would, if I may, like to answer the question we promised you a subsequent answer to, which is the share if we had included the programme of support in our total programme in education. It would be about 6%, about £2.4 million going into education through the programme of support and then £1 million this year through the Education Transition Fund. As the Minister said, we were trading off speed with efficiency and value for money. We have got a much cheaper deal and, therefore, can buy many more textbooks in the way we have done the procurement, but I take the point you have made about needing to think carefully about that trade-off between speed and efficiency.

Q117 Andrew Stunell: So when do we now expect those books to be available to schools, bearing in mind the money was allocated back in July, August last year?

Mr Lowcock: We will need to check when we expect the first deliveries, but the procurement process is advanced now.

Q118 Andrew Stunell: And the schools have no books.

Mr Lowcock: Well, most schools have some books. Clearly, yes, there is an issue and that was the trade-off we were trying to manage. I will find out for you exactly when we expect the first deliveries.

Q119 Mr Lancaster: The Committee went to see some projects directed at orphans and vulnerable children and the Department estimates that more than 90% of the country’s orphans have been absorbed by the extended family. Indeed, 40% of households in rural areas actually care for orphans and vulnerable children but they have almost no financial assistance, so how do you feel that external donors can help in this process and support them?

Mr Thomas: There are a number of programmes that we contribute to which have an impact on orphans and vulnerable children and the financial needs either of the individual children themselves or those who are looking after them. I described the programme of support to orphans and vulnerable children in answer to Mr Stunell. Paying for education fees of the most vulnerable children is one obvious way in which we can help. The second is through the Protracted Relief Programme which we talked about in answer to questions from Mr Battle. That also provides support often to some of the young people of Zimbabwe who have lost parents and who perhaps head up households themselves because of the loss of parents. Many of those people who have taken in orphans and vulnerable children are beneficiaries of the Protracted Relief Programme and in that sense get support from the international community. As a Department we do not pick the individual recipients, that is done through the NGOs who, if you like, deliver the process and the support on the ground.

Q120 Mr Lancaster: I accept the answer, but I suppose what I am really pushing for is given the sheer scale and how a relatively small percentage are being reached given limited resources from the Department, how can we move forward perhaps in greater collaboration with others. That is really what I am asking.

Mr Thomas: I think the Protracted Relief Programme is expanding. It has gone from the first phase when it was largely just the UK funding it to a much bigger programme which is allowing us to reach many more people, including orphans directly or those who are looking after orphans. Similarly, the expansion of the number of children who will get support through the overseas programme up from about 250,000 so far to, we hope, 600,000 this year is an example of the way in which we are trying to expand the numbers that we can access. As we have discussed, in the end it does come back to the economic and political situation in the country moving forward and donors being willing to do more as a result and, frankly, more resources being able to be generated in-country.

Q121 John Battle: If I could just go back to the issue of food security. I think the UN at one point said five million people would be food insecure and the Crop and Supply Assessment Mission estimated around 2.8 million might need humanitarian assistance before the next harvest, which is this April. Some of the reports are suggesting that the weather has not been all that good and the harvest might not be that good. What is your latest prediction for food aid requirements that are coming up in the next year from April?

Mr Thomas: In terms of prediction in terms of hard numbers, I am not sure I can give you that specifically now. We share the analysis that you employed that there are some early indications that this year’s harvest is not going to be as good as in previous years. As I said, notwithstanding that sense of what this year’s harvest is going to be, I think we will have to provide humanitarian assistance anyway at least for the next two years.

Q122 John Battle: The next two years.

Mr Thomas: In recent years there has always been a substantial humanitarian component of our aid programme at different times, almost 50% or more. We work very closely with organisations such as the World Food Programme who deliver that food aid and humanitarian assistance. Frankly, the development of the Protracted Relief Programme is not only an attempt to meet the immediate food needs of those affected but is trying to get at some of the deeper roots of that humanitarian crisis. As well as giving the seeds and fertiliser programme direct support, we are also giving support to NGOs so that they can give actual guidance to people as to how to use those seeds and fertilisers to increase the yields that they do get.

Mr Lowcock: I was going to add a point on when we will have a better sense of this year’s harvest. It will be March-time probably. Most people think that it will be better than 2008 and possibly less good than 2009, so the numbers requiring emergency assistance will be in that range that you described.

Q123 John Battle: Can I thank you for the way in which you gave the answer to that longer term rather than immediate relief. Forgive me, I am not sure I clearly understand this. You provided £9 million to the World Food Programme in 2009 and that aid was mainly for food relief programmes. I wonder whether the World Food Programme itself has that longer term food programme development as well as relief. It is that distinction between your work on the programmes I referred to earlier that are getting sustainable agriculture again, but are you working with the World Food Programme itself on getting those longer term programmes in as opposed to just dishing out food aid, frankly?

Mr Thomas: We are, but it is important to recognise that the World Food Programme has particular expertise at getting food aid to those who need it instantly, who are hungry now in that sense. We are looking as a donor community, which includes WFP, at a cash transfer programme, in a sense, which helps people both to plan for a slightly longer term process as well as meeting their immediate needs now.

Q124 John Battle: If I could follow through from Mark Lowcock’s comment. When will the figures be available? We are in March next week, are we not, so is there a chance that an assessment could be included in our report? Have we got time to get that far?

Mr Lowcock: Normally it is sensible in Zimbabwe to make an assessment of the harvest level by late March. We will give you any update we can at the point at which you want to go to press, but late March is probably the earliest at which we can say something resembling an authoritative answer.

Q125 John Battle: If I can be absolutely clear, that is two things: one to get on to those longer term food development programmes, both our own and working with the World Food Programme, and the other is to look to cash transfers to stimulate that rather than going to handouts. Have I got that right?

Mr Thomas: That is effectively where we are now. Obviously if the harvest is better than anticipated then we can move further up that particular long-term process earlier.

Q126 John Battle: Also not to lose, and sometimes it is lost, may I say, and criticism is made of the UN and the World Food Programme sometimes. People standing in queues and just getting it dished out to them does not always encourage community participation, whereas other methods might include that engagement of development with the people at the local level, which is where I am hoping our programmes are geared towards now.

Mr Thomas: You have to use a range of ways of getting help to people and you have to look at the reality on the ground and adjust what you do to reflect that reality.

John Battle: The direction of the overall programme is very clear from that answer, thank you.

Q127 Richard Burden: Could we move on to the question of internally displaced people, which is clearly a very, very big issue. Estimates vary of IDPs making up between just over 4% of the population and 7.5% of the population. Yet there is also difficulty, there is quite a lot of evidence, a lot of concern being voiced that as far as the Zimbabwean Government is concerned, because they take the view that IDPs do not exist, IDPs are being fairly systematically excluded from a number of relief and humanitarian programmes. Some of the NGOs are saying that really the UN as an institution is not tackling this head on and that it needs to be a lot more assertive around the question of IDPs, both in terms of Zimbabwe’s own obligation under UN obligations but also from a straight humanitarian point of view; aid is not getting to where it should be getting. What is your response to that?

Mr Thomas: I think that was a situation that was certainly true of the previous Government. I think the Inclusive Government has been better at recognising both the existence of IDPs and their needs, but I would not want to downplay the challenges that still remain. I think many of our existing programmes upon which we have touched are also giving assistance to those who are internally displaced within Zimbabwe but who are perhaps living with other families or who are vulnerable in some other way. Clearly there is more we need to do, as we have described, across the range, but I do believe that our programmes and those of others in the international community, are helping to get aid to those who are internally displaced, albeit there is clearly a lot more that could happen.

Q128 Richard Burden: Certainly the impression we got was that a number of NGOs and others were saying that yes, whilst things may have improved since the formation of the Inclusive Government, the issue is still very much there as far as IDPs are concerned. Partly because of the nature of some of the security ministries, it is quite easy to get in the way of aid programmes where necessary.

Mr Thomas: In that sense, absolutely, I would agree with that. There is a huge problem in terms of the ability of IDPs to move around in terms of particular locations and the level of need that we have described in terms of humanitarian issues, in terms of children or young people, if they have been internally displaced, it is particularly acute in that sense. What I would want to avoid the Committee having the impression is that none of our programme is thinking through issues around IDPs; they very much are. However, as NGOs have described to you, certainly there are real difficulties for IDPs in terms of the security situation.

Q129 Chairman: The aid programme to Zimbabwe has more than doubled in the last four years. You said in a press release last August that the Department was willing to re-engage and support recovery in Zimbabwe provided the new Government can demonstrate: its commitment to sound economic management; the democratic process and respect for human rights; the rule of law; full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; and a timely election held to international standards. I would suggest none of those things is what is happening on the ground. The serious point behind that is, nevertheless, you have increased it. What capacity is there for increasing it further or perhaps, putting it the other way round, how do you assess your ability to deliver and whether you should do more or less? What is the process that goes round the Department in evaluating this?

Mr Thomas: We do look firstly at the humanitarian situation on the ground and we would provide humanitarian aid almost regardless of the political situation, and it is clearly right that we do get help to people who are in desperate need, despite the particular governments that they have. In terms of long-term development assistance, you are right, we will have to look at the political and economic conditions that are operating and are on the ground before we can make big decisions about be it substantial increases in aid or substantial changes in the nature of our programmes. I think there has been progress in Zimbabwe, in particular in terms of the economics of the country. Clearly the political progress in Zimbabwe has been much, much slower, and that certainly affects our ability to do more and more quickly; there is no question of that. If we were to see faster political progress, then there is no question that we could do more, and more quickly, and I am sure that others in the international community would probably see things in the same way.

Q130 Chairman: We were told, and indeed we saw for ourselves, that in spite of the migration of some of the brightest and best people from Zimbabwe, the administrative capacity to deliver services was one of the best in Africa. Even now we saw effective delivery. Do you envisage a situation, if the political background were transformed, where government support or sector support would be a possibility? Obviously it is not today but can you see a scenario where it would and how would you judge that? Is that something you could even incentivise?

Mr Thomas: I think it is a long way off. I would hope that we could get to a situation where the politics of Zimbabwe had moved so radically forward that we could have confidence in government systems or in the particular sector plans of particular ministries. I think we are a long way off from having confidence that the Government’s financial systems are strong enough and robust enough and would be free from political interference. Having said that, there are ministries that are committed to reform and who are starting to try and give direction to what should happen in their particular sectors, and where we have confidence in the plans of those ministries, then we are trying to align our support as a donor community behind those plans. I think moving down the route of sector support or budget support is a long way off. The first stage is what we are embarked on, which is where we have confidence in the plans of a particular ministry thinking through how, without going through government systems, we can support those plans and move forward.

Q131 Chairman: And if you were increasing the funding further, how would you allocate that between multilateral or donor partnerships as opposed to the bilateral work that the NGOs are doing, which, to be honest, is mostly what we were looking at, which was extremely good, but the question is whether it is best to expand that or would it be best to expand it through multilaterals or would it be a parallel process?

