“We say to hell, to hell, to hell with them.” – Robert Mugabe1

ZANU PF supporters have on several occasions expressed the wish that President Robert Mugabe die in office.2 With speculation about Mugabe’s ill health rife3 and more plausible than usual, it is interesting to consider the legal position and what ought4 to happen in terms of the current constitution if Mugabe were to die today.

Section 29(3)(b) of the Constitution provides that if the president becomes incapable of performing the duties of his office by reason of mental or physical incapacity he will cease to hold office if a joint committee of the Senate and House of Assembly formed at the request of a two thirds majority of Parliament so recommends. This provision was supplemented in 2007 by Constitutional Amendment No 18,5 drafted specifically with the possibility of Mugabe’s sudden death or retirement in mind. Section 28(2)(b) of the current constitution now provides that if the office of the president becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation or removal from office, the two Houses of Parliament will come together as an electoral college to elect a new president. The new president will remain in office until the next election.6 If these provisions are implemented, given the intense jockeying that is like to take place to fill this immensely powerful post, the procedure to be followed is of some interest.

The election of the president through the Parliamentary Electoral College must take place within 90 days of the death or resignation. The procedure to be followed is set out in the Fifth Schedule to the Electoral Act.7 The Clerk of Parliament plays an extremely important role in this regard.

He8 sets the date of the election on not less than 14 days notice and simultaneously invites nominations for the post from members of Parliament.9 10 Candidates must have at least 25 nominators and must signify their acceptance of the nomination in writing. The Clerk of Parliament, whose decision is subject to review by the Supreme Court, may reject any nomination which does not comply with the Act.11 Where there is more than one candidate a vote then takes place, with the House of Assembly as the preferred venue, and presided over by the Chief Justice.12 Half the members of the Electoral College constitute a quorum, but, if there is no such quorum, the matter is simply adjourned for an hour and those present thereafter constitute a quorum.13

Voting is not secret. The Chief Justice directs persons to gather in blocs in parts of the House allocated to each candidate and for whom they wish to vote. One member of the bloc is appointed to compile a register of number of persons and their names in his or her candidate’s bloc.14 The tally of supporters in each bloc is then given to the Chief Justice, who announces the figures. If no candidate receives an absolute majority of votes, the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated and the process repeated until such a majority is achieved.15 If there are only two candidates, who receive an equality of votes, the process is repeated over and over, with such adjournments not exceeding 48 hours as the Chief Justice may determine, until one candidate has attained majority. The Chief Justice announces that candidate as duly elected as president.16 Lists of those comprising the voting blocs, indicating who voted for whom is entered into the Journals of both Houses.17 However, since the enactment of the Constitutional Amendment No 19, (which incorporated, almost verbatim, Article 20 of the appallingly drafted Inclusive Political Agreement) little is clear and free from ambiguity in relation to the composition of Zimbabwe’s government.

One of the most glaring anomalies is that Zimbabwe’s constitution is unique in that it does not merely provide that Zimbabwe is to have a president, but it is a constitutional requirement that the president is a specific individual, Robert Gabriel Mugabe.18 On the death of Mugabe there can be no compliance with this provision. It is unusual that constitutional provisions are drafted in such a way that their implementation may be avoided on account of vis maior (an act of God). However, from this provision it may be inferred that the legislature did not contemplate that the post of presidency would be occupied by any other person during the subsistence of the Global Political Agreement (GPA19), and thus that no provision was made for the contingency of Mugabe’s death. It is then arguable that Article 20.1.10 of Schedule 8 to the Constitution was not intended to apply to the presidency. Article 20.1.10 provides: In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 and 20.1.9 above, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising. The office of president is a post referred to in clause 20.1.6. If it is held that this clause does apply to the presidency any vacancy arising through the death of Mugabe, must be filled by a nominee of ZANU PF. The provisions of Schedule 8 to the Constitution “shall, during the subsistence of the Interparty Political Agreement, prevail notwithstanding anything to the contrary in [the] Constitution.”

However, a further question arises as to whether 20.1.10 is intended to replace the provisions relating to the Parliamentary Electoral College or to exist alongside them. If they are to replace the provisions, then ZANU PF may nominate a replacement for Mugabe, and the nominee is presumably sworn in as president as if elected without further ado. This interpretation should not be accepted lightly. An enormous amount of power is concentrated in the presidency. Section 28 of the Constitution requires that the president is democratically elected either through a national election or through an electoral college comprising primarily democratically elected representatives of the people. The effect of this interpretation is that these democratic provisions are excluded in favour of a provision which allows the president to be selected by a party cabal, and the person so selected may lawfully continue in office until 2013 or the next election.20 This clearly subverts normal democratic practice.

However, there is no need to interpret Article 20.1.10 in this manner. Article 20.1.10 is not “contrary to something elsewhere in the constitution” and does not contradict the provisions relating to an Electoral College. Reading the provisions together would merely create a requirement that only ZANU PF nominees may be submitted to the Clerk of Parliament as candidates for election by the Electoral College to ensure that the vacancy is filled by a nominee of ZANU PF.

To summarise, as the constitution now stands it is unclear whether Article 20.1.10 applies to the presidency. If it does not, any Member of Parliament able to muster the endorsement of 25 other Members may submit nominations for election to the presidency through the Parliamentary Electoral College. If 20.1.10 does apply, it is unclear whether the law requires simply that a ZANU PF nominee is appointed as president without further ado, or whether the law requires that an election is conducted through Parliament acting as an electoral college, but with only ZANU PF nominees as candidates.

This ambiguity in the law to be followed upon Mugabe’s sudden death, when considered alongside the uncertainties of ZANU PF’s succession politics,21 has the potential to turn the merely messy into the thoroughly chaotic, as each contender endeavours to apply an interpretation of the law which is most advantageous to him or her. Past displays of ruthlessness by competing factions within ZANU PF over the succession issue suggest that this is not a prospect to be welcomed.

There is no constitutional requirement that the nominee submitted by ZANU PF for appointment as president is the person who succeeds Mugabe as leader of ZANU PF in terms of ZANU PF’s Party Constitution. There is also no provision in Zimbabwe’s Constitution indicating who has the authority to submit the name of the ZANU PF candidate as nominee to fill the vacancy, the assumption being that this would be determined by ZANU PF as a party and more particularly, that Mugabe would represent ZANU PF for the purpose of submitting nominations for executive vacancies.

The ZANU PF constitution also contains no clear provisions as to what is to happen on the demise of its president.22 The president is elected by the National People’s Congress.23 This Congress convenes every five years and the 230 member Central Committee is mandated to act on behalf of the Congress when it is not in session. Fissures with ZANU PF might develop into open rifts within the Central Committee, which may be unable to reach consensus on the ZANU PF nominee. Rival groupings may both claim the right to put forward a candidate for immediate appointment as President in terms of Article 20.1.10.

In this situation a faction or factions of ZANU PF may seek to exploit the ambiguity of the law outlined above, and, if they feel that their favoured candidate will not be put forward under 20.1.10 as the sole and most probable electee may demand that the competing nominees face an election through the Parliamentary Electoral College, arguing, as they would have every right to, that this is the correct and lawful procedure to be followed.

At this juncture it is also worth noting that the provisions of Article 20.1.10 only have application during the subsistence of the GPA. If the GPA has terminated due to the withdrawal of any party (and there is no legal impediment to a party so doing), then the constitutional requirements of convening an electoral college must be implemented and nominees will not be restricted to persons from ZANU PF. If MDC-T shows more chutzpah than it has hitherto, it may insist that Article 20.1.10 has no application to a vacancy in the presidency or decide to withdraw from the GPA precisely so that Article 20.1.10 has no application and its own nominees might be advanced as candidates to the Electoral College. Once again, matters could get extremely messy juridically. If MDC-T withdraws from the GPA after the death of Mugabe, but before the appointment of a replacement it is unclear whether Article 20.1.10 should still have effect, or whether it will fall away and the constitutional provisions relating to the Electoral College have sole, unadulterated application. In other words does one apply the constitutional provision prevailing at the time of Mugabe’s death or at the time of determining the replacement?

Given the current composition of the Houses of Parliament, in the event of an electoral college being convened, the MDCs’ position will present possibilities for manoeuvre. The 100 seat Senate comprises 60 elected seats, 10 provincial governors, 12 appointed seats and 18 chiefs. Of the 12 appointed seats, four must be nominees of MDC-T and two nominees of MDC-M. The House of Assembly has 214 seats, 210 of which are elected, while one Vice-President, the Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers hold seats ex officio.24

Due to vacancies arising from the death and suspension of some Members, the current party voting strengths in the House of Assembly are MDC-T 96; ZANU-PF 96; MDC-M 7, a total of 199 Members. In the Senate the MDC-T has 27, the MDC-M 8 and ZANU PF 29 elected and appointed Members. The remainder of sitting Members comprise 10 Provincial Governors and 17 traditional Chiefs making a total of 91 sitting members.25 Mugabe has extensive powers over the appointment and dismissal of Chiefs 26 and all Provincial Governors in the Senate are Mugabe appointees.27 On the basis of their past records, the Chiefs and Governors can be expected to vote with ZANU PF. On this basis the combined voting strengths in the two Houses sitting as an electoral college is the MDC formations 138 (15 MDC-M) and 152 ZANU PF.

ZANU PF thus has a narrow margin of a 14 seat majority by virtue of the presence of Governors and Chiefs in the Senate (and therefore the Electoral College). The significance of the manner in which these appointments are made thus comes to the fore. Article 20.1.3(p) of Schedule 8 to the Constitution and section 115 of the Constitution together require that any appointments made by Mugabe in terms of any Act of Parliament be made with Tsvangirai’s consent. The appointment of both Governors and Chiefs are made by Mugabe in terms of Acts of Parliament and thus both require Tsvangirai’s consent. Mugabe has refused to follow this constitutional requirement in regard to the appointment of Governors (a matter of some current controversy) and Tsvangirai has not attempted to seek compliance in regard to the appointment of Chiefs. Leaving the dispute over the appointment of the Governors to SADC, rather than testing this in the courts, may thus not be the wisest course of action for MDC-T.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that in a poll by the Parliamentary Electoral College to choose between several ZANU PF candidates competing for the presidency, it would be numerically possible for the MDC-T, MDC-M or either party alone to determine the outcome. One would expect the MDC to provide support to one candidate or the other only in exchange for some political concessions relating to the powers of the future president and the governance of the country.

However, these legal niceties are unlikely to find traction in the less subtle realm of Zimbabwe’s present political milieu. A powerful political cabal within ZANU PF will most probably impose its anointed successor claiming the authority of Article 20.1.10 to do so. This cabal may have the political power and brute force to swiftly crush any rivals seeking to advance an alternate person or process to determine the succession. And if it has the power to rapidly impose its will in this manner, so too will it have the power to ensure that the advent of democracy in Zimbabwe is indefinitely delayed.

Notes:

1 Mugabe, at the burial of his sister Sabina on 01.08.10, giving instructions to Western powers, – perhaps directing them to the most probable venue for his next round of negotiations with them on “sanctions”. Mugabe is a practising Catholic. The issue of eternal damnation is obviously much on his mind, as he frequently mentions “hell” in conjunction with the West, aid and “sanctions” – see for example To Hell with Western Aid, Says Mugabe The Zimbabwe Independent 09.07.10
2 Let Mugabe Die in Office, Says Moyo The Standard 26.09.10
3 Mugabe Losing Cancer Battle http://www.zimdaily.com/beta/news276244.html 25.08.10.
4 The word is selected as it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that those interested in assuming power might declare the constitution suspended and place Zimbabwe under formal military rule.
5 Act No 11 of 2007.
6 Section 29(1) of the Constitution.
7 Chapter 2:13.
8 Currently a male, Mr. Austin Zvoma.
9 Paragraph 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Fifth Schedule.
10 Paragraph 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Fifth Schedule.
11 Paragraph 3(5) and paragraph 3(8) of the Fifth Schedule.
12 Paragraph 5(a) of the Fifth Schedule.
13 Paragraph 6(2) of the Fifth Schedule.
14 Paragraph 7(1)(a) of the Fifth Schedule.
15 Paragraph 8(1)(b) of the Fifth Schedule.
16 Paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Fifth Schedule.
17 Paragraph 9(2) of the Fifth Schedule.
18 Article 20.1.6(1) of Schedule 8 to the Constitution – the provisions of the Kenyan Constitution establishing a unity government contain no equivalent provision. It is also a constitutional requirement that the Prime Minister is Morgan Tsvangirai, and no one else.
19 This is the term generally applied to what is more correctly the Inclusive Political Agreement.
20 There is considerable speculation as to when the next elections will be held, though there is no legal requirement to hold elections before 2013.
21 Zanu Must Conclude Succession Debate ASAP http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6319 03.09.10.
22 The Constitution of ZANU PF is a skeletal document, bereft of detail, though the constitutional procedures of the party have presumably been elaborated in party resolutions.
23 The composition of which is undefined in ZANU PF’s constitution.
24 If the persons appointed to these posts already held seats in Parliament, the appropriate party may nominate a non-constituency member to the House where they held a seat (one of the 12 appointed seats in the Senate is such a seat). Only those in these posts who were not members of parliament become ex officio members of the House of Assembly – Article 20.1.8 of Schedule 8 to the Constitution.
25 The figures are from Veritas Bill watch 30/2010.
26 The President appoints Chiefs in terms of section 3 of the Traditional Leaders Act [Chapter 29:17] though “wherever practicable” he must appoint a person nominated by the appropriate persons in the community concerned and in accordance with customary laws of succession. The 18 Chiefs in Parliament comprise the President and Deputy President of the Council of Chiefs and two Chiefs from each of the eight non-metropolitan provinces (sections 34(1)(c) and (d) of the Constitution) chosen by an electoral college comprising the provincial assemblies of Chiefs (section 40(b) of the Electoral act [Chapter 2:13]).
27 The Provincial Governors were appointed by Mugabe in August, 2008 under section 4 of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act [Chapter 29:11]. Their term of office being two years (under section 6) these posts are technically vacant, and so too, then, are these Senate seats.