Mr Thomas: I do not think we have a fixed view, frankly, in that sense. We would want to spend money in a way that was going to have most impact most quickly and for which we can properly account. Whether that is through UN organisations or through civil society, I think in reality it will be through a mixture and quite what the balance of that mixture would be going forward, I do not think we are yet in a position to say. It does depend on how particular programmes work. I think the Protracted Relief Programme is a programme, for example, that has a mixture of a whole series of civil society organisations and is making a significant difference. If the humanitarian situation were to deteriorate, clearly using organisations like the World Food Programme would make a huge amount of sense, but they, too, use civil society organisations, as I understand it, so it is not a question of either/or. I think it will simply come down to a hard decision as to which particular organisations are going to get money on the ground where it needs fastest.

Q132 Chairman: In spite of the very heavy anti-British rhetoric, the general dynamic on the ground is the attitude between the Zimbabwean and British people is quite positive in terms of that underlying trend. It was suggested to us that Zimbabwe ought to be one of the overriding priorities for the UK, in other words one of the three or four countries in which we do most, not because of that particular British interest, which is just stated as a positive underlying fact, but because it would have such a dynamic effect on the whole dynamic of Southern Africa if it could be turned around. Do you accept that as a possible analysis and, if you do, what could DFID do more that would reflect that priority, taking on board entirely that it is complicated and unpredictable but the argument that so long as you were working in the right direction it justified that kind of prioritisation?

Mr Thomas: Zimbabwe takes up a significant amount of both ministerial and very senior official time in both Departments in that sense, so it is accorded a high level of priority. I think the analysis about the importance of Zimbabwe to sub-Saharan Africa is absolutely right. There is no doubt that if we were to see further economic stability and progress and further political progress, Zimbabwe’s recovery could help to drive progress towards the Millennium Development Goals across the whole of the region. I have a particular interest in regional integration and in the transport infrastructure that helps to drive, if you will forgive the pun, that integration, Zimbabwe has a pivotal place in the north-south corridor, a network of key roads, and therefore the investment, or lack of investment, that Zimbabwe puts into its road network has a fundamental impact on the capacity of sub-Saharan Africa to trade between the countries in that area. I think the analysis is spot on and that is why I hope that we will see the type of economic progress and political progress that I suspect all of us would want.

Q133 Chairman: Thank you very much. The Committee would want to repeat the thanks that have already been made to the DFID staff for the visit they organised. All eight members of the Committee who went on the visit came away with a much more positive impression of what is going on than we had anticipated, although I would hasten to add we are not naive enough not to realise the huge political difficulties and underlying tensions and threats that could blow it all away. We understood that. What we saw was impressive. Our report has to focus on the development agenda rather than the political agenda, but, again, you cannot deliver the one without the other. Our intention is to complete the report in advance of an Election unless we are ambushed.

Mr Thomas: With that in mind, I wonder if I can ask Mr Lowcock to give you the answer on the textbook delivery timescale. I think we have that information.

Q134 Chairman: Anything you have now and anything you do not have now if you can think days rather than anything else.

Mr Lowcock: Could I preface the answer to Mr Stunell’s question by saying that of course we are not in complete control of this because we are a tiny part of the financing. We have to get all the other players into place as well. The answer to the question is that the contract will be let in the next few weeks and the first books will be delivered from about eight weeks from then, so about 12 weeks from now the first books will be delivered.

Q135 Chairman: The Committee will obviously watch with interest the developments which obviously go through convolutions almost daily. Perhaps the one positive thing Mark said was that whilst nobody knows where it might head, the feeling was that things had got to the point where going back to a situation where there was no space was perhaps unthinkable unless the situation deteriorated beyond all hope. If I may say so, there were comments and compliments about DFID’s role, and indeed the Foreign Office’s role because it is important to recognise this is a joint operation, in doing that. I think it was the Dutch development representative who said specifically that he wanted to put on record his appreciation of the leadership role that was being provided by DFID in Zimbabwe and how important it was, both politically and in terms of development. I am happy to put that on the record and say that we appreciate it and we appreciate that the team there are doing really good work in difficult and challenging situations, but at the moment not unrewarding because there is something coming back for it. Can I thank you very much indeed for your evidence. I genuinely hope that our report is something that will make a useful contribution to both your work and a wider understanding of what we are trying to do.

Mr Thomas: Thank you, Mr Bruce.

Africa Briefing N°70

Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010

I. Overview

As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a unity government, the challenges to democratic transformation have come into sharp focus. Despite reasonable progress in restoring political and social stability, ending widespread repression and stabilising the economy since February 2009, major threats could still derail the reform process. In particular, resistance of intransigent and still powerful security sector leaders and fractious in-fighting between and within the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) must be addressed now. South Africa and other countries in southern Africa – who monitor the accord that guides the transition – must press the parties, and particularly President Robert Mugabe, to see the transition through to a successful conclusion. Donors should back their efforts.

The unity government, created under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by Mugabe and MDC factional leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, was born under a cloud of scepticism. Most observers gave it little chance, predicting that, even as prime minister, Tsvangirai would fall prey to Mugabe’s “divide, rule, co-opt and destroy” strategy. Against the odds, the government started well: schools and hospitals re-opened; civil servants were paid and returned to work; the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved; goods returned to store shelves; and a cholera epidemic was controlled. Human rights activists reported a significant drop in abuses. Donors generally received well an ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction program calling for $8.5 billion in foreign aid and investment.

But major concerns undermining the transition process have come to the fore. Hardline generals and other Mugabe loyalists in ZANU-PF are refusing to implement the government’s decisions, boycotting the new national security organ and showing public disdain for Tsvangirai. Farm seizures have continued virtually unabated. Most attention has focused on completing the GPA, but ZANU-PF has delayed or ignored important commitments in that document, while stalling constitutional reforms by insisting on preserving broad executive privileges. Key blocked steps include a land audit, appointment of MDC governors, an end of arbitrary detentions and arrests, regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations Command, public consultations on a new constitution and preparation for elections.

These delays reflect the two deeper challenges on which this briefing concentrates. First, a mature political system must develop, so that ZANU-PF and MDC engage as both competitors in the political arena and partners in the inclusive government. This will be difficult, especially under the divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU-PF leaders, including the factions led by Vice President Joice Mujuru, and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, know that their party has lost much popular support and needs a generational shift. For its part, the MDC must keep faith and engaged with its broad following in the transition process, including trade unions, human rights groups and women’s organisations. It must also show the country as a whole that it is a viable custodian of the state – competent, transparent, and capable of preserving social change since independence.

Equally challenging are security issues. A relatively small number of “securocrats” use their positions and symbiotic relationship with Mugabe to exercise veto power over the transition. They are motivated by differing factors: fear of losing power and its financial benefits, fear of prosecution for political or financial abuses, and a belief that they guard the liberation heritage against Tsvangirai and the MDC, which they view as fronts for white and Western interests. Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are quietly considering how to ease these officers into retirement, even at the cost of allowing them to keep their assets and providing them a degree of impunity from domestic prosecution, while simultaneously professionalising security forces respectful of human rights and a democratically elected government.

While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) must take seriously its GPA guarantor role. South African President Jacob Zuma’s activism as mediator must convey the message that the region will abide no alternative to the GPA. His recent actions, including appointment of three respected advisers to oversee the Zimbabwe account, are welcome indications he will be tougher vis-à-vis Mugabe on GPA obligations and respect for rule of law.

The broader international community, especially the UK, U.S., EU and China, should support and complement SADC’s efforts through careful calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress; maintenance of targeted sanctions on those thwarting the transition; and lifting of sanctions on entities key to economic recovery. Donors should provide new recovery and development assistance – including for rural development, health and education and strengthening of the judiciary, legislature and civil society – through transparent mechanisms, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

This briefing focuses on political party and security issues, as well as South Africa’s mediation. Subsequent reporting will analyse other topics vital to the transition, including constitutional and legal reform, justice and reconciliation, sanctions policies and security sector reform.

II. The INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT’s Mixed Record

Ten months after the violent and disputed 29 March 2008 elections that led to political stalemate with the long-time ruling ZANU-PF party of President Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai’s wing of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) announced it would enter the government alongside ZANU-PF and the splinter MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M) faction. This followed an extraordinary summit of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) on 26 January 2009, whose final communiqué called for Tsvangirai to be sworn in as the prime minister by 11 February and the remainder of the government two days later.[1]

The unity government was formed under the auspices of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which had been hammered out with SADC assistance during lengthy negotiations. The GPA spelled out a specific continuing role for the regional mediators in monitoring and supporting its implementation. This was especially important, since most observers believed that the agreement was essentially unworkable, having established two centres of power within a single government but leaving most real political and military authority with Mugabe, his party and the hardline security establishment.[2] Many considered that the African Union (AU), SADC, and the primary mediator, the then South African President Thabo Mbeki, had been too accommodating and respectful of Mugabe during the negotiation process. Additional concerns emerged after the GPA was signed, as Mugabe was allowed to ignore deadlines and otherwise repeatedly undermined the agreement without consequence.

Now into its second year, however, the inclusive government is making discernible, if slow and painful progress in a number of areas, bringing a degree of stability and predictability to a country that twelve months earlier was on the brink of collapse. Most notably, schools and hospitals have reopened, multi-million per cent inflation has come down to single digits, government revenue has begun to pick up and shops are fully stocked with food and other commodities.

Key Western donors have been slow to embrace the new government largely because of its failure to fully implement the GPA and their continuing antipathy toward Mugabe. For much of 2009, donors provided welcome expansion of humanitarian assistance, but generally adopted a wait-and-see posture on longer-term financial support for recovery and reconstruction. This risked thwarting the very changes the international community is seeking, both by weakening the hand of relative moderates in ZANU-PF and more generally by undercutting popular support for the reform process. More recently, the U.S., UK and European Union (EU), among others, have expanded the definition of “humanitarian assistance” to cover many important social and economic sectors, such as agriculture, health, sanitation and education.

A. Economic Reforms

Rebuilding a devastated economy with a 90 per cent unemployment rate is a daunting challenge for the inclusive government. Finance Minister Tendai Biti has won praise for his steps to restore a degree of confidence and fiscal stability, but the prospects for rapid recovery are weak, not least because the fragile inclusive government and incomplete GPA have caused investors to shy away. Recently, government workers have gone on strike to demand a pay increase beyond the $160 monthly stipend they are generally now receiving, which they point out is insufficient to cover even basic costs of living in Harare and other urban centres.