Almost ten years younger than the President, Sabina was the mother of Leo Mugabe, Patrick Zhuwao and Robert Zhuwao. Her nephew is the prominent and controversial businessman Philip Chiyangwa.

In 1985, Sabina served as a Member of Parliament for Makonde East and was subsequently legislator for Zvimba South constituency between 1990 and 2008. She was also the Zanu PF Women’s League national secretary for production and labour.

During her time in active politics, Sabina was described as being an integral part of the Mugabe political dynasty.

She withdrew from active politics two years ago, shortly before the controversial elections in 2008.

Prior to independence in 1980, Sabina taught dressmaking to aspiring entrepreneurs from the townships around Harare (then Salisbury).

It was Sabina who gave Robert Mugabe the tragic news of the death of his three-year-old son, Nhamo, from encephalitis in December 1966. The toddler had passed away at the home of his maternal grandparents in Ghana.

At the time, Mugabe was in detention and had been moved from the Midlands to Salisbury Remand Prison.  Despite Sabina’s efforts, he was inconsolable and struggled to come to terms with the tragedy and the fact that he had seen so little of his son.

After Mugabe’s release from prison in 1974, the church gave him an office in Silveira House, where his sisters Sabina and Bridget were employed to work on women’s development programmes.

According to a Catholic churchman interviewed by journalist and author Heidi Holland, Sabina in the latter years turned into a different person, barely recognisable as the gentle woman they had known.

In November 2000, nine months after the farm invasions began, Sabina, then Zanu PF MP for Zvimba South, and Agness Rusike, a war veteran leader, united to lead a terror campaign against white commercial farmers and their farm workers in the Norton district, 40 km south west of Harare.

Travelling in an official black Mercedes Benz, they urged black squatters to grab white-owned farmland for themselves.  One of the farms targeted was that of Terry Ford (55) whom they visited in tandem with a large truckload of militant youths.

Sabina insisted she would take over the house and furniture of Ford’s aunt, who had died a few months earlier.  Further threats ensued and soon afterwards, Ford’s farm equipment was confiscated.

Four months later, Terry Ford’s battered body was found beside the gate of his homestead on Gowrie farm.  After the vicious beating he had been shot in the head.  Earlier that night, the house had been surrounded by militants and the police had refused to assist.

The photograph of Ford’s beloved Jack Russell, Squeak, curled up on the blue bedspread covering his master’s body, focused international attention on the tragic events taking place across Zimbabwe.

On a list of the people who have taken over farms and are multiple farm owners, Sabina is noted down as having three farms. The document was released in November 2009 by human rights activists.

The Zanu PF politburo has agreed that Sabina will be declared a national heroine and will be buried at the Zimbabwe National Hero’s Acre on Sunday.

Zimbabwe Democracy Now

www.zimbabwedemocracynow.com

May 12, 2010

The reality of thousands of survival migrants and refugees arriving and existing on the margins in South Africa is grim.

In June 2009, Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) released a report, No Refuge, Access Denied, which outlined the severe risks Zimbabweans took in order to cross the border, the dangerous conditions under which they lived once they reached South Africa and their lack of access to health care. Almost one year later, their situation remains dire. They still lack access to proper health care, shelter and safety, while also facing violence, police harassment and xenophobic attacks. Formal legal status to be in the country is often difficult to obtain, if not impossible. Gangs prey on them when they cross the border. Many of them, as well a vulnerable South Africans, face further threats living in appalling conditions, particularly in derelict buildings in Johannesburg where they try to find shelter.

MSF has been running two projects in South Africa since 2007 to respond to the health needs of survival migrants and refugees. The MSF clinic in Musina near the border with Zimbabwe and the MSF clinic in Johannesburg provide primary health care, mental health support and referrals to hospitals and specialised facilities including for chronic conditions such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In Musina, staff also run mobile clinics to nearby farms where many of these vulnerable migrants work.

This document focuses on the perilous journey of many people crossing into South Africa and the appalling living conditions they later face, as well as what MSF sees as their precarious health situation. As a medical organisation, MSF continues to express grave concern for the health and lives of thousands of survival migrants and refugees. The threat of sexual violence for those crossing the border from Zimbabwe must be acknowledged. They need access to a formal status to be legally allowed in the country so they are not forced to cross the border irregularly and be exposed to this extreme violence. Access to both emergency shelter and primary health care should be ensured for survival migrants, refugees and vulnerable South Africans living in dangerous shelters in Johannesburg.

MUSINA: Fleeing hardship and crossing into uncertainty and legal limbo

Despite the establishment of Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity in February 2009, people there are still living in a state of a humanitarian crisis and continue to flee daily across the border into South Africa. An average of 300 people a day, largely Zimbabweans, apply for asylum at Musina Department of Home Affairs Refugee Reception Office.

Among them, many unaccompanied minors, who are particularly vulnerable and have specific health as well as safety and security needs. Most children cross the border alone – either because their parents send them to South Africa to earn money to subsidise their family, or to join relatives who have already arrived in South Africa. Many come looking for an education.

Getting into South Africa is a journey full of hurdles for everyone trying to cross the border from Zimbabwe. Obtaining a passport costs $150 US, rendering it out of reach for the majority who are unemployed. People are then forced to cross irregularly through the Limpopo River and the bush, placing themselves at risk of falling victim to violent criminals on both sides of the border. While the Department of Home Affairs promised a year ago to create a special dispensation permit to ease the process for migrants crossing the border, this has never been implemented.

In Musina, people can in a one-day process apply for asylum in South Africa. This allows them to move on to other parts of the country before needing to attend an interview which determines whether or not they are granted refugee status. Some try to find temporary work on farms near the border. Less than one per cent of applicants are granted refugee status at the end of the procedure. Those rejected have no formal legal status even if they cannot be deported at the moment.

Today, as there is no alternative provided, many people use the asylum procedure to have at least a formal status in the country temporarily. When those people return to their country of origin they lose their status as an asylum seeker, a phenomenon which occurs to many Zimbabweans when returning home to bring money and goods to their families.

Sexual violence at the border

Sexual and gender-based violence has been occurring consistently along the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa for years now with virtually no coherent attempts by relevant authorities to act. Criminal gangs known as guma guma rob women and men of their belongings before raping them. Often more than one perpetrator will rape every woman in a group of people who have travelled together hoping for safety in numbers. Men are often forced to rape wives, sisters or aunts and if they dare refuse, they are raped by the guma guma.

“I crossed the river with a group of four people. We were met by a gang of seven guma guma on the South African side who were armed with knives and guns. They forced me to have sex with the women in my group and I refused. Then one of the guma guma forced his penis into my anus and ejaculated inside. I don’t actually know how many of them forced themselves on me because I was confused by the whole incident. I fainted and when I woke up they were nowhere to be found.”
– 27-year-old Zimbabwean man, patient at MSF clinic in Musina

When these severely traumatised people seek help, police in Musina are often unwilling to open a case of rape or indecent assault, saying the incident did not occur in South Africa but on the Zimbabwean side of the border and that the opening of the case would amount to a waste of resources as the survivors often move on to other parts of South Africa within days of the incident. However, at least 83 per cent of the cases of sexual violence seen by MSF in the last three months occurred in South Africa. The large majority of these cases happen as people cross the border irregularly – a problem that would be eliminated if people could cross the border legally without a passport but with some other form of documentation.

Since the beginning of this year MSF has treated 103 survivors of sexual violence, 71 people since March 1 alone. Of these cases, 45 of the survivors were women and 26 men. Sixty-nine of the victims were Zimbabweans, one was Mozambican and one was South African. Eight women are pregnant as a possible consequence of their rape. Only 56 per cent of these cases were reported within 72 hours of the incident occurring, meaning only about half of those treated were able to receive post-exposure prophylaxis to prevent the possible transmission of HIV/AIDS within the required first crucial 72 hours after the incident.

“Condoms are never used in these rape cases. Many of the sexual violence survivors and the guma guma gangs are already HIV-positive. This means we are seeing a cycle of HIV spreading as different people in the guma guma gangs often rape the same women several times and the fellow travellers are also often forced to rape those same women. We cannot always give people post-exposure prophylaxis against HIV because they do not come to us in time. After they are robbed at the border they often first work on the farms and only come to Musina days later once they have earned some money. By that time it is too late to prevent HIV.”
– MSF counsellor working in Musina

Access to health care: Treating HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis in a highly mobile population At present MSF provides more than 2,000 medical consultations per month through mobile clinics at six farms in the Musina area and one mobile clinic at the Refugee Reception Centre in Musina town.

The mobility of patients poses a challenge when it comes to treating the chronic illnesses, including HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, which many of them face. Antiretroviral treatment for HIV as well as tuberculosis care require that patients stay nearby for some period of time in order to access regular follow-up visits to clinics to get their medicines and to have their condition assessed by medical workers. When people with HIV and tuberculosis are constantly on the move it becomes extremely difficult if not impossible for them to remain adherent to treatment, especially when they are initiated in another country and they carry no records with them when crossing borders. In a positive development to deal with this challenge, MSF and the Department of Health started a joint program in March of this year to provide decentralized care for HIV and tuberculosis patients in remote rural areas with a mobile population and a high number of workers from outside the country.

JOHANNESBURG: Trying to survive in the shadows

Shelter
A year ago the most well known shelter for newly arrived survival migrants without established networks in Johannesburg was the Central Methodist Church, as outlined in the No Refuge, Access Denied report. Although the number of people seeking shelter in the church every night has reduced since last year, MSF estimates that upwards of 2,000 people are still staying there. This difficult living situation remains a serious health risk because of the overcrowded and unhygienic conditions.

The situation at the church has been partially addressed by the local and national authorities with the renovation of the Moth Building, a transit shelter which when ready is supposed to accommodate vulnerable migrants from other countries as well as South Africans in need of shelter. With a capacity of 700 people, the Moth Building will be run with international funds, relocating only a portion of the most vulnerable people currently sleeping at the church.

In the past year MSF has seen an increasing number of patients attending our clinic adjacent to the church coming from living in abandoned buildings in and around Johannesburg’s downtown core. These are the more than 1,000 buildings left derelict since the beginning of 1990s by their owners and progressively occupied by internal migrants coming from townships and rural areas and by refugees and survival migrants from other countries coming to Johannesburg. The majority of these buildings have private owners, while some of them are owned by the city.

Most of these buildings are hijacked by criminals or controlled by slum lords whose interest is to milk maximum profits from tenants while little or no maintenance work is done and basic water and sanitation services are in shambles or non-existent. This exploits vulnerable people who cannot afford or find any other accommodation or shelter in the city and puts their health at risk.

During outreach activities in the past year, MSF has independently identified 45 such buildings (former offices, industrial sites or flat blocks) in the inner city where an estimated 30,000 people are staying in appalling living conditions. These spaces are overcrowded with subdivided rooms in warren-like conditions, there is very poor or non- existent sanitation, people have difficult or no access to water, and they lack proper waste management and disposal. All of these factors have a direct impact on personal and public health, including a significant effect on mental health.

“The quantity of rubbish is growing every day. Look at this big pile: you can see and hear rats moving around all the time. Can you imagine that here children are walking and playing and that in this room – just next to the rubbish – there lives a small baby just few days old? ”
– Mozambican man living in abandoned building

Most of the buildings identified are accommodating between 500 and 1,000 people, in some cases up to 1,500 people. They are mainly asylum seekers and survival migrants coming from Zimbabwe but they are also from other countries including Malawi, Tanzania and Mozambique. South African citizens are also living in these buildings.

“I’m worried about outbreak of disease. There are not toilets in this building and so people defecate everywhere.” –South African woman living in abandoned building

Even in these unacceptable living conditions, people are not staying for free. Rental fees charged by slum lords or gangs can be between 50 Rand per day (about US $6) to 750 Rand per month (about US $99).

At meetings MSF attended in the last seven months chaired by the City of Johannesburg and on the city’s own web site, Johannesburg has expressed a clear intention to tackle this issue, aiming to eliminate these buildings in the next few years with a program of renovation and beautification. But to date no real coherent plan of action has been put forward to either address this state of affairs or improve the conditions people are living under.

Between September 2009 and March 2010 MSF witnessed at least four evictions from buildings with a population between 700 and 1,200 people each. All of these evictions happened in the same way: private security companies – often one known as the Red Ants – and sometimes policemen were sent by the owner to chase residents out from the buildings with violence, using sticks and sometimes rubber bullets. Once out of the building the residents were not allowed to go back inside to collect their belongings, which were thrown out from the windows. In many cases residents complained that their belongings were stolen by the security or police.

MSF treated several residents injured during those evictions for severe bruising and open wounds received from the beatings with sticks and from rubber bullets. During the last eviction, which occurred in February 2010, some people on treatment for chronic conditions including HIV/AIDS lost their medications and had to be reassessed by medical staff and then resupplied with drugs. This included a five-year-old child on treatment for HIV.

No strategy for the relocation of the residents in the building was implemented or even proposed. In the following hours, people tried to contact friends or relatives to find refuge in other buildings. Days after the evictions, hundreds of people – including pregnant women, children and people in critical medical condition – were lying on the pavement in the middle of the city with no access to basic necessities like toilets or proper food, exposed to weather conditions, unsafe, and uncertainty about their future. Residents were only allowed to re-enter the buildings after a South African legal organization took their case to court.

“The building owners, their security and the police came into the building, with the police asking people why they had gone back into the building. They asked people to move out of the building as they were not supposed to be inside. In the process they started to assault people beating them with the back of guns and batons. The police were shouting at people telling them to go back to their country.”
– Person evicted Feb. 16, 2010. This was the second set of violent evictions in this building since October 2009.

Medical conditions and access to health care

The main diagnoses at the MSF clinic are respiratory tract infections, diarrheal and gastro-intestinal conditions, skin conditions and stress-related ailments. Most of the diseases treated in the clinic are directly linked to unhygienic and overcrowded living conditions, and without a change to these conditions patients’ health will not improve.

MSF is alarmed by the high rates of tuberculosis diagnosed. During the last six months approximately 500 patients have been tested and 10 per cent of them were positive for tuberculosis. As well, we see high rates of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

Since the opening of the MSF clinic, the number of consultations have steadily increased, starting with 750 patients per month in early 2008 and reaching an average of 2,300 consultations per month in 2009 and 2010 so far. Initially the MSF clinic was primarily frequented by residents of the church next door. Today, more than 70 per cent of patients are coming from city’s derelict buildings.

This gives indications that there are many people in need of health care and although the primary health care access is guaranteed through a number of nationals directives, there are barriers preventing survival migrants and refugees from accessing public health facilities and so they come to the MSF clinic. Those barriers include language and inability to pay for consultations. Many patients at the MSF clinic say they are made to feel unwelcome in public health facilities because they don’t speak the local language.

In addition to providing basic health care and psychosocial support, MSF staff often accompany patients to existing health services in Johannesburg to make sure people receive the essential medical care they need.

“In September of 2009, I went to a public clinic because of an incomplete miscarriage but the nurse told me they only do abortions for South African people. After they asked for 400 Rand [US $48], which I didn’t have, so I went to a N’anga (traditional healer) who helped me with the abortion. In November I went to the same clinic because I had severe abdominal pain. They asked me again for my passport and 140 Rand [US $15]. I walked out and bought antibiotics and painkillers.”
– 28-year-old woman living in abandoned building

Police harassment

Survival migrants in Johannesburg face the threat of police harassment. On Jan. 14 2010 a joint raid was conducted by the South African Police Service and Johannesburg metro police outside the church. According to South African Police Service, 39 people were arrested for loitering. Those arrested included at least two patients who were queuing for treatment at the MSF clinic.

“Moving around even doing shopping the South African or metro police are always after foreigners. They will definitely find a crime for you and ask you to make a plan [pay them], like giving them money, even as little as 20 Rand [US $2.40].” – Zimbabwean man living in Johannesburg

XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

After the wide-spread outbreak of xenophobic violence which erupted in 2008, refugees and vulnerable migrants have continued to be victims of violence. These instances may be on a smaller scale but the consequences are equally severe.
On Nov. 22, 2009, more than 1,600 people including 187 children, all Zimbabweans, were chased out by local residents from a different township in the suburb of De Doorns, in the Western Cape vineyard areas. Their shacks were destroyed and looted and most of their belongings destroyed. Locals were saying people from outside the country were taking their jobs by accepting to work on farms as low-paid labourers. A campsite for the displaced people was set up by local authorities. MSF was present in the campsite for two weeks providing medical care and trauma counselling. The attacks had a strong impact on the mental health of the displaced. Stress levels were very high especially among those who had witnessed other attacks in February 2009 during which seven Zimbabweans were burned to death. Through individual and group counseling sessions MSF found a high level of anxiety as people did not know if they would be accepted back in the community or relocated. Their major concerns were about safety, security and being able to go to work.

The night of Dec. 7, 2009, South African Police Service and Polokwane Municipality relocated more than 100 Zimbabweans living in a suburb of Polokwane to a nearby stadium. The relocation followed several hours of violence carried out by South African citizens against non-South Africans living in the community. At the stadium, MSF provided medical assistance to 13 people, including two children under three years old, as well as six people with severe violent trauma injuries. Many people said they experienced headaches, stomachaches, chest pains, difficulty breathing or nightmares soon after the attacks, all clearly related to the trauma suffered.

“A group of people burst into the house breaking the door. They asked me to show them my South African ID, and when I said I didn’t have any, they started to beat me with sticks, stones, punches, kicks. I managed to escape from the house and started to run along the road, but they didn’t stop. They started to follow me with the car and let me run for a while. They caught me again and beat me up until I was lying on the ground covered in blood. They left me there because they thought I was dead. After a while I tried to move and with difficulty reached a phone box and called an ambulance. The ambulance didn’t arrive. Three people stopped their car when they saw me lying on the ground, carried me into their car and brought me to the hospital. This is not the first time. Last year six people beat me up, but it wasn’t like now – this time they wanted to kill me.”
– 20-year-old Zimbabwean man in Westernburg, Polokwane

Many of our patients tell us they continue to worry about threats to their lives because of who they are, because of where they come from.

”I’m afraid of the xenophobia everybody says is coming after the World Cup.”
– 31-year-old Zimbabwean man living in Johannesburg

CONCLUSION

MSF speaks about what we see in assisting our patients in Musina and Johannesburg and what their vital health needs are.

One year after the MSF report, No Refuge, Access Denied their situation remains dire and unacceptable.

• Sexual violence occurring on the border or during the border crossing should be addressed by the responsible authorities in Musina and Limpopo province. Zimbabweans need access to a formal status to be legally allowed in the country so they are not forced to cross the border irregularly and be exposed to this extreme violence, something which has been promised by the South Africa government.

• Residents of derelict buildings in Johannesburg who are being evicted need access to emergency shelter that is clean, safe and meets basic standards of living. The Moth building may hold promise for those currently staying at the Central Methodist Church, but this will not meet the larger needs, including those of the vulnerable South African homeless population as well as those from outside the country.

• While there has been some improvement in access to chronic care, there remains a critical need for greater access to primary health care for this vulnerable population.

“I came to South Africa in June 2008 after I was diagnosed as HIV positive. I crossed the border through the river because I didn’t have documents. The guma guma assaulted me and raped me several times. They said to me, ’We rape you because you have to pay to us and you don’t have money.’ When finally they the let me go, I had to seek medical help because I was feeling very sick. I was admitted to the hospital in Musina. After I spent three months in town, I decided to go to Johannesburg, where I spent six months at the Central Methodist Church. I moved to the J.C. [an abandoned building] after I was diagnosed with tuberculosis because I needed a place to rest in the morning after taking my tablets. In September 2009 the Red Ants came to evict us from the building. Since then I’m staying at the M. building where I’m sharing a room with other 11 people and paying a rent of 80 Rand [US $9.60] per week. Now my wish is to buy a stove and start to bake for selling.”
– 28-year-old Zimbabwean woman

In Part one, we concluded that:

The only acceptable means of achieving this transition is for the region to refuse another rigged election in Zimbabwe, while enabling a solution by one of two methods :

A)     a process similar to South Africa’s CODESA, or

B)     the holding of free and fair elections under a neutral and independent electoral administration.

The CODESA-type option appears to be unfeasible because the Mugabe faction will renege on any outcome unfavourable to itself, and will refuse to relinquish its repressive control. The remaining option is new harmonized elections.

Another rigged election is unacceptable and will perpetuate the personal suffering and economic destruction of Zimbabwe, along with a continued flood of economic and political refugees into neighbouring states.

In order to implement free and legitimate elections in Zimbabwe today, there are four basic requirements:

1)    Electoral reforms,
2)    Internationally supervised election process,
3)    The deterrent of the implications of non-compliance with the SADC Electoral Protocol,
4)    The official endorsement and support of SADC, the AU and UN.

Political will, funding sources and administrative resources would have to be found for the implementation of these requirements, and all three could be provided by an initiative motivated by African democratic institutions and backed by the United Nations. Sufficient funding to enable a fresh election has been offered by various international bodies.

There has been no meaningful reform of Zimbabwe’s Electoral Act, the Electoral Commission or the Voters’ Roll since they were last used in 2008.

The following recommendations have been informed by, and formulated within, the frameworks of the standing AU and SADC regional protocols, guidelines and charters governing elections, and contextualised by the findings of pan-African dialogues, conferences and Zimbabwean civic bodies such as the ZESN (Zimbabwe Election Support Network).

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1)    Electoral Reforms needed:

In September 2009 the ZESN produced a list of the most pressing electoral reforms that need to be legislated before a credible election can take place in Zimbabwe. ZDN endorses these required changes, which are summarised hereunder in priority order:

1) Constitution:  The implementation of a new constitution in which will be embodied reformed fundamental electoral laws.

2)    Electoral Authority:  A new and truly independent and non-partisan electoral commission and administration, in which the Zimbabwean public have confidence, must be formed.

3)    Voters’ Roll:  The above new organisation must be in charge of compiling a new voters’ roll. (Currently this is done via the Registrar-General of Voters, appointed by a partisan president). Additionally, an audit of the Roll should be carried out, and a new bio-metric system installed to minimise balloting fraud.

4)    Delimitation Exercise:  A full and comprehensive electoral constituency delimitation exercise to correct previous mass-scale gerrymandering.

5)    Tabulation of Results:  Transparent and expeditious counting and tabulation of results to take place in the presence of candidates or their polling agents.

6)    Intimidation:  Safeguards to be legislated and put in place to eliminate partisan violence and intimidation of voters.

7)    Monitoring Restrictions:  Removal of the regulations restricting election observers and monitors; local and international observers must be free to observe all elections and by-elections before, during and after the process.

8)    Media Restrictions:  Removal of the regulations restricting access to and reporting by the media on the polling process before, during and after any electoral event. This would include freeing of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Zimpapers from partisan management and direction.

9)    Independent Electoral Commission:  Limits set on the powers of the Electoral Commission to change regulations. Any changes that can be made should not have to be approved by the Justice minister. The Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act cannot be used to change any electoral rules.

10) Voter Verification: Citizens should be allowed to vote at any polling station in their constituency on the basis of their National ID cards. (At present citizens can only vote in their ward, with proof of residence, valid voter registration slip and ID).

11) Expatriate Vote:  That citizens residing outside Zimbabwe should be able to cast their vote by postal ballot. A new expatriate voting system with fraud-proof mechanisms must be set up.

12) Voter Education:  In the case of a referendum on a new Constitution, full and transparent voter education on the full contents of the draft being submitted, must first be disseminanted nationwide to all citizens, including illiterates.

However, President Mugabe uses his presidential powers selectively and illegally to overturn, block or indefinitely delay the signing into law and gazetting of any legislation he does not support. This would have to be dealt with by Parliamentary decree, guaranteed by African regional bodies.

In addition, the newly formed Electoral Commission cannot have reforms or changes to the Electoral Act passed without the approval of the current Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa (who is a Zanu-PF hardliner). This too would need to be dealt with, possibly by re-assigning the administration of the Commission  to an interim neutral electoral authority.

Therefore, the Inclusive Government in Zimbabwe should in the first instance be invited by SADC to fast-track and adopt the above electoral reforms.

Then, in the case of noncompliance of the GPA, the ramifications and implications must be spelt out by SADC followed by the imposition of an Emergency Election to be held under the auspices of the AU and SADC, with UN endorsement.

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2)    Internationally supervised election process

Whether a new Constitution is adopted or not, the original Zimbabwe Electoral Act should be suspended and replaced by the following measures to be implemented and supervised by an independent regional Emergency Electoral Administrative body.

The implementation of free and credible elections for Zimbabwe, whether under Emergency conditions or not, would include the following practical measures: (Note: these are ZDN recommendations which have endorsed by a cross-section of pro-democracy NGOs, research Institutes and civic groups.)

•    The neutral, independent administration of the electoral process should be implemented according to the SADC Electoral Protocol international codes of best practice.

•    The electoral administration to be set up and managed by a team of experts under the umbrella of the United Nations and drawn from African states’ most respected election authorities – e.g. teams from South Africa, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, and Zimbabwe’s own civic bodies, NCA and ZESN.

•    Sufficient numbers of UN, AU and SADC Peacekeepers to be deployed countrywide to prevent pre-election violence and post-election reprisals. Peacekeepers to be in place at least 3 months before and 2 months after the results are announced (in the case of a referendum or by-election) or until the incumbent government has been formed (in the case of a general election).

•    Security forces, with the exception of police, to be confined to barracks for the determined electoral period.

•    A widely implemented public information campaign in all official languages, to educate the voters on any changes to the voting system.

•    No financing of party political campaigns from state resources.

•    Immediate media reform and the repeal of POSA and AIPPA (the restrictive laws governing media and public gatherings).

•    Free party political campaigning allowed, with the state-run media to be released from party control, direction or censorship.

•    Free access to communication channels including telephone, microwave, 3G and radio installations.

•    Local and international media personnel & their equipment to be accredited and allowed to travel and work freely within the country prior to, during and after the election.

•    Independent and neutral armed security personnel, equipped with field radios, at every polling station to protect the voters on election days.

•    Neutral and independent, qualified election supervisors and monitors to be recruited by the Emergency Electoral administration and deployed before and during the election process.

•    Neutral and independent supply of ballot papers, boxes, indelible marking inks, tamper-proofing devices, etc. to be sourced and distributed.

•    Training of local election monitors and balloting officials to international best-practise standards, with sufficient resources to support their work (food, transport, phones) before during and after election days.

•    No campaigning allowed within 300 metres of polling booths.

•    Voters’ Roll to be temporarily set aside and replaced with the presentation of national ID cards.

•    Restoration of voter rights of permanent residents.