Nevertheless, there are some signs of recovery. GDP grew 4.7 per cent in 2009, the first positive totals in a decade. The 2010 budget aims for 7 per cent GDP growth, underpinned by 10 per cent growth in agriculture, as was already achieved the previous year, and 40 per cent growth in mining. Since the Zimbabwe dollar was suspended and the U.S. dollar and South African rand adopted as legal tender, inflation has fallen from an official 231 million per cent in July 2008 to a 6 per cent average in 2009 and is forecast at 5.1 per cent in 2010.[3] The International Monetary Fund extended $510 million to Zimbabwe as its share under an expansion of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) facility that was authorised as a response to the global economic crisis. This has been earmarked for debt clearance, support of the budget and productive sectors, and water and sanitation, health and education needs.[4]

The improved economy and donor pledges to cover half the $718 million required to cope with disease and hunger have been reflected in a lessening of the formerly dire humanitarian situation. Cholera, which had become rampant in late 2008, was brought under control in 2009, but there are warnings of a potentially new serious outbreak during the current rainy season.

B. Political Reforms

Ultimately, the economy cannot be restored to health through technical measures alone. The political reforms envisaged in the GPA are needed. Helped by the regional re-engagement that resulted from the SADC Maputo summit in November 2009, there has been some gradual progress on implementation since the MDC-T briefly suspended participation in the unity government the previous month to protest ZANU-PF’s intransigence in discussions to move forward on GPA requirements.

Independent commissions have now been formed to address media, human rights and election issues.[5] Notwithstanding statements to the contrary by senior ZANU-PF officials, a land audit may soon begin that would not just be a survey but rather an attempt to lay the groundwork for addressing this most sensitive reform area, including multiple farm ownership, production by new farmers, compensation for former white commercial farmers and an end to farm invasions. Arbitrary and politically motivated detentions and arrests have declined, though they have not ceased entirely, and the repressive Public Order Security and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Acts (POSA and AIPPA) remain on the books.

The challenges of completing the GPA, crafting a new constitution and moving toward elections could yet cause the inclusive government to collapse. A number of issues are still outstanding in the protracted negotiations over GPA implementation. Indeed, the six on the original agenda have ballooned to 27, as the MDC-T, MDC-M and ZANU-PF have brought in additional topics they considered had either been overlooked when the mediation began or had gained prominence during the course of the negotiations.

The negotiators have agreed to postpone to the end the especially contentious appointment of MDC-T’s Roy Bennett as deputy agriculture minister as well as the status of Mugabe stalwarts, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and Attorney General Johannes Tomana, whom the MDC believe were re-appointed to their positions unilaterally by Mugabe in violation of GPA provisions requiring consultations. Agreement has been reached on sharing provincial governors, though the dates of their appointments have not yet been determined.[6] How the new National Security Council (NSC) is to function as a successor to the infamous Joint Operations Command (JOC) is still sharply contested.

Controversial matters introduced by the MDC-T and remaining open include security sector reform and compliance with the National Security Act, a framework for government operations (including procedures for chairing of the cabinet when the president is not present) and rule of law topics such as freedom of assembly and association.[7] ZANU-PF has put forward for consideration such issues as removal of sanctions, donor-funded parallel government structures, the role and funding of non-governmental organisations, selective funding of ministries and other entities by donors and the functions of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, a basket fund coordinated by the international community to support the inclusive government.[8]

The constitutional reform outreach program intended to lead to a new constitution kicked off on 7 January 2010 but needs greater impetus.[9] There is a growing recognition that this process cannot be the exclusive preserve of government and legislative committees, but rather must be a national exercise with full participation of civil society groups. This is especially essential for the MDC, since there are concerns that the party is losing contact with its popular base. Civil society activists and unions have complained, however, that the process is being driven by political elites for their own purposes, and some have even called for the international community to withdraw support for the transition until a credible consultation process has been adopted.[10]

It is positive, nevertheless, that there is increasing acceptance across the political divide that the “Kariba Draft” – agreed by the inclusive government’s three parties under Mbeki’s mediation – cannot be the only reference for the new constitution, since it incorporates a number of potentially anti-democratic principles, most notably further enhancement of executive powers at the expense of legislative or judicial authority.

While many political figures believe a broadly acceptable compromise draft is likely by the end of the year,[11] sharp differences remain between the parties. A blueprint written by ZANU-PF strategists linked to the hardline camp around Emmerson Mnangagwa suggests that the party remains committed to an all-powerful presidency.[12] While the 41-page document – a comparative analysis of ZANU-PF and MDC-T constitutional positions – gives an insight into the long-time ruling party’s intention to preserve an authoritarian centralist government, the notion of an imperial presidency is not shared by the party wing around Vice President Joice Mujuru and her husband, ex-general, now prominent businessman Solomon Mujuru. The MDC-T wants executive authority to be shared between president, prime minister and cabinet, with internal checks and balances within the executive. ZANU-PF – arguing that the past year has shown two centres of power are unworkable – supports a presidential system of government.[13] The ZANU-PF document states:

The experience of the people of Zimbabwe with the inclusive government since February 2009 has shown that sharing of executive power by the President and Prime Minister will result in … always a fight for power rather than progress. If there has to be a Prime Minister, he [should] not have executive authority. He is only a senior minister appointed and accountable to the President. In the SADC region, the prevalent arrangement is Head of State and leader of government.[14]

Finally, preparations need to be made for presidential and parliamentary elections. There is much discussion of delaying these for several years, perhaps until 2013, so as to put electoral politics aside while the country copes with massive economic and social tasks. Many in Tsvangirai’s camp believe their party has not yet built a strong record in government and are equally concerned over how the military would react to a potential MDC-T victory.[15] Meanwhile, many ZANU-PF stalwarts believe their party would be convincingly defeated, since recent polls indicate its support is now less than 20 per cent.[16] Though it is still possible that Mugabe might dissolve the government in an attempt to catch the opposition off-guard with a rigged snap election as early as 2011, this seems unlikely at present, partly because of increased international scrutiny and engagement.

C. Threats to the Transition

Despite the current stalemate on outstanding GPA issues, there is some prospect that compromises can eventually be reached, though only with the help of intense mediation. However, security sector reform – firmly rejected by Mugabe – has emerged as a key challenge. Failure to initiate this process could unravel the inclusive government, prevent a smooth transition to the post-Mugabe era and raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying instability that would affect the whole region. A dozen or so “securocrats” – senior military and intelligence figures – are widely considered to hold de facto veto power over any real transition. A cabal of powerful generals, with the support of elements in ZANU-PF, still believes that Tsvangirai should not be permitted to lead the country, even if he wins an election. The MDC-T leadership has raised this implicit threat with SADC leaders. The issue is so sensitive that it was not addressed in the Mbeki-led GPA negotiations, but it has become a key agenda item for the new mediation team appointed by Jacob Zuma, his successor as South African president.[17]

Moreover, even if the inclusive government completes the GPA, achieves a new democratic constitution and addresses the electoral process, the transition will not be assured unless a broader challenge is met, namely development of the political system to ensure that ZANU-PF and the MDC-T balance political competition with cooperation in governance. This will be particularly difficult as long as the divisive Mugabe is at the helm. At the December 2009 ZANU-PF congress, he retained his party presidency unchallenged for an additional five-year term, thus positioning himself to contest another national election.

III. Political party strategies

The three principal parties to the GPA went into the inclusive government with a stated objective of securing political stability, initiating economic recovery and holding fresh elections under a new constitution within eighteen months, that is, by March 2010.[18] While that date is no longer realistic, the government’s perceived successes and failures have emerged as the key battleground between the parties as they position themselves for an eventual electoral test.

ZANU-PF – divided along factional lines on strategy, still seized with its Mugabe succession problem and battling to retain power that it has only reluctantly shared in the inclusive arrangement – comes close to unity only in its intent to frustrate reforms whose benefits would accrue primarily to the MDC-T. The MDC-T believes that success for the inclusive government in instituting political reforms and economic recovery would pave the way for it to win the right to form the next government after elections. MDC-M leaders, recognising their party lacks a solid base, are hedging their bets, seeking to keep the inclusive government functioning, while searching for an advantageous alliance ahead of a national vote.

A.    ZANU-PF’s Divisions

1.      The Mnangagwa camp’s hard line

ZANU-PF’s overall objective in the inclusive government is to undercut any major political and economic reforms associated with the MDC-T and Prime Minister Tsvangirai. Under Emmerson Mnangagwa, the defence minister and presidential hopeful, and with the support of military leaders, ZANU-PF’s participants in the unity government want to neutralise Tsvangirai and his party’s ministers, while taking advantage of the former opposition’s presence in government to push for the removal of targeted travel and related international sanctions on Mugabe and his party’s ministers.[19]

This approach has Mugabe’s backing but, for reasons related to ZANU-PF’s ongoing internal power struggle, not that of the Mujuru faction. Mnangagwa allies control the state bureaucracy, while Mujuru allies control what remains of grassroots support in those provinces the party dominates. Mugabe, conscious that neither faction commands overwhelming support within the party or sufficient national popularity to ascend to power on its own, plays them against each other in order to maintain his grip on the divided movement. While he has tended to side with Mnangagwa in dealings with the MDC-T, he has mostly favoured the Mujurus on internal ZANU-PF decisions.[20]

The attempt to frustrate the MDC-T includes at the national level:

• securing a five-year term for the inclusive government (to 2013), with Mugabe at the helm until then or he decides to retire, while making both it and the parliament dysfunctional; steps in this regard continue, including acts of lawlessness such as continued farm invasions, violations of property and investment rights, and resistance to political and economic reforms so as to discredit the MDC-T both nationally and internationally as an effective political force;
• retaining control of key state institutions and reducing Tsvangirai to a ceremonial prime minister, while discrediting, compromising and corrupting him and his party’s ministers;
• derailing the pace of the constitutional reform process; and
• inducing fears of a military coup should Tsvangirai win the election and attempt to take over from Mugabe.[21]

The plan is executed at government level by ZANU-PF permanent secretaries, whose appointments Tsvangirai accepted in the misguided belief that they would act as professional civil servants.[22] All these ZANU-PF loyalists selected by Mugabe were first recommended by Misheck Sibanda, chief secretary to the cabinet and a key Mnangagwa ally. In general, the permanent secretaries have taken advantage of the inexperience of MDC-T ministers to acquire free rein in determining the pace and implementation of government decisions and policies.[23] Permanent secretaries in education and public service ministries, for example, have in effect overturned decisions by their ministers with regard to new school fees structures and a manpower audit of the civil service, on whose payrolls ZANU-PF has placed more than 20,000 youth militia members.[24]

George Charamba, the influential permanent secretary in the information and publicity ministry, who doubles as Mugabe’s spokesperson, has denigrated the work of the government in which he serves, saying “I am in the kitchen; there’s lots of smoke but hardly much cooking going on”.[25] This characterisation suits those in ZANU-PF who fear that the electorate would credit successes primarily to Tsvangirai and the MDC-T.[26] Likewise, strategists aligned with Mnangagwa calculate, failures of the inclusive government are more likely to cast doubt on Tsvangirai’s capacity to provide effective national leadership.[27]

Tsvangirai is also being prevented from demonstrating authority. He has not been able to chair a single cabinet session,[28] even though the GPA makes him deputy chairman of cabinet as well as prime minister and leader of government business in parliament. He should normally exercise the chair function in the president’s absence, but ZANU-PF argues at the GPA negotiations that allowing him to do so would make the two vice presidents, Joice Mujuru and John Nkomo, redundant, causing further tension in the already fractious party.[29] Consequently, those senior ZANU-PF members alternate in chairing the cabinet when Mugabe is absent. On 25 January, Mugabe issued a written order for all ministers to report to the vice presidents and their permanent secretaries, not to Tsvangirai, on the execution of government business. While the order was subsequently withdrawn, the MDC-T considered it a blatant attempt to neuter the prime minister’s office.[30]

In addition to frustrating the constitutional reform process so as to extend the lifespan of the inclusive government, a second strand of the strategy involves ensuring that parliament does not pass laws that would affect ZANU-PF control of state institutions.[31] Even though the two MDC parties together constitute a small majority in the legislature, only eight bills have been passed in more than a year, two of which were meant to facilitate formation of the inclusive government, and the parliament has limited its work days due to inadequate funding.[32] While ZANU-PF’s bloc has used parliamentary procedures to stall movement, this meagre legislative record is also partly the result of the MDC-T’s own failings (see below).