•    Re-issue of destroyed or confiscated ID documents to be expedited.

•    Citizens and permanent residents to be allowed to vote in any ward in Zimbabwe.

•    Diaspora vote: Temporary balloting stations to be set up in every country hosting a significant number of Zimbabwean citizens; criteria to be determined urgently beforehand via the diasporean civic networks. Expatriate voters to use their Zimbabwe ID or Passport.

•    Signed and verifed on-site results of initial ballot count posted on the outside of each voting station at the close of balloting for public inspection; the document to be photographed by an official monitor, the image and results MMS’d, SMS’d and/or radioed to a central monitoring post for immediate public broadcast from a national tabulation centre.

•    Diasporean vote count to be verified in the same way and results faxed directly to the central counting facility in Zimbabwe as well as to the independent central tabulation centre – Zimbabwean embassy staff are often partisan.

•    Ballot boxes sealed and secured before transportation under neutral 24-hour guard from each polling station to voting ward pickup point, thence escorted to municipal, provincial and finally national tabulation centre.

Each box checked in and accounted for at each of the three points, each ballot box assembly point to be guarded 24 hours/day.

•    Independent neutral management and supervision of final vote counting, with a ballot audit before tabulation of officially verified results. No delays allowed in official announcing of results.

•    Irregularities and complaints reporting facility to be set up, with official logging and subsequent investigation of all incidents.

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3)    The deterrent of the implications of non-compliance with SADC Electoral Protocol /AU Charter’s Military Option

Chapter 6 of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Government requires states to institutionalise civilian control of the military and to punish unconstitutional overthrow of democratically elected governments.

The only environment in which control of the military could be transferred, is with the free and credible election of a legitimate democratic government.

The AU’s Constitutive Act furthermore stipulates in Article 4(h) that the AU has the right to intervene in a member state ‘pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. The act thus creates a legal basis for intervention to prevent crimes against humanity.

Elections in Zimbabwe have, since 1980, been held in an environment of appalling politically-motivated violence and rigging. The current President, backed by the commanders of the security forces (a continuation of Ian Smith’s Joint Operations Command) has vowed never to give up power through the ballot: “How can a ballpoint pen argue with a gun?” said Mugabe prior to the harmonised elections in 2008. His party cadres routinely refer to the electorate as ‘the enemy’.

It is obvious that voters alone cannot convince Mr Mugabe and his party to accept defeat and go into honourable opposition. Thus, if the will of the people is to be respected, their choice of government has to be physically protected from the very real threat of a coup.

Apart from reluctance to relinquish political power and status, Mugabe and his generals are very likely to engage in civil warfare in order to retain their direct access to valuable national commodities – agricultural land, diamonds, gold and platinum in particular.

A peaceful and genuine handover of the instruments of power can only be achieved if the democratic transition is backed by a NEUTRAL military force large enough to prevent counter-insurgency.

The African Standby Force could be convened for this purpose.

The AU’s African Standby Force (ASF) will have been developed by the end of 2010. ASF brigades could therefore be formed and deployed in Zimbabwe for the express purpose of preventing violence and supporting the democratic choice of the people in a 2011 election.

The AU’s Peace and Security Council Protocol specifically authorises deployment of the ASF in monitoring roles, conflict prevention, disarmament exercises, and armed intervention.

NB: Zimbabwe has recently been elected to serve a term on the AU Peace and Security Council – and President Mugabe is therefore expecting to be able to block any Council decisions regarding possible intervention in Zimbabwe.

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4)    The active support of SADC, the AU and UN.

The role of regional and continental bodies is paramount as the solution to the Zimbabwe crisis is one that has to be solved by Africans, and it is extremely important that the entire process of holding a free and fair election should be officially adopted, endorsed and supported through these bodies. The resources and expertise and neutrality of the United Nations would be sought once the initial decisions have been made.

On Security Forces. The de-politicisation of the security forces is the top priority. While recognizing the difficulties of achieving this in the current circumstances, a dialogue on the role of the army and  the police in elections must start now. A conference on this specific item could be organized, ideally under the auspices of the AU and the UN, where senior police and army officers from all the provinces could participate.

The SADC election guidelines  must be reviewed and ensure that they reflect the experience collected for the past 20 years of elections in the region to close all the gaps and prevent Zimbabwe from running once again elections which bring chaos than peace to the country.

The AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Government must be adopted without delay by at least 15 member countries, including Zimbabwe. The bloc of countries represented by ECOWAS could complete this adoption process, should it so choose.

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Conclusion:

The political will of the AU, of SADC and of the Republic of South Africa as guarantor of the GPA is being publicly tested by the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe. These bodies recognise that the misrule in Zimbabwe has already impacted negatively on the region, and threatens to cause further disruptions.

A free and credible election in Zimbabwe must be implemented by any means necessary. Without this, no future government or president can be considered legitimate in the eyes of Zimbabwean citizens, the region and the world.

It is incumbent therefore on the AU, SADC, the UN and the international community at large, NOT to recognise the result of any election in Zimbabwe unless it has complied with the above minimum conditions and requirements.

We urge the serious consideration of the above recommendations and look to the strong and inspired leadership of South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma to make history in Africa by siding with the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for democracy.

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Produced by Zimbabwe Democracy Now

References:

African Union (AU) Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
(adopted by the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30 January 2007)

AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa
– AHG/DECL.1 (XXXVIII)

AU Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions – EX/CL/35 (III) Annex II.

SADC Electoral Protocol

SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections

SEOM report on Zimbabwe run-off elections issued June 30 2008

SADC Election Observer Mission (SEOM) preliminary statement presented by the Hon. José Marcos Barrica Minister in the Republic of Angola and head of the SEOM on the Zimbabwe Presidential Runoff and House of National Assembly by-elections held on 27 June 2008

COMMUNIQUÉ – Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa, January 2009 (review of the implementation of the Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement)

ACCRA COMMUNIQUÉ of the COLLOQUIUM ON AFRICAN ELECTIONS
November 14, 2009  (convened by leaders from election management bodies, political parties, security services, civil society and media from 25 sub-Saharan countries)

The role and Place of the African Standby Force (ASF) within the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (ASA)
ISS Paper 209 • January 2010 by Dr Solomon A. Dersso

THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE:
A NEW DAWN FOR THE ENTHRONEMENT OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN
AFRICA?  By Solomon T. Ebobrah, AfriMAP, May 2007
(examines the salient features of the AU Charter in comparison with the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2001)

ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK – A Comment on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) Report on the 2008 General Elections.
29 May 2009

ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK – Electoral Reform Proposals
21 April 2009

ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK – Priority Areas for Electoral Reform ahead of By Elections and Referendum.
16 September 2009

Measuring the Zimbabwe Presidential Runoff 2008 Election according to the SADC Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections
Analysis by States in Transition Observatory (SITO), July 2008

Measuring the Zimbabwe Harmonised 2008 Elections According to the SADC Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections
Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, June 2008

Before the 2000 general election in Zimbabwe, the late Vice-President, Simon Muzenda, told the nation that if Zanu-PF chose to nominate a baboon as candidate, then the people would have to vote for that baboon.

Not surprisingly, the people did not choose the Zanu-PF candidate, but the regime at the time did not intend to simply rely on people’s free choices.

Robert Mugabe claims he has the support of the people of Zimbabwe. But he has yet to prove it in a free, credible and violence-free election, without the benefit of the following documented election rigging techniques that he and his Zanu-PF party have deployed in the past:

•    Partisan electoral commission with handpicked management,
•    Secret ballot paper printing and distribution,
•    Ghost voters and doctored voters’ roll,
•    Ban on expatriate citizen vote,
•    Ward and district gerrymandering,
•    Party-appointed internal monitors (civil servants and the like),
•    Very limited international observer teams, no foreign supervision or monitoring deterrent
•    Partisan-controlled, state-owned mass media,
•    Selective accreditation of international media personnel,
•    Intimidation of perceived opposition groups,
•    ID document confiscation campaigns,
•    Pre-election targeted violence by party youth militia, predominantly in rural areas,
•    Partisan police, army, air force and intelligence corps, used in a planned   nationwide, pre-election campaign of deadly violence and coercion,
•    Unlimited use of state resources to finance the party election campaign,
•    Bribery and coercion of rural traditional chiefs and headmen,
•    Use of (and withholding of) food aid to force voters to support Zanu-PF,
•    Banning of opposition rallies,
•    Supervised voting of all security force personnel in the presence of senior commanding officers,
•    Fraudulent postal balloting (8000 people applied to cast postal votes in 2008 but 600 000 postal ballot papers were printed and issued).
•    Secret transfer of polling station results by police radio frequencies
•    Military controlled ballot box transportation without supervision and the presence of all the contestants’ polling agents,
•    Unobserved ballot counting and tabulation of results,
•    Illegal delays in revealing the results of poll counting. (For example, in March 2008 there was a full month’s delay before the announcement of presidential results),
•    Campaigns of violent post-election reprisals.

In addition to the above measures, in the Presidential ‘run-off’ election of 2008 Robert Mugabe was the sole candidate, thus guaranteed victory. But leaving nothing to chance, his electoral machine managed to produce a much a higher number of votes for him than in the first round, in spite of a significantly lower voter turnout.

It is evident that anyone on the planet could get elected president in Zimbabwe with these advantages.

Consequently, the SADC Election Observer Mission’s official report concluded that:

“The process leading up to the presidential run-off elections held on 27 June 2008 did not conform to SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. However, the Election Day was peaceful. Based on the above-mentioned observations, the Mission is of the view that the prevailing environment impinged on the credibility of the electoral process. The elections did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe.”

The only possible interpretation of this statement is that Robert Mugabe’s presidency is illegitimate.

SADC, led by South Africa under president Thabo Mbeki, nevertheless declared the election ‘free and fair’, then went ahead and allowed Robert Mugabe to retain all the vital controls of power in the subsequent ‘power-sharing’ General Political Agreement (GPA).

The outcomes have proved to be entirely unsatisfactory.

After more than a year, the previous regime has refused to comply with the provisions in the GPA. Zanu-PF has retained its de facto one-party state apparatus and the misrule, looting, political violence, human rights violations, impunity and selective application of the rule of law continues unabated.

The cosmetic improvement to the economy brought about by the removal of the national currency is a temporary situation, which is being used as window-dressing while the excesses of dictatorship continue as before.

Already classified as a Failed State, Zimbabwe is now a delinquent state in terms of unregulated diamond and gold trading. The country has become a threat to the stability of the southern African region.

SADC as architect of the GPA is directly responsible for resolving this potentially unstable situation. It must immediately take steps to enforce, as guaranteed, Zimbabwe’s transition to good governance and genuine democracy. It is in SADC’s interests to create the conditions that will kick-start the country’s rehabilitation into a stable economic partner which will anchor the prosperity of the region and ultimately bring about the dreamed-of African Renaissance.

The only acceptable means of achieving this transition is for the region to refuse another rigged election while enabling a solution by one of two methods :

A)     a process similar to South Africa’s CODESA, or

B)     the holding of free and fair elections under a neutral and independent electoral administration.

In both cases, the process would have to be backed and protected by the SADC Electoral Protocol where the implications of non-compliance (cf Lesotho) are clear. This provides the mandate to ensure the peaceful transfer of power through a legitimately elected government freely chosen by the citizens of Zimbabwe.

On 9th April, negotiators from both the MDC and Zanu-PF were reported to have agreed on several important electoral reforms, but these have not yet been adopted. Although these represent a giant step in the right direction, changes to the Electoral Act have to be passed by the (Zanu-PF partisan) Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa.

Click here for Part 2 – The Solution

By Abbey Chikane, KP Monitor for Marange, Zimbabwe

21 March 2010

Introduction

The author prepared this report to confirm the understanding of the mandate of the KP Monitor for Zimbabwe. The report is written with a view to ensuring that the KP Monitor’s approach to the implementation of the Joint work plan is consistent with Kimberley Process, Working Group on Monitoring expectations. The terms of reference and joint work plan incorporate in this report provide further details of the KP Monitor’s respective responsibilities and; the fact-finding visit to Zimbabwe facilitated an on-the-spot assessment of the situation. Further, the fact-finding-visit has enabled him to determine his approach to the assignment and confirmed his operational requirements.

The fact-finding-mission occurred from 1-3 March, 2010.

Background

Appointment of the KP Monitor

Abbey Chikane, founder chairman of the Kimberley Process was nominated KP Monitor for Marange, Zimbabwe by the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring, in consultation with the current chairman of the Kimberley Process. Following communication between Mr. Chardon, chairman of the Working Group on Monitoring, and the Honourable Obert Mpofu, Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Chikane was accepted by the government of Zimbabwe.

Understanding the Mandate

The Seventh Annual Plenary of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme met from 2 – 5 November, 2009 in Swakopmund, Namibia. At this meeting, the Plenary adopted an Administrative Decision on a joint work plan aimed at bringing Zimbabwe’s diamond trade into full compliance with the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process. This follows acknowledgement by Zimbabwean government representatives that there have been certain challenges in complying with the minimum standards of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The government noted its commitment to urgently addressing issues identified in the reports of the Working Group on Monitoring (WGM), Working Group on Statistics and the report of the Kimberley Process Review Mission to Zimbabwe that took place from 30 June to 4 July 2009.

The joint work plan was developed by Zimbabwe and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to implement recommendations of the Review Mission (2009). The joint work plan is expected to be supported by technical assistance from Participants and Observers in the Kimberley Process. Plenary also urged Kimberley Process Participants and Observers to promote regional cooperation and outreach in support of this plan. The implementation and progress of the plan will be reviewed by the Intersessional and Plenary of the Kimberley Process in 2010.