Mnangagwa supporters believe that despite its problems, the inclusive government could well limp on for a full term until 2013, with Mugabe at the helm, as the constituent parties have no better alternative.[33] They consider that this would give their camp time to regroup from its failure to tilt the balance of power at the ZANU-PF December 2009 congress, when it supported the unsuccessful candidacy of ZANU-PF Women’s League chair Oppah Muchinguri to oust incumbent Vice President Joice Mujuru.[34] They hope also that, after elections, they can dominate a new coalition government through alliance with MDC-M and perhaps even some MDC-T elements.

The Mnangagwa camp and its military allies, led by Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga, was behind the resolution at the December congress instructing Mugabe to make no further concessions on outstanding GPA issues until the MDC-T provides satisfaction on a number of ZANU-PF demands, including the removal of targeted Western sanctions against party leaders.[35]

2.  The Mujuru camp’s pragmatism

The Mujuru camp believes the successes the inclusive government has achieved and its ability to put a crimp in Mnangagwa’s presidential ambitions at the December congress have strengthened its chances to control the party and retain significant national power when Mugabe eventually retires or dies. Its dominance in the new politburo announced on 10 February 2010 by Mugabe confirmed that it is tightening its grip on the party leadership.

Mujuru supporters no longer call for Mugabe’s early exit, instead supporting him to stay until a moment of his own choosing.[36] This shift results from a conclusion that he is too strong to be forced out at present and that his continued prominence provides cover for their largely behind-the-scenes manoeuvres to consolidate their position for the eventual showdown with Mnangagwa. Consequently, the Mujurus seek to promote further achievements for the inclusive government and building lines to Tsvangirai and the MDC-T that could eventually result in a coalition. They realise that it would be difficult in the immediate term for any ZANU-PF candidate to beat Tsvangirai and the MDC-T in reasonably free and fair elections[37] but conclude that Zimbabwe is likely to need an inclusive government for at least the next decade regardless of which party does best in a national vote.[38]

This strategy requires Joice Mujuru, 54, to retain the country’s senior vice presidency, a position that gives her the inside track to ascend to the presidency if Mugabe retires or dies before the end of his term.[39] The current constitution provides that in such a contingency the senior vice president acts as head of state for a 90-day period followed by elections. The GPA stipulates that ZANU-PF would appoint a successor for the remainder of Mugabe’s term.[40] Because of her seniority, that would also favour Joice Mujuru.

In either event, the Mujuru camp considers that an alliance with Tsvangirai would be necessary to solidify Joice’s position. She herself has privately told supporters she would have no problem working with Tsvangirai in the post-Mugabe period, though in public she talks tough about the MDC-T leader. A senior ally in the ZANU-PF politiburo said, “she recognises Tsvangirai as an undeniable key player in Zimbabwe politics and in any future arrangement, hence strategic political relations are being cultivated across the party divide using the platform of the inclusive government”.[41] Cabinet ministers linked to the Mujurus have established a degree of confidential collaboration with their MDC-T counterparts and Tsvangirai to promote the reform agenda. This is still mainly preparatory and has not yet produced concrete legislative achievements, however, because the Mujurus rightly fear that to come into the open now would leave them vulnerable to criticism from the hawks within their own party.[42]

The Mujuru camp advocates a constitution providing for an executive prime minister and a president with considerably less power than at present.[43] Its assessment is that there will need to be a second inclusive government of some kind after Mugabe leaves the scene[44] and that such a constitutional arrangement would be advantageous under the two likeliest scenarios – both of which acknowledge that it may have to be content with the junior role in a partnership with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T. If the Mujurus lose the internal party battle to Mnangagwa, they might throw their support behind MDC-T in the elections and Tsvangirai as a strong prime minister in exchange for the backing of Joice as a relatively weak president. Even if the Mujurus win control of ZANU-PF, however, they doubt they could defeat Tsvangirai nationally, so the presidential post would be a reasonable second best in a political settlement to which they would bring their presumed ability to placate a critical mass of the military.[45]

A close Mujuru adviser summed up: “Tsvangirai and MDC-T would be key in any future dispensation, and our political strategies are alive to that reality”.[46]

3.  Clan politics and the Mugabe succession – the “Zezuru mafia”

The December congress that retained Mugabe at the helm of the party for another five years appeared to confirm the view that the octogenarian wants to die in office rather than face an uncertain future in retirement. Barring any major midstream leadership changes, Mugabe, who turned 86 on 21 February 2010, now seems likely to stand for re-election.[47] However, clan and regional fault lines that will influence the question of his eventual successor as party leader were also highlighted at the congress.

While Mugabe has kept his authority in the party in part by skilfully playing the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions against each other, he has also relied heavily on the fact that the presidium – the party president, two vice presidents and the national chairman – is dominated by members of his Zezuru clan. He used that connection again in December 2009 to keep his position unassailable. In particular, the Zezuru line-up in both the presidium and politburo beat back relatively marginalised clans, mainly the Karangas led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, who believe it is their turn to have more power.[48] A key consequence of this latest round of clan politics was, therefore, the strengthening of the Mujurus’ position vis-a-vis Mnangagwa.[49]

The Zezuru dominance results from the 1980 division of Zimbabwe into ten provinces. Mashonaland (Zezuru) was cut up into four provinces: West, East, Central and Harare; Matebeleland (Ndebele) into three: North, South and Bulawayo; and Masvingo (Karanga) into only two, Masvingo and Midlands, while Manicaland (Manyika) remained undivided.[50] On any decision in ZANU-PF, the Zezuru grouping, now headed by the Mujuru camp, has a virtual veto and needs only two other provinces to carry the day. Moreover, the strength of the Mashonaland East and Central vote for ZANU-PF in past national elections has increased the leverage of the Zezurus generally and the Mujuru camp specifically.

The Karangas, who are 35 per cent of the national population to the Zezurus’ 25 per cent, received none of the top five party posts at the 2004 congress and were determined to do better in December 2009.[51] By the eve of the congress, however, it was apparent they would fail. Basil Nyabadza resigned as party chairman for Manicaland in protest at what he described as a flawed nomination process and told Crisis Group: “Some leaders are like UN permanent Security Council members”,[52] a reference to Mugabe’s rigid allocation of presidium positions based on the ZANU/ZAPU 1987 unity accord. While the congress’s rejection of the Karanga-Mnangagwa initiative and confirmation of Zezuru dominance within the party gave the Mujuru camp an edge in the succession struggle,[53] it at the same time exacerbated clan tensions that risk erupting into conflict at the national level in the post-Mugabe era.

4. Tsholotsho II

Mnangagwa, 65, has the support of the ZANU-PF leadership in Manicaland, Midlands, Masvingo and Matebeleland South, but these provinces have been MDC-T strongholds in recent elections. This suggests that he starts well behind in any three-way national contest against Tsvangirai and Joice Mujuru. He is a resilient politician, however. Despite a series of setbacks in the past ten years, he continues to marshal support and remains a serious contender for power. Having been thwarted in the campaign to bring down Joice Mujuru at the December congress, his camp is having more success in its current campaign, called Tsholotsho II,[54] to return key allies – suspended or marginalised in the aftermath of the 2004 congress defeat – to influence in party structures.[55]

A Mnangagwa supporter in the ZANU-PF politburo said, “we are creating our party within the main party – it’s one of the strategies which we are crafting to ready ourselves for the challenges ahead to win the presidency”.[56] Mnangagwa is also using his defence minister portfolio to strengthen ties to the security establishment,[57] and his emissaries have even begun to explore possible alliances with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T, or at least some elements of that party.

Nothing is impossible in politics. There are no permanent friends or enemies. All options are open for consideration. Our Plan A is for our preferred candidate to ascend to power on his own. Our Plan B is to consider how we can forge an alliance with MDC-T and Tsvangirai, though this is still a remote possibility at this juncture.[58]

B. MDC-T

1. Advancing the inclusive government

The MDC-T leadership believes that it will ultimately be judged by the electorate on its record in office. As a result, it has been focused over the past year on pushing implementation of the GPA and making the inclusive government functional. Thus, it has given relatively little attention to growing the party by building alliances and to shoring up its structures countrywide. Tsvangirai considers that a successful inclusive government would pave the way for the MDC-T to take responsibilities more firmly into its hands after fresh elections, since it can prove to sceptics that it is competent and can be entrusted with stewardship of the country. He told Crisis Group:

We are in this inclusive government to restore political and economic stability and give Zimbabwe hope for a better tomorrow and a chance for a fresh beginning, and we believe, besides the setbacks and frustration, we have managed to do that in the past year. … Zimbabweans have seen a modest peace dividend and want more. Our challenge is to deliver on that front.[59]

The decision to enter government was driven by a pragmatic assessment that Mugabe, ZANU-PF hardliners and the security forces held a monopoly of force, were willing to use it against opponents and were favoured by Mbeki, the SADC mediator. The MDC-T calculated that in those circumstances, its capacity to effect change would be greater inside than outside government, and it believes that events are proving it correct.

The party is proudest of the inclusive government’s ability to overcome obstacles put up by the ZANU-PF hardliners and its limited financial resources to record some impressive economic gains. Finance Minister Tendai Biti said the MDC-T had managed “to stop the bleeding and to bring sanity to the governance of economic affairs under very difficult circumstances. … An economy works on the basis of predictability and trust, and what we have done in the past ten months is to bring predictability, consistency and therefore some legitimacy”.[60]

Though Biti added that the recovery is fragile, and more donor support is needed to sustain the momentum for change and avoid a relapse, [61] economic stability has caused Tsvangirai’s popularity to rise. A poll by the reputable Harare-based Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) in September found that 57 per cent would vote for Tsvangirai, 10 per cent for Mugabe in new elections.[62]

Tsvangirai believes that the international community should reward progress by extending aid for reconstruction and development. “There is no dispute in everyone’s assessment that there is, indeed, progress being made in Zimbabwe, and how do you reward that progress? By moving away from just humanitarian aid to economic growth, development aid and ensuring that any existing restrictions are removed”.[63] Attempting to walk a tightrope with its ZANU-PF partners in the inclusive government, the MDC-T wants the lifting of “non-personal sanctions” – those impacting government entities vital to economic recovery, such as the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe – but targeted measures retained on individuals who continue to block meaningful political reforms.[64] Tsvangirai has written to EU leaders, including UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, urging a general review of restrictive measures, while Biti requested the EU to free eight government companies from its sanctions.[65] On 15 February, the EU responded by renewing the sanctions regime for a year, while dropping nine companies from the list.[66]

2. The Tsvangirai/Mujuru axis

The MDC-T originally anticipated that the inclusive government would last at most two years, during which rapid political and economic reforms would be followed by fresh elections.[67] This expectation has been modified by political realities, and a senior Tsvangirai aide summed up the frustration: “You really wonder whether Mugabe is in charge. Maybe we should have directly negotiated with the military during the mediation, because they appear to be the ones calling the shots”.[68] Tsvangirai has suggested publicly that an early election might be necessary to break the impasse,[69] but this appears to be a tactic to put pressure on ZANU-PF. He realises that more time is required to democratise state institutions and put a new constitution in place, so the MDC-T may be prepared to stay in uneasy harness with ZANU-PF in the inclusive government for a full five-year term.[70]

Tsvangirai and his team are consequently taking a two-pronged approach, pushing for incremental gains on political reforms through the negotiation process, while seeking to take full charge of the economy through Biti’s finance ministry. Jameson Timba, the MDC-T deputy information and publicity minister, told Crisis Group:

We have ring-fenced the ZANU-PF economic tsar, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, and our minister, Biti, is in control. On that front, we have made huge strides because the treasury has reclaimed its power, which was not the case before. Now we are going to pitch the fight to expedite political reforms.[71]

Party strategists worry that if the inclusive government collapses before meaningful political reforms are implemented, elections would be held under the current constitution in an even more hostile environment conducive to ZANU-PF rigging than March 2008.[72] ZANU-PF hawks are mainly responsible for frustrating reforms, but the MDC-T shares blame for failing to lead in parliament, where it has not used the speakership and its plurality to initiate progressive legislation to open political space. It has not moved aggressively, for example, against restrictive laws like AIPPA and POSA. The MDC-M leadership has threatened its legislators with party expulsion if they get too close to the Tsvangirai wing of the once unified movement, and, as noted above, the Mujuru camp of ZANU-PF is not yet prepared to cooperate openly. But some MDC-T leaders in government and parliament appear satisfied with the temporary arrangement and the accompanying perks it provides. There are also allegations, as yet unproven, of corruption involving ministers and local councils the party controls.[73]

The MDC-T constitutional proposal – an executive prime minister and a weaker president – is similar to what the Mujuru camp supports, and Tsvangirai, like Joice Mujuru, has privately indicated to confidantes a willingness to work together.[74] However, Tsvangirai seeks to maximise his leverage by keeping options open, since both ZANU-PF factions are privately reaching out to him about possible post-Mugabe alliances.

MDC-T insiders told Crisis Group the past year has convinced Tsvangirai he would still need to work with some ZANU-PF elements after an electoral victory “to complete the transition and neutralise hawks in ZANU-PF and some elements in the securocrats who still control most key institutions”.[75] A close adviser said, “we would need to form a second inclusive government with some elements in ZANU-PF out of our own magnanimity to complete the transition and soft-land the crisis, even if we were to win outright in the next election”.[76] But worry about a military coup explains much of the MDC-T leadership’s interest in exploring a second inclusive government, in particular with the Mujuru camp, which commands loyalty from some influential generals.

C. MDC-M

The MDC-M faction, which has ten members of parliament, exercises limited influence and recognises that its very survival is heavily dependent on the durability of the inclusive government. While publicly stating that an early election would favour ZANU-PF, its leader, Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, acknowledges that he needs the full five-year term to raise his political standing and give the splinter party time to forge new alliances that might allow it to stay relevant in the post-Mugabe era. Mutambara’s claim that he and the party play a critical unifying role in the GPA and keeping the government functional despite Mugabe’s and Tsvangirai’s often tense relationship is less than fully persuasive in view of their unhelpful role in parliament.[77] Without solid grassroots support, it is most likely that the MDC-M will eventually collapse, with some leaders rejoining the larger MDC-T, a revived ZAPU[78] or ZANU-PF, depending on which faction gains control of the old ruling party. Industry and Commerce Minster Welshman Ncube, the MDC-M power broker, would favour collaboration and an inclusive government pact with the Mnangagwa camp.[79]

IV.   The Securocrat Problem

A. Opposition to the Transition Process and Hints of a Coup

After almost a year in the inclusive government, senior MDC-T officials told Crisis Group that they believe the greatest threat to the power-sharing coalition and to the country’s stability will come from leaders of the national security services who are refusing to accept the new dispensation.[80] One said:

We can implement the GPA to the last line, but if we don’t deal with the contentious issue of the security leadership in this country, we will be haunted by it at the next elections. We will have a Madagascar-like situation if the military is left with free rein to dictate and influence key decisions with regards to political developments in the country, including national leadership.[81]

In private discussions in South Africa, Tsvangirai and other senior MDC-T officials highlighted the issue of “phased security sector reform” as his principal concern in the run-up to new elections.[82]

Most observers believe that up to twenty high-ranking security officials (the “securocrats”) maintain a de facto veto over the transition process. Among those frequently cited as hardliners are Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri and Central Intelligence Organisation Deputy Director General Maynard Muzariri.

In hushed conversations, MDC-T officials and civil society activists express fears that a coup could come shortly after an MDC-T electoral victory or should Mugabe die in office. Mugabe has fully backed the military leadership, his last remaining line of loyal support given his fractious party, in part by ruling out attempts to carry out a security reform program. He left no doubts about this symbiotic relationship in his closing remarks to the ZANU-PF congress on 19 December 2009:

ZANU-PF as the party of the revolution and the people’s vanguard shall not allow the security forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any negotiations for the so-called security sector reforms. …That is the most dependable force we could ever have, it shall not be tampered with”.

The issue of the military command was not specifically addressed in the GPA negotiations. Still, the parties agreed to establish a new coordinating body for defence and security policy, the National Security Council (NSC), that would include Tsvangirai and his two deputy prime ministers and replace the ZANU-PF-dominated, secretive and abusive Joint Operations Command (JOC).[83] Over the past decade, the JOC has been behind the strategy of repression to keep Mugabe and ZANU-PF in power. It is the instrument through which Mugabe has masterminded the rigging of elections and the continuing wave of violent farm seizures. The fact that the NSC has met only once in the past year while the supposedly defunct JOC holds numerous weekly sessions with no MDC-T participation is deeply worrying. Most recently, the JOC was reportedly behind the January decision by the ZANU-PF politburo to make no further concessions to implement the GPA until sanctions are lifted.[84]

A number of generals are now contemplating moving into full-time politics in ZANU-PF, including Chiwenga, who is eyeing a leadership position in the party’s campaign in the new elections. This pattern underlines their determination to remain at the centre of national political and economic life.[85]

B. “Soft Landing” Considerations

The motives driving the senior security leaders to undermine the transition process and the inclusive government are diverse. In the past, they have reportedly benefited from packages administered by Reserve Bank Governor Gono through so-called “quasi-fiscal measures”, as well as largesse channelled through Mugabe’s wife, Grace, and Chiwenga.[86] A number of generals have reportedly built up substantial landholdings, either personally or through family members and other proxies, as a result of farm seizures ostensibly designed to assist the rural poor. Their desire to protect these holdings is a key reason ZANU-PF is opposing implementation of the GPA requirement to conduct a comprehensive land audit, since that exercise would expose these ownership patterns. Mugabe is reportedly still sustaining the livelihoods and patronage network of a small group of generals, mainly through proceeds from the controversial private sale of diamonds being mined in abusive conditions from the Marange fields in eastern Zimbabwe and through loans extended to the military by the Chinese government.[87]

Some senior security officials fear prosecution for gross human rights abuses committed in recent repression campaigns, especially those associated with the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as decades-old abuses, such as the killing of over 20,000 mainly Ndebele-speaking people in Matebeleland in the 1980s in a campaign known as Gukurahundi. Amnesties have been granted frequently in the post-independence period, including in 1980, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995 and 2000. The amnesty provision in 1990 provided a full pardon for security force members for any offense committed during “anti-dissident” operations “if that offence was committed in good faith for the purpose of or in connection with the restoration or maintenance of good order and public safety in Zimbabwe”.[88] Still, a number of senior security officials have quietly expressed concerns that such amnesties could be revoked under an MDC-controlled government and legislature and that these provisions do not afford protection from international prosecution.[89]

Others generals are motivated by a continuing sense of ideological fervour, viewing their acts of repression against “dissidents” and white farmers over the past three decades as simply a continuation of the liberation struggle of the pre-independence period. In the extreme, they believe that Tsvangirai and the MDC-T are mere puppets for white farmers and business interests, as well as foreign interests, especially British. They see themselves as the bulwark and Praetorian Guard of the revolutionary struggle, and thus handing over power to Tsvangirai, who has no liberation war record, would amount to selling out. One implication of this attitude is that these security officials would be loath to appear before anything resembling a truth and reconciliation commission and acknowledge their abuses, since they believe that their acts were not crimes but heroic feats to protect Zimbabwe from its enemies.

Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are increasingly debating the question of how to secure the retirement of these security officials during the life of the inclusive government.[90] Many are highly reluctant to consider any concessions to the officials, viewing them as rewards for past abuses and undercutting rule of law in a future Zimbabwe. While even these individuals see the threat from the generals, they also believe that the threat can be minimised by playing on the growing divisions between senior security officials and the rank-and-file military and police, who have themselves suffered under the economic implosion brought about by Mugabe and his cronies. Further, they doubt that concessions would have the desired effect, given the varied motivations of the generals and their scepticism regarding the permanence and utility of past amnesties.

Some suggest that security sector reform, leading to higher salaries, improved housing and educational benefits and a greater sense of pride in a professional security service, would better undercut the capacity of senior officers to use troops against a democratically-elected government.[91] Expanded international pressure on Mugabe and ZANU-PF to ensure the full functioning of the National Security Council, truly disband the Joint Operations Centre and proceed with the land audit to settle issues of ownership and compensation, if necessary, would go a long way toward diminishing the threat of the security officials.