To oversee and support the implementation of the joint work plan, Plenary resolved that a Kimberley Process Monitor for Zimbabwe (KP Monitor) be appointed. As stated in the Joint work plan, the role of a KP Monitor is to examine and supervise shipments of rough diamonds from the Marange area. The Joint work plan provides for a supervision of export mechanism under which exports of Marange diamonds are subject to Kimberley Process verification and confirmation that those rough diamonds were handled in full compliance with the minimum standards of the Kimberley Process. The Administrative Decision also provides for a review mission to assess progress in the implementation the joint work plan.

Although the terms of reference and joint work plan eloquently explained the task, the KP Monitor would like to restate his understanding of the assignment. The main objective of the KP Monitor is to support the implementation of the Swakopmund Plenary Administrative Decision and Joint work plan and work with the Zimbabwean authorities towards full compliance with the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

The main activities of the KP Monitor involve monitoring the implementation of the Joint work plan and reporting on a regular basis, with the frequency of such reporting still to be mutually agreed, to the chairman of the Working Group on Monitoring with copies to the Kimberley Process chair and the

Minister of Mines and Mining Development of Zimbabwe. The Kimberley Process and the government of Zimbabwe have agreed that the KP Monitor will have full and unhindered access to all relevant diamond production and processing sites as well as to all stakeholders from the point of mining to the point of export, including representatives of government, industry and civil society.

On request, the KP Monitor will prepare an Interim Progress report for the Kimberley Process Intersessional meeting, to be held in June 2010 and/or for the preparation of the Kimberley Process Review Mission which will be conducted in terms of the Joint work plan, as well as a Final report for the Plenary which is scheduled to convene in November 2010. The calendar for submitting regular progress reports will be provided to the KP Monitor for consideration by the Chair of the working group on monitoring.

In addition, prior to each export, the KP Monitor will examine, at the request of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, diamonds shipment from any producing areas in the Marange diamond fields to confirm whether diamonds selected for shipment meet Kimberley Process minimum requirements and confirm their certification for export.

The KP Monitor will conduct a thorough examination of individual shipments and their chain of custody to confirm their compliance with Kimberley Process requirements, according to the following procedure:

- When the KP Monitor assesses that an export shipment has been produced and prepared in accordance with Kimberley Process Certification Scheme minimum requirements, the KP Monitor is required to confirm this on the relevant Kimberley Process Certificate with his signature and stamp, and will digitally photograph the certificate and shipment. A specimen of the KP Monitor signature and stamp will be provided to the Kimberley Process Chair for prior distribution to Kimberley Process Participants.

- When the KP Monitor assesses that an export shipment has not been produced and prepared in accordance with Kimberley Process Certification Scheme minimum requirements, the KP Monitor will provide to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development specific written indications as to the reason(s), including any possible means of remediation. Any such proposed export will be held until the necessary remedial action is completed, after which the KP Monitor will reexamine the export and, if fully Kimberley Process Certification Scheme compliant, certify the shipment and sign the Kimberley Process Certificate.

After each examination, the KP Monitor is required to prepare a specific KP ‘export examination report’, providing summary conclusions on exports that have been reviewed against specific Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requirements. Such KP ‘export examination reports’ are to be submitted within one week of the certification examination to the chair of the Working Group on Monitoring, with a copy to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development of Zimbabwe. Pictures of certificates and shipments must be attached to the ‘KP export examination reports’. Finally, the KP Monitor will perform his tasks under the aegis and supervision of the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring, and will refer any related issues to this working group. The KP Monitor may be invited to take part in the meetings or teleconferences of the working group, at the discretion of the chair of the working group.

KP Monitor Meetings in Zimbabwe

Courtesy visit to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development

On 1 March 2010, the KP Monitor arrived in Harare on a three-day visit to begin the fact-finding mission. He met Mr. Thankful Musukutwa, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. At this meeting the Permanent Secretary proposed a three day programme, including logistics and resources allocated for the success of the visit. The meeting was followed by a courtesy visit to the office of the Honourable Obert Mpofu, Minister of Mines and Mining Development. The Minister assured the KP Monitor that he would have full access to all relevant government representatives, relevant diamond production and processing sites as well as to all relevant stakeholders from mine to the point of export. He reiterated his government’s desire and commitment to comply fully with the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

Meeting with KP Joint work plan stakeholders

The KP Monitor then met with officials of numerous state-owned entities and departments. These included representatives of the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development (MMMD), Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), the Ministry of Finance represented by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), Minerals Unit, and Zimbabwe Republic Police. In addition, industry representatives of several private companies were present, including Marange Resources, Mbada Diamonds, Canadile Miners and Global Diamond Valuators, Namibia.

At this meeting, the Permanent Secretary of Mines and Mining Development introduced the KP Monitor and requested all present to introduce themselves. He then requested the KP Monitor to present himself to elaborate on the purpose of his visit. The KP Monitor explained that this was a fact-finding-mission to Zimbabwe to make preliminary assessments on operations at the Marange diamond field and to determine his requirements for technical support in fulfilling his mandate.

Visit to Mbada Diamonds sorting facility

The KP Monitor visited the Mbada Diamonds sorting and valuation facility housed in a hangar at Harare Airport (referred to as the hangar). The KP Monitor was received by Dr. Mhlanga, chairman of Mbada Diamonds, chief executive officer, Mr. Rhuhwaya, and Mr. Dave Kassel, chairman of Reclam, a company associated with Mbada Diamonds. The Monitor was also received by a contingent of government department representatives most of whom are responsible for the monitoring and implementation of the Kimberley Process Joint work plan.

At Mbada Diamonds, the line management team demonstrated the process of the movement of diamonds from Marange diamond fields to the Harare sorting and valuation facility. The team also explained security and control systems at the facility, chain of custody, as well as policies and procedures for handling diamonds in and around the ‘hangar’. Mbada Diamonds operational policies and procedures were designed and implemented by Global Diamond Valuators of Namibia, a consulting firm retained by Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners. Most importantly, management explained and demonstrated company production pipeline procedures, audit processes, administrative and document handling procedures.

Findings:

(i) Policies, processes and procedures applied at Mbada Diamonds are world class on paper and the company needs to build the necessary capacity to implement them. The company also needs to inculcate a culture of full compliance with Kimberley Process minimum requirements.

(ii) At the ‘hangar’ there is an area of the sorting and valuation facility without cameras. This creates ‘blind-spots’ and risks breaking the chain of warrantees. It also creates an opportunity for rough diamonds to be removed from the security and monitoring control system. The KP Monitor believes this situation compromises the audit process;

(iii) There is inadequate security around the helicopter landing pad. While the heli pad is in a secured area, it is also close to a standard fence that could be ripped apart;

(iv) Representatives of state security agencies present at the ‘hangar’ do not seem to be adequately trained or experienced enough to ensure that the manner in which rough diamonds are handled is fully compliant with Kimberley Process Certification Scheme minimum requirements;

(v) There is no visible paper trail to track the movement of rough diamonds from the safe to cubicles. Management of Mbada Diamonds would like to believe that the current paper trail is adequate; however the KP Monitor believes the system can and should be improved.

(vi) The sorting and valuation site requires a senior well-trained and experienced Diamond Auditor. At present the company has entrusted this responsibility to a person who does not qualify for the job. However, management promised they will employ a qualified person to take full responsibility for implementation of audit policies, processes and procedures.

Meeting with Global Diamond Valuators

At the end of the Mbada Diamonds visit the KP Monitor requested a presentation by Global Diamond Valuators Namibia to explain its role and the nature of contractual relationships between the firm and its clients. Representatives explained they are retained by Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners as technical advisors to establish policies, processes and procedure to meet Kimberley Process minimum requirements, particularly the industry chain of warrantees. In addition, the KP Monitor requested soft and hard copies of manuals, policies and procedures recommended to Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners. These were provided and are in the custody of the KP Monitor.

Findings;

(i) Methodologies and tools used by Global Diamond Valuators are consistent with international best practice, however, there is a possibility that Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners management may receive all the required knowledge and information but fail to implement systems due to lack of capacity.

(ii) The duration of the contractual involvement of Global Diamond Valuator is not certain. This poses a concern on the implementation and sustainability of the systems.

Meeting with the diplomatic community

The KP Monitor was invited by the Head of Delegation of the European Union to Zimbabwe, His Excellency, Ambassador Xavier Marchal who hosted a dinner at his residence for the Heads of the Missions accredited to Zimbabwe from countries or entities that are Participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Ambassador Marchal advised the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe through a note verbale that he had invited Heads of the Missions accredited to Zimbabwe to the dinner. About 20 representatives of participating states and regional economic integration organisations attended.

In his speech, the KP Monitor explained that he was on a fact-finding-mission to assess operations at Marange diamond fields and to determine his staff requirements. In response, members of the diplomatic community raised a number of issues, including press statements by both Honourable President Robert Mugabe and Minister Mpofu that the government of Zimbabwe still had an option to trade diamonds outside the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. However, members emphatically shared their commitment and support for the implementation of the Joint work plan and that revenue generated from the sale of rough diamonds should be used to rebuild the Zimbabwean economy and improve the livelihood of its people, particularly children.

Findings;

Most member countries represented at the dinner fully supported the implementation of the Joint work plan with some expressing concerns on the political uncertainty in Zimbabwe.

Visit to Chiadzwa, Marange

On 2 March 2010, the KP Monitor visited the Chiadzwa, Marange diamond fields for first hand information on mining operations in that area before touring Forbes, a border post between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The visit to Forbes followed claims that diamonds from Chiadzwa were being smuggled through the borders between the two countries. Chiadzwa, Marange is a group of diamondiferous, largely alluvial gravel properties in the province of Manicaland, Zimbabwe. Mining takes place on surfacial alluvial and alluvial blocks, with open pits hardly reaching three metres depth.

The ground is broken with excavators, loaded into dump trucks using a backhoe excavator and hauled to the ore bin or stockpile at the plant.

Geologists explain that the ore consists of sands, gravels and pebbles with minor portions of boulders of conglomerates. All material from the mining block is processed as discrete batch and thus results can be compared with the sampling forecast for the block to check the efficiency of the recovery process. It is estimated that an area of 66 648 hectares (ha) held under 4 special grants that belong to ZMDC. The special grants are identified as follows:

SPECIAL GRANT NO. AREA COVERED (ha) % OF REA

SG 4718 600 0.90

SG 4719 400 0.60

SG 4720 2100 3.15

SG 4765 63 548 95.35

TOTAL 66 648 100.00

Based on the geological exploration carried out by ZMDC, 11 889 hectares or 18% of the total concession is prospective for diamonds. The remaining 54 759 hectares show low prospects, and further exploration is underway in this area. The prospective concession area has been demarcated and issued to two investors with some demarcated but not issued yet.

SPECIAL GRANT NO. AREA COVERED (ha) STATUS

SG 4718 600 Demarcated, not issued

SG 4719 400 Demarcated, not issued

SG 4720 1 100 Issued to Mbada Diamonds

SG 4720 1 000 Issued to Canadile Miners

SG 4765 8 789 Demarcated, not issued

TOTAL 11 889

Aside from the visit to Forbes border post, the KP Monitor’s objective was to (a) identify the total area under the control of ZMDC in Chiadzwa, Marange, (b) subdivision of resources into manageable areas and (c) assess mining operation at both Mbada and Canadile mining sites.

Visit to Canadile Miners sorting site

The KP Monitor visited the Canadile Miners sorting and valuation site in Mutare, Manicaland province.

At the site, the delegation was received by line management and shareholders of the company. Overall, the sorting and valuation site appeared non compliant with the Kimberley Process minimum requirements, largely because their security and monitoring control systems were in-adequate, and diamond audit systems were equally not up to standard. Understandably, the offices were only recently occupied and some if not most of their staff had been recently employed. When the KP Monitor randomly selected an employee, who happens to be an employee of the MMCZ, for questioning, it became apparent that he had no idea of activities at the sorting and valuation site, despite his role as the representative of a state owned entity.

Findings;

(i) Canadile Miners sorting and evaluation site does not meet a voluntary system of industry self-regulation aimed at facilitating the full traceability of rough diamond transactions by government authorities;

(ii) Policies, processes and procedures applied at Canadile Miners are world class in theory and therefore need the company to build the necessary capacity to implement them. The company also needs to inculcate a culture of full compliance with Kimberley Process minimum requirements;

(iii) At the sorting and valuation site there is an area without cameras. This creates ‘blind-spots’ and risks breaking the chain of warrantees. It also creates an opportunity for rough diamonds to be removed from the security and monitoring control system. The KP Monitor believes this compromises the audit process;

(iv) There is inadequate security around the premises;

(v) Representatives of state security agencies on site are not adequately trained or experienced enough to ensure that the manner in which rough diamonds are handled is fully compliant with Kimberley Process Certification Scheme minimum requirements;

(vi) There is no visible paper trail to track the movement of rough diamonds from the safe to cubicles. Management of Canadile Miners believes the current paper trail is adequate; the KP Monitor believes the system can be improved;

(vii) The sorting and valuation site requires a senior well trained and experienced Diamond Auditor;

(viii) Back-up of footage from the electronic security system is inadequate;

(ix) Roles and responsibilities of shareholders, management and staff are blurred and confusing. The KP Monitor was unable to identify the public office or accounting officer, even though the Managing Director was present at the meeting;

(x) The KP Monitor deducted, without conclusive evidence, that Canadile Miners may be encountering financial difficulties. This conclusion, if correct, contradicts the assertion that the company had committed US$100 million to develop its operation in Marange.

Visit to Mbada Diamonds mining site

The KP Monitor visited the Mbada Diamonds mining site where a relatively new, but highly mechanised, mining operation was established. The KP Monitor was received by the same team that met him at the sorting facility; Dr. Mhlanga, Mr. Rhuhwaya, and Mr. Dave Kassel. The KP Monitor was also received by representatives of government. At the mine Mbada Diamonds demonstrated the process of the

movement of diamonds from the mine site to screening, weighbridge, surge bins, sort boxes, all the way to the lock boxes. The company also demonstrated health and safety procedures, operational procedure and process flows. An elaborate security and monitoring control system was demonstrated. All machines and equipment found at Mbada Diamonds mine site are relatively new; this includes all mining machinery and equipment. The KP Monitor concluded that Mbada Diamonds, especially when compared to Canadile Miners, appears to be funded heavily by a large and established financial institution.

Findings:

(i) Mbada Diamonds mine is highly geared;

(ii) The company has been mining in the Marange area since late 2009 and has, stock-piled diamonds;

(iii) Comparing like with like, Mbada Diamonds mine is equipped on par with medium to large mining operations in Botswana and Namibia. Management believes the company has built a ‘hands-free’ mining operation;

(iv) During the visit, security arrangements in and around the mine were elaborate and highly visible (see section on security situation below);

(v) Operational and geological staff demonstrated knowledge of their mining operation;

(xi) Representatives of state security agencies present at the mine are not adequately trained or experienced enough to ensure that the manner in which rough diamonds are handled meets a voluntary system of industry self-regulation aimed at facilitating the full traceability of rough diamond transactions by government authorities;

(vi) The Mbada team (shareholders and management) is intimately involved in running the business.

Visit to Canadile Miners mine site

The KP Monitor visited the Canadile Miners mining site where a mechanised mining operation was established. The KP Monitor was received by management team under a tree where he was briefed about the programme and activities of the day. Apart from government and parastatal officials, present at the mine were directors and management of the company. These included, Mr. Rob van der Merwe, Marco Chioppi, Adrian Taylor, chief executive office, Z Ncube, Deputy chief executive officer and Gwiba, office Manager. This is the same team that the KP Monitor had met at the sorting offices.

At the mine Canadile demonstrated the value chain and the process of the movement of diamonds from mine site to the sorting and valuation office in Mutare. Canadile machines and equipment at the mine site are ‘work in progress. The splitting of diamonds and non-diamonds is done in a container. Whilst the KP Monitor was at the mine site, there was construction underway. The Canadile staff appeared to be working hard to meet Kimberley Process Certification Scheme minimum standards before the next visit by the KP Monitor. The Canadile Miners management team has also undertaken to engage the services of Global Diamond Valuators to expedite implementation of minimum requirements before the next visit of the KP Monitors and that of Kimberley Process Review Mission.

Findings:

(vii) Canadile Miners may be experiencing financial challenges;

(viii) The company has been mining in the Marange area since late 2009 and has stock-piled diamonds;

(ix) Comparing like with like, Canadile Miners mine is currently the size of a small-scale miner with machinery and equipment that can be moved from one site to another without much difficulty. ;

(x) During the KP Monitor’s visit security arrangements in and around the mine were sufficient to prevent intrusion;

(xi) The operational and geological staff demonstrated knowledge of their mining operation;

(xii) Representatives of state security agencies present at the mine are not adequately trained or experienced enough to ensure that the manner in which rough diamonds are handled meets a voluntary system of industry self-regulation aimed at facilitating the full traceability of rough diamond transactions by government authorities;

(xii) The Canadile miners managing director did not demonstrate active involvement in running the business. Although he was present, he never participated in company briefings.

Security at the plant

MBADA

Screened concentrate weighed with truck on a weigh bridge

Weight of concentrate from head feed is captured Weight-o-meters used to weigh concentrate

Process at DMS double-locked by security and mine management

Process in recovery up to vault is also double locked

Glove boxes have cameras inside to monitor the sorting operation

Sorting operations are hands free

Exporting boxes use self-locking mechanism

Exporting boxes locked with two locks

Access to all diamond areas are controlled by centralised access control system

Exit from mining area is via an X-ray machine

CANADILE

Count number of scoops from tipper into head feed

Weight concentrate from surge bin recorded again Security personnel on horses doing rounds

DMS plant is hands free

Conveyor belts screened off with wire mesh

Recovery up to vault is double locked

Glove boxes have cameras inside to monitor the sorting operation

Sorting operations are hands free

Exporting boxes use self-locking mechanism

Export boxes locked with three locks

Access to all diamond areas controlled by centralised access control system

Exit from mining area is via a thorough physical search

Security at the mine

MBADA

Entrances and security exits manned 24 hours

Static security space at 100m intervals

Motorbike units conduct rounds every hour

Dog unit right around the fence area

Control towers Watch towers at corners of the perimeter

CANADILE

Entrances and security exits manned 24 hours

Static security at 100m intervals

Security personnel doing rounds on horses

Night vision cameras along the fence and mining are- linked to central control tower

Visit to Forbes border post

En route to Harare, the KP Monitor toured the Forbes Border Post. At the border the delegation was able to briefly meet the head of Zimbabwe Revenue Agency who explained that she was not authorised to speak on behalf of her organisation.

Findings:

(i) The government of Zimbabwe has designated Harare International Airport as the country’s official point of export for diamonds and that no border gate or other exit point was equipped and/or authorised to facilitate the export of rough diamonds;

(ii) Rough diamonds exported from a border gate or any other domestic airport is deemed illegal;

(3) On the other hand, the KP Monitor was unable to obtain regulations or legislation that supports this desired situation. It appears that if a diamond trader met Kimberley Process minimum requirements and obtained the Kimberley Process Certificate, he/she could apply for permission to use a border of his/her choice.

Workshops with Stakeholders in Harare

On 3 March 2010 the KP Monitor arranged one-hour long workshops with individual key stakeholders at the offices of the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. The purpose was to outline individual implementation plans to prepare templates. The workshop also provided further clarification for the implementation of the Joint work plan.

Meeting with the Reserve Bank

In a separate meeting with officials of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (Reserve Bank), two representatives of the bank, Messrs. Manase and Chiremba explained that as part of the court order, the Reserve Bank was requested to provide custody for the diamonds in question during the dispute period. The bank received all the diamonds referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the High court order in judgment no. HC 6411/07 for safekeeping pending determination of the appeal noted against the judgment. In fulfilling this request, the Reserve Bank established a monitoring committee comprising representatives of the following institutions:

1. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

2. Minerals and Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe

3. Ministry of Mines and Mining Development

4. Office of the President

5. Zimbabwe Republic Police

6. Deputy Sheriff

7. African Consolidated Resources (legal representative)

The Reserve Bank further appointed Mr. Jamal Joseph Ahmed, a diamond valuator from Premier Diamonds, a company registered in Belgium with offices in Antwerp. Premier Diamonds was assigned to confirm the weight and value of the diamonds. members of the monitoring committee were invited to witness the valuation and sealing of the diamonds. The diamonds were placed in a trunk and one key was kept by the deputy sheriff and another by African Consolidated Resources legal representatives. The deputy sheriff also issued a receipt presented to African Consolidated Resources. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development has informed the KP Monitor that its team is currently seeking legal interpretation of the court order and the implications.

Meeting with cabinet task force on Marange production

The KP Monitor met with the Zimbabwean cabinet task force on Marange production. The Task Force was established by government, to monitor developments in Marange, among other issues. The committee comprises Honourable Mpofu, Chairman of the Committee and Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Honourable Biti, Minister of Finance, Honourable Ncube, Minister of Industry and Commerce, Honourable Mnangangwa, Minister of Defence, and Honourable Mangoma, Minister of Economic Development and Investment Promotions.

At this meeting, the KP Monitor briefed the Task force on his activities in Zimbabwe as part of his factfinding mission. He assured them that Zimbabwe has the capability and potential to meet Kimberley Process minimum requirements.

Second meeting with the Minister of Mines and Mining Development

The KP Monitor met the minister at the end of his fact-finding mission. At this meeting, the KP Monitor informed the Minister that his fact-finding mission was successful and that he was able to visit every site possible and met all relevant stakeholders in the time frame provided. The KP Monitor also informed the minister that he would be preparing a report on his findings and that a copy would be sent to the minister.

Media Briefing

At the end of the visit, the KP Monitor met members of the media at the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. He informed the media that his mission was accomplished and that he would be reporting to Mr. Stephane Chardon, chairman of the Working Group on Monitoring who, in turn, would report to the chairman of the Kimberley Process and the Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Honourable Obert Mpofu. The KP Monitor ended his fact-finding mission and returned to South Africa.

Agencies and companies actively involved in mining Marange diamonds

Mining in Zimbabwe is administered and managed by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. Among other issues, the ministry is responsible for granting mining rights by issuing certificates of registering mining claims, special grants, mining leases exclusive prospecting orders etc. The ministry discharges some of its functions through state owned entities such as the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), a company created by act of parliament.

Another wholly-owned state entity is the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ). Its mandate is to sell and coordinate the export of minerals, for which it receives a commission of (0.875%). It also purchases rough diamonds from the local market and sell them to diamond manufacturers and dealers. MMCZ is Zimbabwe’s Kimberley Process Certification Scheme exporting authority. The MMCZ authority is required to keep diamond production statistics and other related production and export information.

The ZMDC is mandated to invest in the mining industry of Zimbabwe on behalf of the state. ZMDC operates 26 separate mining companies in Zimbabwe. Some of its operations include four special grants in the mining area of Chiadzwa, which are held directly by ZMDC. Together, the company owns approximately 125 000 hectares of diamondiferous area.

Initially, ZMDC attempted to produce and sell rough diamonds without partnering with commercial entities. This attempt, which produced 1 366 872 carats over less than three years, was later reconsidered and it was concluded that joint ventures were the preferred way to grow its technical and financial capabilities. As at October 2008, the company was allowed to sell rough diamonds in the open market. An estimated 876 000 carats valued at US$8,3 million were sold to the open market and a balance of 490 000 carats were kept in stock. Of the US$8,3 million, US$837 000 was paid to the national fiscus.

Formation of Joint Ventures

Following the Kimberley Process Review Mission, 2009, a report outlining levels of non-compliance, including the security situation around the Chiadzwa and Marange diamond fields, the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and ZMDC resolved to revise their mining business model. A decision was taken to consider partnering with commercial mining companies. According to representatives of the Zimbabwean government, unsolicited expressions of interest from the mining fraternity were received from various local and international operators and a file was opened for applications.

When the government revised its business model, the need arose to select potential partners. The simplified version of the selection process can be summarised as follows; prospective investors were selected by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, which was preceded by establishing “a special purpose vehicle” that represented ZMDC commercial interests. This company was later named Marange Resources Private Limited (Marange Resources), a wholly owned subsidiary of ZMDC.

Marange Resources although wholly owned by ZMDC is a private company registered under Zimbabwe’s Companies Act Chapter 24:03. The company was originally registered as Block Wood Mining and later the name was changed to Marange Resources.

In July 2009, two companies, namely Core Mining, registered in South Africa and Grandwell Holdings, registered in Mauritius were considered for joints ventures with Marange Resources. ZMDC would hold its interests in the joint venture through Marange Resources. According to a report based on ZMDC oral evidence to the parliamentary committee on mines and energy, on 8 February 2010, Core Mining Resources is a diamond mining company operating in Kimberley, South Africa and Grandwell Holdings is a company involved in the reclamation business with strong a financial and administrative capacity to put in place a fully fledged mining operation.

Due diligence was conducted on both companies and subsequently the ZMDC signed a suspensive Memorandum of Understanding with Core Mining and Grandwell respectively. The report states that the Memorandum of Understanding with both companies was superseded by the shareholders agreements signed on 13 and 14 August 2009. The joint venture for Grandwell was signed on 13 and Core Mining on 14 August 2009.

Issuing special grants

ZMDC then released special grants named 4720 measuring 2100 hectares to Core Mining and Grandwell Holdings. The special grants were divided in two almost equal parts. The companies pledged US$100 million investment in the form of equipment and machinery that would be used for building physical, processing, water, road and security infrastructure. The agreement also undertakes to relocate communities within and around the mining fields. An inter ministerial committee was established to oversee the relocation programme. This committee included the ministries of local government, public works, mines and environment.

These joint ventures have resulted in the formation and incorporation of two distinct companies in which ZMDC (through Marange Resources) has 50% shares. Grandwell and Marange Resources hold their 50/50 shares in a joint venture company called Condurango, trading as Mbada Diamonds. Condurango has entered into a management agreement with joint venture partners, with the understanding that Condurango will be responsible for the day-to-day running of the mining operation.

For Core Mining Resources, a new company called Canadile Miners Private Limited was formed. Unlike Condurango, Canadile Miners partners have agreed to jointly manage their operations. Both joint ventures have board of directors. Condurango has ten seats, while ZMDC is allocated five directors and Grandwell five directors. The chairmanship of the board rotates after two years. The same arrangement applies to Canadile Miners.

Relocation of affected villagers

A total of 4,207 households have been identified for resettlement to pave the way for diamond mining operations. Total costs of resettlement have been calculated by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing at $11,791,644 (Table 1). The investors currently have committed to share the cost equally. New investors in the area will share the cost on pro-rata. The government has already identified ARDA Transau farm for resettlement of affected households. The first phase of the resettlement exercise will see 1,800 households being moved to ARDA Transau farm where each household will get one hectare for a homestead and half a hectare for crop farming.

The investors have so far built two sample houses at ARDA Transau and sunk 10 boreholes. The existing school and clinic have been renovated. The investors will install irrigation infrastructure for the settlers.