At the same time, a number of MDC-T and MDC-M officials and human rights activists, including some who have suffered the worst of the abuses, have raised the possibility of arranging “soft landings” for the securocrats.[92] Persuading them to retire peacefully will not be easy, given their fears of the post-Mugabe era. Among the ideas being discussed is a new domestic amnesty for acts committed since the last amnesty in 2000, in exchange for the retirement of the officials, but revocable should they be found to be engaging in actions to thwart the transition to democratic governance. In keeping with past Zimbabwean practice, such an amnesty would not apply to so-called “specified offences”, such as murder, rape and theft of public property, nor would it protect the officials from international prosecution for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

Another idea being discussed is to allow the generals to keep their assets, including perhaps even their farmlands, by arranging legal transfer to them as retirement compensation, but also providing compensation to those illegally dispossessed. The U.S., EU and others could sweeten the deal by removing targeted sanctions on those who comply with its terms, since they would no longer be thwarting the transition.

It is unclear whether these measures, even in combination, would be sufficient to remove the threat posed by many of the incumbent leaders of the security forces. Having always associated the exercise of power with the use of force, they may never be satisfied that their economic interest and personal security could be adequately protected after they surrender their power.

V. The role of South Africa and SADC

Zimbabwe’s economic implosion and Mugabe’s increasingly authoritarian rule have had wide regional implications. The country traditionally was Southern Africa’s bread-basket, and its relatively modern infrastructure, extensive mining and manufacturing sectors, prosperous tourism and well-trained labour force helped anchor the region. With the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, many envisaged South Africa and Zimbabwe driving a broad regional market, complete with extensive energy and transport links. Instead, Harare has become a regional crisis and embarrassment. Up to four million Zimbabweans[93] – roughly a third of the population – have flooded across national borders due to political repression and absence of economic opportunities, affecting the stability of particularly South Africa and prompting xenophobic attacks by those fearing loss of jobs or a drain on social spending.[94] Similarly, South African business grew deeply concerned over the collapse of Zimbabwe’s mining, manufacturing, tourism and agriculture sectors and infrastructure, in all of which it has major investments.[95]

A month after the failed March 2008 elections and acting on behalf of SADC and the African Union, Thabo Mbeki launched the mediation that produced the GPA in September of that year. As described above, this mediation remains essential, because of the difficulties that immediately developed with GPA implementation and the operations of the inclusive government. Facing a political crisis at home that eventually led to his resignation as president, Mbeki did little further, but the advent of Jacob Zuma as his successor has changed the situation. While Zuma carefully refrained from challenging Mugabe or the new SADC president, the Congo’s Joseph Kabila, during the early September 2009 Kinshasa summit, he has subsequently displayed a refreshing engagement and toughness on the Zimbabwe account.[96]

In a clear break with the Mbeki team, Zuma appointed three of his most trusted and powerful advisers – international relations specialist Lindiwe Zulu, anti-apartheid veteran Mac Maharaj and former cabinet minister Charles Nqaqula – as his point-persons for the mediation process. Significantly, at SADC’s special summit on Zimbabwe in Maputo in November 2009, following the MDC-T’s suspension of its participation in the inclusive government, Zuma was reportedly firmer with Mugabe than anyone had been during the lengthy crisis, reaffirming that there was no alternative to the GPA and that a tough response would be forthcoming against any party that derailed it. “He told the three principals, including Mugabe, that with him at the helm of the mediation, it was no longer business as usual”.[97]

There is growing impatience among the South Africans with the slow pace of reform. Though it looks improbable, the mediation team indicates that all main outstanding issues should be resolved before June, when the football World Cup begins in South Africa: “We don’t want trouble in our backyard, especially this year when we host the World Cup, and our mediation team will work hard to ensure that key issues are out of the way before mid-year”.[98] The South African intelligence leadership has reinforced this message with all principals in the inclusive government,[99] and Zuma has publicly urged the three political parties in the power-sharing arrangement to resolve remaining issues in time for elections in 2011.[100]

The Zuma team considers that ZANU-PF and MDC-T have both been guilty of adding peripheral items to the negotiating agenda. Zuma has called on the principals to be more flexible and “park” a number of topics for the time being to allow progress.[101] A senior ANC executive member told Crisis Group:

The heart of the crisis in Zimbabwe centres around security issues which have closed political space and yielded disputed election outcomes for the past ten years. That’s what should consume our time in the mediation process. Getting Reserve Bank Governor Gono out today or arguing about the prime minister’s residence is not going to result in a free and fair election and a smooth transition”.[102]

Zuma’s mediation also includes an effort to deal with the securocrat problem. A selected group of retired generals from South Africa and other SADC countries are to hold discussions with senior Zimbabwean officers about the role of the military in a civilian-led government.[103] At the same time, Pretoria is working on issues related to a possible amnesty or other forms of immunity for the current security leadership in the post-Mugabe era. A senior official in the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s ruling party, explained:

The way the security leadership in Zimbabwe is handled is crucial to how a smooth transition process can be achieved. Our mediation process, as well as the main parties to the negotiations, cannot turn a blind eye to that critical element given Zimbabwe history. We can complete all the elements as outlined in the GPA, but if we don’t work on and begin to engage that sensitive issue now, it could create great instability and roll back all the gains which we would have achieved. We are very aware that is the crux of the matter, and we are exploring ways to delicately engage on this sensitive issue.[104]

In order to influence the emerging power dynamics in Zimbabwe, the Zuma administration has also deepened its relations with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T, while privately urging ZANU-PF to consolidate and clarify its own party succession plan.[105] A member of the ANC executive told Crisis Group that because his party was doubtful there would be a smooth political settlement after another round of elections or a Mugabe exit, it was drawing on its experience in ending apartheid to encourage a private dialogue between moderates in ZANU-PF and the MDC-T with a view to building support for a coalition government after the polls regardless of who wins.[106]

SADC as an organisation has continued to defer to South Africa on Zimbabwe policy, while calling for strict adherence to the GPA, continued negotiations on outstanding issues, new foreign assistance and investment and a lifting of Western sanctions. Many in Zimbabwe believe that only Zuma, among current southern African leaders, has the mix of political stature and revolutionary credentials to take a tough, effective line with Mugabe. While Mugabe is reportedly surprised and angered at his treatment by Zuma, recent progress, though slow and inconsistent, suggests the approach can work. Aware of the impact of Zimbabwe’s continuing crisis on his own country’s economic and social conditions, there are strong reasons for the South African president to remain engaged once the World Cup is over and indeed to adopt the even more assertive approach to the mediation and the parties that may be necessary to resolve the crisis.

VI. Conclusion

Zimbabwe remains at risk from the long legacy of misgovernment that produced the interlocking political, economic and humanitarian crises of the past decade. In addition to the challenges of governance and security highlighted in this briefing, any of a wide range of problems, singly or in common, could return it to the edge of collapse, particularly as long as Robert Mugabe remains head of state and his long-time ruling ZANU-PF party maintains its intransigent stance. The reformist MDC, split into sharply opposed factions, has performed reasonably in government, but has not seized the impetus for reform that seemed possible after it gained a parliamentary majority in 2008.

But despite its internal contradictions, the widely divergent ambitions of its three participating parties and the reluctance of donors to fully embrace it, the unity government has important achievements to its credit. The economy has gained a degree of stability, arbitrary political violence has been reduced, and a dialogue continues, with South African mediation, on the major political, constitutional and electoral issues. Even a bitterly divided ZANU-PF implicitly acknowledges the need for a generational change, and at least one of its two main contenders for Mugabe’s mantle is well into exploration of ways to come to terms with the main MDC wing and the transition process.

South Africa’s role remains vital, especially now that Jacob Zuma is bringing to it a more even-handed and energetic quality of engagement. Western governments need to offer complementary financial as well as political assistance, including the maintenance of targeted sanctions on the spoilers and the selective removal of corporate sanctions that stand in the way of economic growth. Above all, Zimbabweans themselves – both the parties in the inclusive government and broader civil society – must put the legacy of “divide-and-rule” politics behind them and learn basic lessons of cooperation essential for a successful democratic transition.

Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010

[2] The Global Political Agreement (GPA), which gave birth to the formation of the inclusive government, was signed on 15 September 2008. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°59, Engaging the Inclusive Government, April 2009.

[3] Zimbabwe Budget Statement 2010, 16 October 2009.

[4] “Biti allocates IMF U.S. $510 Million to Fiscus, Productive Sector”, The Herald, 30 September 2009.

[5] “Principals agree on Commission”, The Herald, 11 December 2009. Commission memberships were announced four days later.

[6] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF lead negotiator and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[7] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Harare, 6 January 2010.

[8] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF lead negotiator and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[9] “Constitutional outreach kick off”, The Zimbabwe Standard, 10 January 2010.

[10] Crisis Group interview, Ernest Mudzengi, coordinator, National Constitutional Assembly, Harare, 8 January 2010.

[11] Crisis Group interview, Paul Mangwana, ZANU-PF co-chairman, Constitutional Review Committee, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[12] Booklet on ZANU-PF position on the constitution-drafting process, February 2010, shown to Crisis Group.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Crisis Group interviews, senior MDC-T officials, 4-8 January 2010.

[16] A Gallup International poll released on 18 January 2010 indicated that Mugabe’s support is only slightly greater: 25 per cent.

[17] See Sections IV and V below.

[18] See GPA, preamble, p. 2.

[19] Crisis Group interviews, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 23 December 2009; intelligence official, Harare, 21 December 2009.

[20] Mugabe and the Mujurus belong to the same Zezuru clan. As discussed below, this clan, and not Mnangagwa’s Karangas, tends to dominate key ZANU-PF offices and institutions. Solomon Mujuru also played a vital role during the liberation struggle in persuading fighters to accept Mugabe’s rise to the party leadership.

[21] Crisis Group interviews, ZANU-PF politburo members and intelligence and military officers, Harare, 9-29 September 2009, 23 December 2009-10 January 2010.

[22] “Principals agree on appointment on Permanent Secretaries”, The Herald, 30 March 2009.

[23] Crisis Group interview, MDC-T cabinet minister, Harare, 21 November 2009.

[24] “Permanent Secretaries usurp Ministers Powers”, ZimOnline, 10 January 2010.

[25] “When leaders prove they are a big joke”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 8 October 2009.

[26] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[27] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF member of the commissariat department, Harare, 17 September 2009.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Pretoria, 12 January 2010.

[30] “Tsvangirai rejects Mugabe directive”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 4 February 2010.

[31] Crisis Group interview, senior military official, Harare, 2 January 2010.

[32] Crisis Group interview, Speaker of Parliament Lovemore Moyo, Harare, 17 September 2009.

[33] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 2 January 2010.

[34] “Mnangagwa faction crushed”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 19 December 2009.

[35] “Congress resolves that our negotiators cease to entertain any discussion on or negotiation of the resolution relating to the appointment of the governor of the Reserve Bank, Attorney General and the provincial governors as these issues fall outside the purview of the Global Political Agreement and have their solid statutory origins that protect them. There should be no movement on the concerns of the MDC formations without corresponding and simultaneous redress of ZANU-PF’s concerns such as the illegal western sanctions, western funded radio broadcasts and western interference in Zimbabwean internal politics through the funding of parallel government structures”. ZANU-PF Congress Resolutions, 13-15 December 2009. “No more outstanding issues”, The Herald, 10 August 2009. Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 25 September 2009.