Small scale miners

The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development is drafting policy and procedures on handling small scale mining. Among other issues, the ministry is investigating the roles of each government department and other relevant key institutions. It is also looking at the definition of small scale miner, particularly size. To date, no small miner has been licensed to mine. The ministry indicated that a framework document will be completed by June 2010. However, mining operations by small miners will begin at a much later stage.

Country internal controls

Mining titles are issued by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development (MMMD) after evaluation of the application and due diligence on the investor. The MMMD carries out periodic mine audits and inspections. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Minerals Unit also monitors the movement of diamonds from the mining stage up to the export stage. MMMD and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) are responsible for authorising exports of diamonds after satisfying themselves that the diamonds comply with Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requirements. No diamonds can be exported without the KP certificate.

At the port of exit ZIMRA insists on Kimberley Process certificates being produced before diamonds can be exported. The diamonds must be sealed and accompanied by a commercial invoice with the seal number and number of carats being exported. There is a statutory instrument in place which makes it mandatory for all diamond producers to comply with minimum Kimberley Process requirements.

Marange production and sales statistics

For the period October 2006 to 28 February 2010, a production and sales account of the Marange diamond field is obtainable from the activities of a number of players as summarised in the table below.

Marange Diamond Field Production Summary, October 2006 to 28 February 2010

Source

Product

volume

(carats) Sales volume (carats) Stock (carats)

Marange

Resources 1,363,566.55 1,083,840.36 279,726.19

Mbada 2,005,298.44 0 2,005,298.44

Canadile 346,551.92 0 346,551.92

MMCZ mop-up 531,222.01 525,167.76 6,054.25

Police/MMMD 25,932.88 25,932.88 472.87

ACR 129,031.87 0 129,031.87

TOTAL 4,401,603.67 1,634,941.00 2,767,135.54

Source:MMMD (2010)

Marange Resources annual production volume, 2007 – 2009

Production Period Diamond recovery (carats)

2007 494,181.95

2008 460,017.20

2009 409,367.40

Total Production 1,363,566.55

Source: MMMD (2010)

Marange Resources Sales Summary, 2008 -2010

Sales Carats

Tender 1 01-Oct-08 101,550.00

Tender 2 01-Mar-09 87,307.09

3,706.63

328,305.01

Tender 3 16-Jun-09 64,305.44

2,445.32

104,260.86

2,005.31

61,028.61

Tender 4 20-Aug-09 17,930.11

30,263.06

73,221.52

Tender 5 27-Jan-10 2,753.73

3,678.18

10,387.95

17,445.83

81,056.81

63,297.66

28,891.24

Total sales 1,083,840.36

Closing stock at 28

February 2010 279,726.19

Source: (2010)

Marange Resources only started sales in October 2008. The slow issuance of CD1 (currency declaration) forms by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe slowed the export process causing the accumulation of product/stock pile. A paper trail is available for all transactions entered by Marange Resources. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, through the comptroller and auditor general is engaging a forensic auditor to reconcile production and sales figures for Marange diamonds as stipulated in the Joint work plan, Strategic Issue 8. The exercise will include reconciliation of all diamonds bought by MMCZ and those from police seizures.

National Production Statistics, 2009

Marange

Resources Mbada Canadile Murrow River Ranch TOTAL

409,367.40 302,115.08 57,537.00 121,863.19 72,617.23 963,499.90

In 2009, Mbada and Canadile only started production in December 2009.

Cooperation and Transparency

In 2009, cabinet set up an inter ministerial task force to oversee Kimberley Process compliance issues on Marange diamonds, to include investment in the Marange diamond field and relocation of affected households. The three political parties to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) are represented in the inter-ministerial task force whose members include:

Hon O.M. Mpofu (MP) – Minister of Mines and Mining Development, (chair) Hon T. Biti (MP) – Ministry of Finance

Hon E.D. Mnangagwa (MP) – Ministry of Defence

Hon Professor W. Ncube (MP) – Ministry of Industry and Commerce

Hon E. Mangoma (MP) – Ministry of Economic Development and Investment Promotion.

In addition, there is the parliamentary portfolio committee on mines and energy which monitors compliance with best practices. It also monitors the implementation of relevant legislation and corporate governance by all players in the diamond industry. A steering committee chaired by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, monitors implementation of the Joint work plan agreed to with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Other members of the committee include MMCZ, ZMDC, ZIMRA and ZRP – Minerals Unit. There is also a committee on border control made up of the ZRP – Border Control and Minerals Unit, ZIMRA and immigration officials who work with their counterparts in Mozambique.

A provincial committee chaired by the Ministry of Local Government has been set up to deal with the relocation process for affected households.

The Committee is made up of officials from:

· Ministry of Local Government

· Ministry of Lands

· Ministry of Public Construction

· Department of Irrigation

· Department of Physical Planning

· District Development Fund

· Environmental Management Agency

· Mutare Rural District Council

· Ministry of Agriculture

· Ministry of Mines and Mining Development

· Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation

The committee reports to the provincial governor for Manicaland.

Security situation in Marange

Demilitarisation of Marange diamond field appears to be ongoing, in accordance with the Kimberley Process Administrative Decision and Joint work plan. As resource areas are demarcated and allocated to joint venture companies, investors take full responsibility of their areas and are compelled to secure their areas and operate on hands free auditable systems. The KP Monitor was informed that there is now complete demilitarisation of areas under Mbada and Canadile’s operations. Both Mbada and Canadile have secured their areas of operation through physical security barriers (fences etc) and electronic means.

Industry voluntary self-regulation

The global diamond industry has undertaken to implement a voluntary system of self-regulation by ensuring an effective internal control system of diamonds based on the international certification scheme for rough diamonds. This system includes a chain of warrantees underpinned through verification by independent auditors of individual companies and supported by penalties set by industry, which helps facilitate the full traceability of rough diamond transactions by government authorities. The KP Monitor attempted to establish levels of compliance by mining companies at Marange diamonds fields. The results were as follows:

Security situation at Sorting and Valuation facilities

MBADA CANADILE

· Screened concentrate weighed with truck on a weigh bridge

· Count number of scoops from the tipper into head feed

· Weight of concentrate from head feed is captured

· Weight-o-meters used to weigh concentrate

· Weight concentrate from surge bin recorded again

· Security personnel on horses doing rounds

· Process at DMS double-locked by security and mine management

· DMS plant is hand free

· Process in recovery up to vault is also double locked

· Conveyor belts screened off with wire mesh

· Recovery up to vault is double locked

· Glove boxes have cameras inside to monitor the sorting operation

· Glove boxes have cameras inside to monitor the sorting operation

· Sorting operations are hands free

· Sorting operations are hands free

· Exporting boxes use self-locking mechanism

· Exporting boxes use self-locking mechanism

· Export boxes secured with 3 locks

· Exporting boxes are secured with 2 locks

· Access to all diamond areas controlled by centralised access control system

· Access to all diamond areas controlled by centralised access control system

· Exit from the mining area is via X-ray machine

· Exit from the mining area is via thorough physical search

Security at the mine

MBADA CANADILE

· Entrances and security exits manned 24 hours

· Entrances and security exits manned 24 hours

· Static security at 100m intervals · Static security at 100m intervals

· Motorbike units conducts rounds every hour

· Security personnel doing rounds on horses

· Dog unit right around the fence area

· Control towers

· Watch towers at corners of the perimeter

· Night-vision cameras along fence and mining area- linked to central control tower

Landing air strip and security control tower

The KP Monitor visited the well-publicised air strip that is being built in the area. The mine management team informed the KP Monitor that the airstrip will be used to transport rough diamonds from the mine to the sorting and valuation facility in Harare. The KP Monitor was also taken to the security control tower. The tower is being built on the highest point in the Marange area.

Matter between Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and African Consolidated Resources

The KP Monitor was informed by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development that African Consolidated Resources Plc, a public company listed on the London Stock Exchange, has over the past several years, declared a dispute on mining claims in the Marange diamond fields with the ministry and its associated institutions. The dispute between the parties culminated into a High Court ruling in September 2009 with a court order stating the following (as paraphrased):

· The African Consolidated Resources claims issued to Dashaloo Investments, Possession Investments, Heavy Staff Investments and Olebile Investments, which are within the area previously covered by Exclusive Prospecting order 1523 held by Kimberlit Searches are valid and have remained valid since the date they were originally pegged, and the right granted to a company that is associated with African Consolidated Resources, shall not apply in respect of the African Consolidated Resources claims as indicated on Annexure ‘B’ (of the application). In that regard it is hereby ordered that Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation cease its prospecting and diamond mining activities in the said area.

· The Court Order further instructs that 129 400 carats of diamonds seized from African Consolidated Resources offices in Harare January 2007 be returned to African Consolidated Resources, and the Police be directed to cease interfering with the African Consolidated Resources prospecting and mining activities. And that the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and/or its associate institutions pay African Consolidated Resources lost on a legal practitioner and client scale, the one paying the other to be absolved.

The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development advised that this matter is sub judice and therefore cannot be discussed in detail until a legal opinion is obtained from its advisors.

The matter between the ministry of Mines and Mining Development and African Consolidated Resources is of serious concern. Indications are that the African Consolidates Resources may file an urgent application to stop shipment of rough diamonds that were mined from Marange diamond fields. This action may require Kimberley Process participants and observers to apply their minds on the matter.

The KP Monitor is of the opinion that the Kimberley Process is mandated by its participants and observers to ensure that Zimbabwe complies fully with minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. And that the matter between the ministry of Mines and Mining Development and African Consolidated Resources is a subject of Zimbabwe’s national laws and court decisions. An attempt to handle the matter outside the courts could easily draw Kimberley Process participants and observers into a political and diplomatic disagreement.

The KP Monitor recommends that Kimberley Process should focus on the implementation of the joint work plan, as envisaged, to ensure that Zimbabwe is in full compliance with Kimberley Process minimum requirements. In the event of an urgent application by African Consolidated Resources, Kimberley Process actions should be guided by a court decision on the matter.

The Way Forward

The following challenges and recommendations are not listed in any particular order, but focus on issues that may have a negative impact on the implementation of the joint work plan, directly or indirectly. In listing these challenges and recommendations, an attempt is made to list only those that address issues covered in the joint work plan, and relevant to Kimberley Process minimum requirements.

Challenges Recommendations

· Government agencies have recently deployed civil servants to monitor and report on the diamond production exports and imports, however, most of these individuals are not adequately trained or inducted into this new responsibility

· Ongoing onsite training and coaching be provided to civil servants. Among other issues, the focus should be on system leakage and audit processes and procedures. Others may be trained as diamond sorters and valuators.

· Too many government agencies are involved in monitoring and handling rough diamonds. This poses the danger of diamonds being swapped or stolen in the process.

· Only the MMCZ, ZIMRA and ZRP should handle rough diamonds. Even with these three agencies, movement of rough diamonds should be subjected to a monitoring and security mechanism that can detect the loss or of diamonds.

· ZMDC has issued some special grants and is issuing more such grants.

· ZMDC should accelerate the process of issuing special grants in the Chiadzwa area since illegal miners may seek to occupy unfenced areas.

· ZRP is permitted by legislation to hold confiscated rough diamonds as exhibit. The legislation allows ZRP to transport rough diamonds to court as required.

· Legislation be amended to reduce the risk of diamond swap or loss. In the event that legislation need not be amended, government may consider the safe-keeping of rough diamonds at MMCZ (on confiscation and during court proceedings) and only release them when necessary.

· Zimbabwe Reserve Bank currently holds rough diamonds for safekeeping pending the court order and Appeal of the court order by the government of Zimbabwe.

· Zimbabwean Reserve Bank be encouraged to keep rough diamonds only under extraordinary circumstances, otherwise be discouraged from handling rough diamonds.

· Mbada Diamonds and Canadile need to increase the chances of providing accurate rough diamond statistics from production to sorting and valuation.

· These companies be encouraged to install Torex and counting machines at the mines.

· Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners do not have adequate diamond audit systems.

· These companies need to employ, a full time qualified diamond audit to increase their chances of complying fully with industry self-regulating mechanism as agreed by the global diamond industry and Kimberley Process participants.

· Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners have not been able to demonstrate that their sorting and valuation centres have no blind-spots.

· These companies need to put cameras all around their sorting and valuation facilities.

· Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners claim their sorting and valuation facilities are fully secured and insured.

· Both companies are requested to submit insurance report from a current insurer of the sorting and valuation facility stating that the facilities are fully insured at a value equivalent to the value of its production

· Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners claim their electronic surveillance systems are fully fraud-proof and they guarantee an off-site back-up.

· Both companies are requested to submit an assurance letter certifying that the electronic security system installed at their sorting and valuation facilities cover all areas in the facilities and that on request from the Kimberley Process, they can provide footage of at least three years of coverage, assuming that their operations continue for such a period.

Other Challenges and Recommendations

In addition, the following additional related challenges and recommendations should be taken into consideration.

Challenges Recommendations

· Marange diamonds field is a resource-rich region on the one hand but a politically and economically charged piece of land on the other. The political and economic leadership in and outside government faces the challenge of ensuring that revenue generated from the sale of rough diamonds is used to reconstruct and develop the economy. The challenge is for all parties

involved to communicate clearly the strategic direction the country would like to take in exploiting diamond resources in the interest of all people of Zimbabwe.

The KP Monitor recommends that the Cabinet Task Force on Marange production must lead an economic strategy aimed at developing and growing the diamond mining industry in Zimbabwe to create a significant source of revenue for the state. The strategy will have to be communicated clearly at all levels of government and industry to solicit the buy in of all key players in the industry.

The communication of clear messages to communities and other relevant stakeholders in and around Marange needs to be led by the Cabinet Task Force and/or its representative bodies.