[36]?Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 23 September 2009; “ZANU-PF endorses Mugabe for President”, The Herald, 12 September 2009.

[37] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member and adviser to Mujuru faction, Harare, 11 September 2009.

[38] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mujuru faction, Pretoria, 11 February 2010.

[39] At the ZANU-PF congress, the Mujurus obtained the endorsement of all the party’s provincial leaders for Joice to keep her position in the face of the Mnangagwa-Muchinguri challenge.

[40] See GPA, p. 3.

[41] Crisis Group interview, senior ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mujuru faction, Harare, 2 January 2010.

[42] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF cabinet minister linked to Mujuru camp, Harare, 17 September 2009.

[43] Crisis Group interview, member of Mujuru advisory group, Harare, 21 September 2009.

[44] “Given the political dynamics evolving, it is inevitable that there would be need for a second inclusive government post-Mugabe, regardless of which party or faction wins [elections]”. Crisis Group interview, member of Mujuru camp advisory group, Harare, 22 September 2009.

[45] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mujuru faction, Harare, 16 September 2009.

[46] Crisis Group interview, member of Mujuru camp advisory group, Harare, 22 September 2009.

[47] The ZANU-PF constitution states that the president of the party is automatically its candidate for the national presidency in an election called during his or her tenure, though the individual can choose to step down rather than perform this obligation.

[48] The Zezuru, Karanga and Manyika clans make up the Shona-speaking bloc in Zimbabwe. The other major linguistic grouping is that of the Ndebele from the Matebeleland provinces.

[49] The politburo is the party’s supreme policy-making body, made up of 40 members appointed by Mugabe in consultation with the presidium. Joice Mujuru is a leading member of both the presidium and the politburo. In addition to her and Mugabe, the other members of the presidium are Vice President John Nkomo and National Chairman Simon Moyo, both Ndebeles who owe their positions to the ZANU-PF/ZAPU 1987 Unity Accord.

[50] See “Zimbabwe National Geographical Map”, p. 11, local government and rural development ministry.

[51] Mugabe also regularly gives members of his tribe a large portion of key government, military and parastatal positions.

[52] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 22 December 2009.

[53] The Mujuru camp, with all four Zezuru-speaking Mashonaland provinces voting as a bloc, created alliances with the Matebeleland provinces to control the presidium elections.

[54] Tsholotsho I is the name given to the effort that former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo reportedly spearheaded in 2004 to defeat Joice Mujuru’s nomination to the ZANU-PF presidium.

[55] Among those in key party positions are former ZANU-PF lead negotiator and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa; former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo; Manicaland provincial chairman Mark Madiro (Nyabadza’s successor); former Matebeleland North Chairman Jacob Mudenda; Headman Moyo; Midlands Central Committee member and key adviser July Moyo; Deputy Minister for Energy Power Development Hubert Nyanhongo; war veterans leaders Jabulani Sibanda and Joseph Chinotimba; youth leader Edison Chakanyuka; former Masvingo provincial governor Josiah Hungwe; and Women’s League leaders Oppah Muchinguri, Shuvai Mahofa and Mabel Chinomona. A majority of key government bureaucrats are also linked to Mnangagwa including the chief secretary to the president and cabinet, Misheck Sibanda.

[56] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mnangagwa, Harare, January 2010. An intelligence officer offered a slightly different take, saying that Mnangagwa seeks to weaken Tsvangirai’s presidential chances by forging an alliance with the MDC-M and splitting the MDC-T. Crisis Group interview, Harare, 9 January 2010.

[59] Crisis Group interview, Johannesburg, 30 November 2009.

[60] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 22 September 2009.

[61] Ibid.

[62] See Mass Public Opinion Institute Survey, September 2009.

[63] Crisis Group interview, Johannesburg, 10 October 2009.

[64] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Pretoria, 7 November 2009.

[65] Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Harare, 8 January 2010.

[66] “EU renews sanctions on Mugabe and his cronies”, voanews
.com, 15 February 2010. The EU cited lack of speed in implementing the GPA and reforms as the basic for retaining the sanctions regime. The U.S. announced on 1 March that it would also continue its sanctions regime for another year. “U.S. extends Zim sanctions for another year”, Agence France-Presse, 2 March 2010.

[67] Crisis Group interview, Johannesburg, 10 October 2009.

[68] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 9 October 2009.

[69] “Tsvangirai says early elections could solve Zimbabwe’s political problems”, voanews.com, 5 February 2010.

[70] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Harare, 3 January 2010.

[71] Crisis Group telephone interview, 6 January 2010.

[72] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[73] “MDC-T Ministers under probe”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 15 January 2010.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 24 September 2009.

[76] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 10 October 2009.

[77] Crisis Group interview, Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, Harare, 21 November 2009.

[78] ZAPU is led by Dumiso Dabengwa, a former ZANU-PF politburo member who quit the party to revive the movement that was once led by the late Joshua Nkomo and merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

[79] Crisis Group telephone interview, MDC-M National Executive Council member, 20 January 2010. An electoral alliance with ZAPU to undercut MDC-T support in Matebeleland provinces is also said to be under consideration.

[80] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[81] Ibid. The Madagascar military forced the elected president, Marc Ravalomanana, from office in 2009 and installed opposition leader Andry Rajoelina.

[82] Crisis Group interview, senior official, South Africa international relations and cooperation department, 11 December 2009.

[83] Crisis Group interview, intelligence officer, Harare, 7 January 2010. The JOC is a national security organ chaired by Mugabe. Its membership includes the two vice presidents, the heads of the army, air force, intelligence, police and Reserve Bank, and the defence, state security, and home affairs ministers. It was inherited at independence from the Smith regime.

[84] “No further concessions until sanctions lifted”, The Herald, 1 February 2010.

[85] Crisis Group interview, senior military official, Harare, 8 January 2010.

[86] Crisis Group interview, senior military officer, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[87] Crisis Group interview, senior official, finance ministry, Harare, 3 January 2010.

[88] See “Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace”, The Legal Resources Foundation and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), a March 1997 report on the 1980-1989 disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands.

[89] Crisis Group interviews, senior military officer, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[90] Crisis Group interviews, senior MDC-T, MDC-M, ZANU-PF and civil society leaders, Harare, December 2009, January 2010.

[91] Crisis Group interview, member of MDC-T National Executive Council, Pretoria, 11 February 2010.

[92] Crisis Group interviews and discussions, Zimbabwe, November 2009, January 2010.

[93] “Four million Zimbabweans living in diaspora”, The Business Day, 16 December 2009.

[94] “Xenophobic attacks ignite in Cape Town”, The Star, 27 November 2009.

[95] “South Africa seeks investment protection with Zimbabwe”, The Business Day, 11 December 2009.

[96] Crisis Group interview, senior official, South Africa international relations and cooperation department, Pretoria, 21 December 2009.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Crisis Group interview, senior official, South Africa international relations and cooperation department, Pretoria, 12 January 2010.

[99] Ibid.

[100] “Zuma pushes for early election”, The Zimbabwe Standard, 10 January 2010.

[101] “Zuma calls for Tsvangirai to be flexible”, The Pretoria News, 15 January 2010.

[102] Crisis Group interview, member, ANC national executive, Pretoria, 16 January 2010.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 20 December 2009.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 15 January 2010.

MYN managed to raise R1000 from its members, most of who are not working and have no suitable income to support themselves. They know R1000 is nothing compared to what happened in Haiti and they wish they could help more. The situation needs people to come up with huge amounts of money so that the country can be rebuilt and to provide counseling because I do not think those people sleep well. The MYN is still waiting for other members to bring more donations, which will be forwarded to the victims via the SABC.

The group has plans to rebuild Matabeleland but they stopped concentrating on these plans to pass a helping hand to the Haitians. If people do not understand and fail to donate money to the people of Haiti, the whole country will fall apart and dead bodies will be left unattended, much like the twenty thousand bodies in Matabeleland. Even now you can find these bodies and bones in caves and during road construction. Such things can traumatize people for life. We have a reason to donate as we do not want bones of dead people to be seen around because the memory will always be there and people will find it difficult to forget. This is the situation for the people of Matabeleland. Until someone comes and apologizes and buries the dead bones, it will be difficult for people to forgive and forget. This was said by the MYN spokesperson.

I don’t know whether the Zimbabwean government made a donation to the Haitian victims and I will not be surprised if they do not bother themselves as they have tortured many of their own people. The other thing is they do not know what it is to be a victim; they are always victimizing. The MYN leaders have a vision to rule and be acceptable worldwide, unlike our leaders in Zimbabwe who do not have a clear understanding of other nations, even African countries. The organization claimed in future they would visit the embassy of Haiti to show their support and sympathy and to express their wish that this not happen again to any other country in the future.

These leaders want to bring back confidence to Matabeleland, which was tarnished by the Zanu sponsored dissidents and later Gukurahundi. This practice made Matabeleland very poor because it lost investor confidence in the early eighties. Now, by engaging in international disasters like Haiti, they are trying to make the world understand them and know their background, even though during the Matabeleland genocide, no other countries stepped in to help.

• The MDC is demanding drastic action against Zanu-PF youths who last week threatened Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai for not calling for the removal of targeted sanctions. The youths were marching in the capital on Wednesday in protest against the sanctions. They also detained a freelance photojournalist Andrison Manyere for filming the demonstration, but he was later released.

• President Robert Mugabe on Saturday defended the new indigenisation law that requires all foreign companies to be 51 percent locally-owned, and he also warned foreign investors to keep away from the country’s mineral wealth. He was speaking at celebrations to mark his 86^th birthday. Tsvangirai and his two deputies did not attend Mugabe’s lavish birthday party which is estimated to have cost up to US$500 000.

• China said last Monday its embassy in Zimbabwe had thrown a birthday party for Mugabe on Sunday. Chinese businesses are investing heavily in Zimbabwe.

• An MDC rally on Sunday in Epworth just outside Harare was violently disrupted when Zanu-PF supporters in a three-vehicle convoy allegedly drove at the crowd, resulting in a brawl that left many injured. The act was condemned by the MDC who insisted on Tuesday that the Zanu-PF supporters sparked the violence.

• US embassy economic advisor James Garry on Wednesday rejected suggestions that Zimbabwe was unable to access loans because of the targeted sanctions against Zanu-PF elite. He said even if Washington were to repeal the sanctions law, Zimbabwe would still not be eligible for financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other funders because of outstanding arrears.  In January, the African Development Bank said Zimbabwe’s debt of close to US$6 billion was too huge to allow the country to access new money.

• South African President Jacob Zuma will use his state visit to the UK next week to plead with the British government to remove targeted sanctions against Mugabe and his supporters.

• Zimbabwe’s constitutional committee has said it hopes to produce a new draft constitution by next February, which could see fresh elections, initially earmarked for 2011, further delayed.

Governance

• Mugabe on Friday said the government is doing its best to increase salaries and improve conditions for civil servants, and asked workers to be patient while the government stabilizes the economy.

• The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) has allegedly recruited hundreds of street vendors and illegal street dealers as informers to monitor the activities of MDC officials and supporters, as well as diplomats and trade unionists. The youths have allegedly received Zanu-PF ideological training and are considered reserve militia.

• A new report accuses Zimbabwe Cabinet ministers in the previous regime of plundering state assets prior to the formation of the unity government last year. The special report, compiled by the parliamentary committee on public accounts, also revealed the irregular appointment of more than 10 000 ghost workers, crippling the government’s capacity to pay civil servants.

• Zimbabwe Prison Services (ZPS) allegedly does not have vehicles to transport remand and convicted prisoners to jail or to trial. At times, the police are called in to assist ZPS in transporting the prisoners.

• State-owned Air Zimbabwe is to retrench a further 468 workers this year after it laid off 700 workers last year. The airline has also had to ground two of its three Chinese aircraft due to a serious shortage of spare parts and debt to the plane’s suppliers.

• Zimbabwe and Botswana made peace last week when they met after weeks of tension following the arrest of three Botswana game rangers.

Business

• Zimbabwe will impose a levy on foreign firms to compel them to comply with the new empowerment law. Indigenisation Minister Savior Kasukuwere also said the new empowerment law is only the beginning of legal interventions his ministry will undertake as it seeks to further indigenise the economy, 30 years after independence.

• Mugabe and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor Gideon Gono have reportedly differed on the indigenisation law, with Gono arguing that the act discourages investors. He has also said the law is being created by greedy Zanu-PF officials who want to grab companies for free, in the same way that they appropriated white-owned farms.

• South African mining group African Rainbow Minerals is facing resistance from its shareholders to invest in Zimbabwe. Shareholder Anglo-Rand Financial Services (ARFS) is objecting to the initiative to invest in Zimbabwe’s platinum group metals, citing the new indigenisation law as a concern.

• About 78 percent of exhibition space for this year’s Zimbabwe International Trade Fair (ZITF) has been taken up, with seven African and Asian countries having already confirmed their participation.

• Nigerian immigrants with businesses in Zimbabwe said they were taking the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) to court over its threats to grab their businesses in the name of black empowerment.

• Zimbabwe’s largest auto assembler, Willowvale Motor Industries, is on the verge of collapse due to a US$3.4 million debt to its principal supplier in Japan.

Economy

• The Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) regulations will be finalized this year to provide the necessary legislation to help grow the sector. The new regulations are a component to the strategic plan launched on Monday designed to create an enabling environment for the growth of the industry.

• The African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) has teamed up with pan-African housing finance company Shelter Afrique to provide funding for the country’s tourism industry.

• The Consumer Council of Zimbabwe said prices of basic commodities rose 20.5 percent from January to February, placing pressure on low-income families.

• The Zimbabwe government is losing more than 30 percent of its annual revenue to widespread tax evasion due to “trade mispricing”, a new study by a US think-tank revealed last week. The study by Washington-based Global Financial Integrity (GFI) shows that Zimbabwe tops the list of countries that recorded the largest tax revenue losses as a percentage of total government income between 2002 and 2006, losing US$225 million over the five-year period.

• Zimbabwe’s government is earning only US$100 million per month, 65 percent of which goes to wages, Finance Minister Tendai Biti told said on Thursday. He also said Western donors are ready to cancel Zimbabwe’s US$6 billion foreign debt if the country declares itself a heavily indebted country, but Zanu-PF is firmly opposed to the idea.

• Zimbabwe is seeking US$135 million from two African financial institutions to deal with the debilitating nationwide power shortages. Zimbabwe’s state power utility ZESA said it would bring all the units of its Hwange power station back into operation by the end of March.

Agriculture

• The entire leadership of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers’ Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) are in hiding after a series of arrests, raids and threats against them by Mugabe’s Joint Operating Command (JOC), lawyers said Sunday. The interrogations and threats followed the release of a documentary, “House of Justice”, that the union produced exposing the lawlessness and violence of Mugabe’s land seizures.

• South Africa’s High Court on Thursday upheld a ruling by the SADC Tribunal outlawing Zimbabwe’s land reform programme and paving the way for white commercial farmers who lost property under the chaotic land grab to file for compensation in South African courts. The ruling means that farmers can attach Zimbabwe government-owned property in South Africa as compensation for lost farms.  The Zimbabwe High Court in a ruling last month refused to enforce the SADC Tribunal judgement.

• Zimbabwe is taking legal action to recover US$3 million owed by Zambia for maize delivered prior to the land invasions a decade ago.  Last year, Zambia donated maize to the Zimbabwean government to ease massive food shortages.

• The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has been sued by Seed Co. International of Botswana, one of the largest maize and small grain seed suppliers in the Southern African region, over an outstanding US$3.6 million debt.

• Zimbabwe has declared 11 percent of its 2009/10 planted maize crop a failure after it was badly damaged by a dry spell, and has repeated calls for urgent imports, a crop assessment report has shown.  There has been widespread theft of irrigation equipment and general vandalism of infrastructure by new farmers and the Mugabe elite.

Law

• On Wednesday the Zanu-PF dominated Senate forestalled the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Amendment Bill through proposed amendments apparently meant to weaken it further. Zanu-PF once again adjourned debate on the bill, which aims to limit the Reserve Bank governor’s considerable powers, to March to allow them further time to study it.

• The treason trial of Deputy Agriculture Minister (designate) Roy Bennett was adjourned until next Monday after his defence declared the state witness not suitably qualified to assess the authenticity of email evidence against Bennett.

Diamonds

• Mines minister Obert Mpofu said Zimbabwe would pull out of the Kimberley Process (KP) if the diamond regulatory body finds the country has failed to comply with its regulations. Mpofu said Zimbabwe would continue to sell its gems to diamond trade markets.

• Mpofu has complied with a Supreme Court order instructing him to return diamonds from the Marange field to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, from which he removed the gems last month. The court had ordered the 300,000 carats of diamonds to be held by the central bank pending resolution of a suit against the government by UK-based African Consolidated Resources (ACR) over contested mining rights.

• The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions has called for an investigation into mining of diamonds at Chiadzwa, adding that diamonds should be bought and sold in a transparent matter that will benefit the country.

• Leaders in the global diamond industry are condemning the KP for allowing Zimbabwe’s diamonds to reach the consumer market. Online American jeweller Brilliant Earth said the KP was misleading consumers when labeling the diamonds as “conflict-free.”

• Human Rights Watch (HRW) said last Friday the KP was failing in its core mission following its failure to ban diamonds mined from Marange.

• The Zimbabwe-Russia Mining Protocol has been jeopardized after a Russian company pulled out, citing the controversy surrounding the Marange blood diamonds as its reason.

Health

• About 50 percent of children and teenagers admitted to hospitals in Zimbabwe are HIV positive, a new British study has revealed. Conducted by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), the study reveals the growing crisis of HIV infection acquired at birth in developing countries.

• Aid agencies operating in Zimbabwe have been urged to take antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) directly to people infected with HIV/AIDS amid allegations that some state officials involved in the distribution system were corrupt. The drugs are allegedly being sold on the black market in Mbare, a high-density suburb of Harare.

• The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as well as other organizations in the health sector have embarked on an intensive vaccination programme following a measles outbreak which has hit 28 of Zimbabwe’s 62 districts and is still spreading.

Humanitarian

• An ex-UN official, Zimbabwean Dr Georges Tadonki, is due to give evidence against Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, showing that Ki-Moon and other senior officials blocked cholera relief efforts in 2008 that could have stopped the deaths of 4 000 people.

• UNICEF’s regional child protection advisor for East and Southern Africa, Cornelius Williams, said between 3 000 and 15 000 Zimbabwean children move into and out of South Africa every month. He said the movement of unaccompanied children was one of the biggest problems confronting humanitarian agencies in the region.

Violence

• Human rights group ZimRights said armed Zanu-PF militia have set up torture camps in parts of Mashonaland West, Midlands and Manicaland provinces to threaten villagers if they denounce the Zanu-PF backed Kariba Draft constitution.

• The police have been accused of beating to death Wilson Sabun and of attempting to cover up the act by holding onto the postmortem results. Sabun was arrested at his house in Mutare on January 15 on allegations he impersonated a police officer.

Media

• Dumisani Sibanda, news editor with the state-owned Sunday News weekly, was elected the new Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ) president following a re-election in Bulawayo on Saturday. Sibanda replaces Mathew Takaona, who has headed the union since 1999.

• Alpha Media Holdings (AMH), the publishers of the Zimbabwe Independent, the Standard and NewsDay, have appointed new editors for the newspapers in a restructuring exercise to position the company for a more liberal media environment.

Diaspora

• Zanu-PF has proposed in its nationality programme that only children born in the Diaspora be allowed dual citizenship. If this regulation is adopted, it could affect Zimbabweans living abroad who have taken up foreign citizenship. This has been interpreted as a method of stripping diasporeans of their nationality and thereby reducing voter numbers.

The Good News

• The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) has begun working on a case in which a Zimbabwean exiled lawyer, Gabriel Shumba, wants the Zimbabwean government to be held liable for torture.  The government denies the torture ever happened, despite evidence in the form of medical affidavits and records.

• The U.S. Embassy on Thursday honoured five Zimbabwean students for essays about their hopes following the election of Barack Obama as US president in 2009. The students received certificates, books, and cash prizes, while their schools will receive reference book collections for their libraries.

Source:  Zimbabwe Democracy Now

www.zimbabwedemocracynow.com

The case, brought on behalf of the applicants, Louis Fick, Michael Campbell and Thomas Etheredge by South African human rights organisation Afriforum sought to have the ruling by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) tribunal against Zimbabwe’s land reform programme registered, paving the way for the seizure of government assets.

In 2008 the SADC tribunal upheld the claims of 79 landowners and held that that the seizure of land by the Government of Zimbabwe was arbitrary, racially discriminatory and contrary to the rule of law.

At the time President Robert Mugabe and his Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa rejected the SADC Tribunal rulings as not binding on Zimbabwe.

A further blow was dealt in January when in Zimbabwe’s High Court Justice Barack Patel dismissed the finding by the SADC tribunal which had ruled that Robert Mugabe’s land grab campaign was unlawful.

This latest judgement confirms the original SADC Tribunal ruling and opens the door to the seizure of Zimbabwe government assets by way of compensation for affected farmers.

Over 4500 white farmers will now have some recourse to justice as to date there has been no compensation paid for improvements to the land such as dwellings and other infrastructure despite promises made by the government of Zimbabwe.

It is also hoped that the latest ruling will halt the continued farm invasions and human rights abuses which are still taking place.