· Communities in Chiadzwa, Marange are not connected to the mining activities in the area. They have seen a fence being erected around the diamond fields, an air strip being constructed, and trucks and bulldozers working. And they have been informed that they will be relocated. The national, provincial and local government representatives and their implementing authorities need to develop an inclusive and well-coordinated relocation strategy aimed at building consensus on the way in which relocation should be implemented.

Such relocation of the community may require a well thought out and well orchestrated plan with involves the participation of all stakeholders, particularly the local communities and their representatives. It might also help to remember that the decision to relocate was taken at the height of the diamond rush and that the circumstances have since changed following the end of diamond rush.

A national and regional communication strategy and plan is required to educate and inform the community and all relevant stakeholders on the rationale, goals and objectives of the relocation.

There must be room for new ideas on the nature of the relocation since this decision was taken during or around the diamond rush period. New ideas may include; classification of communities that need to be relocated and categories of communities such as (a) those members of the community who would like to secure jobs at the mine (b) those who may want to be paid cash and start a new life elsewhere; and (c) those who are ready to relocate to a designated area.

· The government and its associate institutions face a financial crisis, as a result certain fundamentals are not in place to develop and grow diamond production in Marange. It might be relevant to consider development institutions in Africa and the world at large that are mandated to provide developmental assistance of all types.

The government needs to appoint a team that will research development institutions such as the African Development Bank, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Industrial Development Corporation and the European Community, etc. This takes into account that there are sanctions imposed on government and government officials.

· The selection of joint venture partners to invest and mine diamonds in the Marange diamond fields has received much criticism from several quarters. Numerous documents suggest prospective investors normally apply for grants and these applications accumulate over time. At a later stage relevant government institutions process these applications and select some.

The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development may want to consider a more transparent, credible and predictable system that will enable the ministry to select applicants for consideration. Such a system will ensure credibility and accountability in a more transparent and predictable manner.

· The certification and shipment of Zimbabwe’s rough diamonds is certainly going to create a revenue base for the government. The communities where diamonds are mined are most likely to expect return on the diamond resources.

The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development may want to consider releasing statistics on the royalties and company taxes paid to government as well as dividends declared by the MMCZ annually to demonstrate how the diamond industry is contributing to the national fiscus. The ministry may also want to demonstrate how mining in the area is contributing to the development of infrastructure, job creation, wealth, health and educational development.

· The development of small scale mining is a daunting task for government due to its complexity and magnitude. The programme that the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and other stakeholders have embarked on is commendable.

The ministry of Mines and Mining Development may want to conduct a benchmark study on small-scale mining in countries that have similar economic and mining circumstances. These include Ghana, Sierra Leon and Angola.

· The implementation of the joint work plan Government needs to expedite the process of requires technical and financial support from participants. Apparently, that the government has written letters to countries such as South Africa to solicit technical support engaging these countries to support speedy implementation of the joint work plan. South Africa and European Community may be ready to assist government with immediate effect. The government should direct specific requests for assistance to those countries that have offered technical assistance, in order to ensure that areas of greatest need are addressed as a matter of priority.

· Experience has shown that illicit trade in Zimbabwe is most likely to spill over to its neighbouring countries. There is need for regional cooperation as recommended by the Working Group on Monitoring and as foreseen in the joint work plan. Such co-operation may include internal monitoring controls, security, technology, and coaching and or training. The DRC as the Vice Chair of the Kimberley Process may wish to consider championing efforts to promote strengthened regional co-operation, in consultation with the government of Zimbabwe, in order to ensure that such regional co-operation is designed to address specific challenges being faced by Zimbabwe in meeting the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

Support for the KP Monitor

· Following the fact-finding-mission, the KP Monitor was able to establish the magnitude of the tasks ahead and has concluded that to fulfill his mandate in a professional and diligent manner he needs secretarial and technical expertise. It would be unrealistic to expect him to fulfill this task without secretarial and technical support.

Recommendations on the Secretarial and Technical support

· The secretarial support that is required includes the facilitation of constant communication with all key stakeholders; planning and coordination of KP Monitor visits to Zimbabwe; compilation of supporting documentation in preparation for writing periodic reports; monitoring media coverage of the Marange diamond fields and general administration of the activities of the KP Monitor. The envisaged secretarial support will ensure that the collection and, verification of data, as well as certification of information provided by the Zimbabwean government and industry is accurate. It will also ensure that periodic reports written by the KP Monitor are prepared professionally. Additional information may reach the KP Monitor through sources such as KP Participants, Observers and the Zimbabwean government.

· The following recommendations are made to expedite the task of the KP Monitor. The individuals who are recommended are highly competent and are known professionally to the KP Monitor and with whom the KP Monitor feels comfortable working. The fact that they are based in the region helps to keep costs down and makes the co-ordination of regular visits to Zimbabwe by the KP Monitor easy to co-ordinate, especially in the area of technical support on site in Marange.

Secretarial

· The KP Monitor recommends Ms. Thuli Magubane, an experienced and professional project coordinator, be engaged to provide the envisaged. For the past seven years, she has served the corporate world as an administrator and coordinator. Her strengths are in establishing programme management offices (PMOs) designed to administer and coordinate large projects. She has implemented PMOs in the financial and property industries in South Africa. Thuli has attended various training courses in programme management office, project management methodologies and project coordination. For more information, please consult the resume, which accompanies this report.

Technical

· The KP Monitor recommends Ms. Jennifer Posthumus, an experienced diamond expert, be engaged to provide the envisaged. With over 20 years of experience in the diamond industry, Jennifer has sorted and valued large quantities of rough diamonds into various assortments for optimum yield. In the past six years, she acquired experience in negotiations with buyers and sellers in the open market. Jennifer attended various training programmes in South Africa, Antwerp, London and Israel. She has worked for the De Beers, group of Companies, including Diamdel, South Africa. Currently, she works for Degas’ Love a rough diamond trading company. Her professional integrity and ethical standards are beyond reproach. For more information, please consult the resume which accompanies this report.

Next visit to Zimbabwe

· The KP Monitor is available to visit Zimbabwe from 6 -8 April 2010, subject to confirmation with chair of the working group on monitoring and the government of Zimbabwe. The purpose of the visit is to conduct a thorough examination of individual shipments from any producing area in Marange and their chain of custody to confirm whether rough diamonds selected for shipment were produced and prepared in accordance with Kimberley Process Certification Scheme minimum requirements.

· If compliant, the KP Monitor is required to confirm the certification on the relevant Kimberley Process Certificate with his signature and stamp, and will digitally photograph the certificate and shipment. If not compliant, the KP Monitor will provide to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development of Zimbabwe written indications as to the reasons, including any possible means of remediation. During this period, the shipment will be held until remedial action is completed, after which the KP Monitor will reexamine the export and, if fully compliant, certify it and sign the certificate, as provided in the joint work plan.

· The KP Monitor would like to be accompanied by a diamond expert and a project coordinator when he visits Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

· The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme remains the only international system that has successfully responded to conflict resource issues worldwide. The scheme has successfully and drastically reduced resource issues on the continent and has contributed to the political and economic stability of fragile states such as Zimbabwe. The scheme is known for imposing extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as ‘conflict free’ and prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate global trade.

· Under the terms of Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, participating states must meet minimum requirements and must put in place national legislation and institutions; export, import and internal controls; and also commit to transparency and exchange of statistical data. Participants can only legally trade with other participants who have also met minimum requirements of the scheme, and international shipments of rough diamonds must be accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate guaranteeing they are conflict free.

· The implementation of the joint work plan is critical for meeting these minimum requirements.

MR GARETH THOMAS MP, MR MARK LOWCOCK and MR JOHN DENNIS

Evidence heard in Public Questions 50 – 135

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee on Tuesday 23 February 2010

Members present

Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair

John Battle

Hugh Bayley

Richard Burden

Mr Nigel Evans

Mr Mark Lancaster

Andrew Stunell

_______________

Memorandum submitted by Department for International Development

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr Gareth Thomas MP, Minister of State, Mr Mark Lowcock, Director General, Country Programmes, Department for International Development, and Mr John Dennis, Head of Zimbabwe Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q50 Chairman: Thank you, Minister, for coming to give evidence. This is the final session on our inquiry into the situation in Zimbabwe. Would you. for the record. introduce your team?

Mr Thomas: Mark Lowcock, who is the Director General for Country Programmes, is on my left, and on my right is John Dennis, who is the Head of the Zimbabwe Desk at the Foreign Office.

Q51 Chairman: Thank you for that. As you know, we visited Zimbabwe a couple or so weeks ago. I will start by saying that we have an extract from an Economist article saying that, since we left, things have deteriorated with strikes. It says things like: the unity government is “as good as dead” and that Harare is “abuzz” with talk of early elections and so forth. What is the political situation? Has it changed that dramatically in the last couple of weeks? Perhaps that would be the first question to ask, and then a couple more will arise from it.

Mr Thomas: I do not think the political situation in Zimbabwe can ever have been described as easy. We have always expected that there would be difficult periods between the formation of the Inclusive Government and eventually free and fair elections taking place. You are obviously aware that there have been reports of both strike action over salaries and of other tensions within the Inclusive Government. Whether or not it leads to elections sooner rather than later, I am not in a position to make that judgment, frankly, and I do not think any of us are in a position to make that judgment. We knew that the period between the formation of the government and elections would be a protracted and difficult period, and events are bearing that out.

Q52 Chairman: Have you seen this article from The Economist?

Mr Thomas: I have not seen that article.

Q53 Chairman: Is that an accurate reflection of the current situation? That is worse than the situation we would have observed three weeks ago. Saying things like the Government of National Unity is “as good as dead.” and “Mr Zuma appears to agree that the unity government has become a sham” but that he does not want any trouble before the World Cup. It says that Mr Tsvangirai has given up all his demands, other than to try to see if he can get space for free and fair elections. There is then this “indigenisation” rule, saying that every company worth more than half a million dollars needs to provide a 51% stake to black Zimbabweans – which is a blatantly racist policy. That, even in relation to three weeks ago, appears to be a serious degradation of the situation.

Mr Thomas: I have no sense that the President of South Africa has given up on the mediation process that SADC have in place and have under way. Our sense, certainly, is that the key players in the Inclusive Government have not given up the sense of the work programme to which the government is committed. As I say, there are tensions at the heart of the Inclusive Government. As we all recognise, political power continues to be very contested. Inevitably, when you have a situation like that there are going to be moments of high tension as well as moments where tensions are relatively lessened. I think we are probably in one of the tenser periods at the moment.

Q54 Chairman: We will explore this in more detail, but for the ordinary people, some of whom at least were getting access to education and health and other services, has the position changed significantly in the last few weeks? Or, in spite of those background difficulties and the strikes, are those services still being delivered?

Mr Thomas: There has been an improvement in the delivery of basic services, as I think you had the chance to see for yourselves when you were in Zimbabwe. Having said that, there are huge challenges still in terms of the delivery of those services. The crisis in terms of access to healthcare which was at the heart of the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe has not gone away, albeit there are more health workers in place. In terms of your specific question, our sense is that basic services are still in place, but they are very basic, and there is still a much longer transition to more recognisable, good quality health, education and other services to take place. The Department staff in Zimbabwe continue to look at what else we can do to improve the quality of those basic services, but that is very much a job in hand, as I suspect you will have seen for yourself when you were there.

Q55 Chairman: The final political point: a call for early elections. That was in the air when we were there. The counter-argument was that you could not possibly have free and fair elections if they were early because the register does not exist – and to the extent that it does exist, it is completely stacked to the benefit of ZANU-PF. Is this call for early elections a realistic call? Is it achievable? Is it desirable?

Mr Thomas: It is difficult to believe that free and fair elections would take place if they took place in the short term. As you say, there are substantial changes that are required, in terms of thinking through issues around voter education, constituency boundaries, the behaviour of the security forces, the role of the diaspora in getting the right to vote. It is difficult to see how free and fair elections could take place in the short term, certainly.

Q56 Chairman: That would imply that you think more time is needed to get those issues straight.

Mr Thomas: Certainly, our view is that what was included in the Global Political Agreement in terms of changes that were going to be needed has not happened as yet. The Electoral Commission is not up and functioning yet, albeit its head has been appointed – although not, I believe, formally confirmed. We would want to see the Electoral Commission being able to go about its work, completing the process of reform that everybody recognises is necessary if free and fair elections are going to take place.

Q57 Chairman: Mr Dennis, do you want to add any comments?

Mr Dennis: I have no comments to add, thank you.

Chairman: Richard Burden.

Q58 Richard Burden: One of the pots of support that DFID has been providing has been to the Office of the Prime Minister. We understand that the purpose of that funding is around enabling that as an office to fulfil its role under the GPA. When we met Prime Minister Tsvangirai over there, he felt that that DFID funding had been particularly useful in fulfilling the obligation to the GPA but he felt more could be done and extra support to his office would be well used, in particular, on the same sort of areas: helping the Prime Minister’s role to lead executive business in parliament and so on. Are there any plans to increase that support?

Mr Thomas: Certainly, if further approaches for assistance were made to us, be it by the Prime Minister or indeed any other ministry that is committed to reform and to a pro-poor agenda, then we would look at them very sympathetically. As you say, our support is designed to enable the Office of the Prime Minister to carry out the sort of normal functions that a head of state’s office would, including oversight of the budget, making sure that the different ministries are following through on the government’s agreed work plan, and helping to resolve disputes between government departments were they to happen. Certainly, that has been the purpose behind granting the assistance that we have done. We also, as you may be aware, granted assistance to a number of other departments to help them carry out the basic functions of their ministries, not least the Ministry of Finance to help them with the budgeting process.

Q59 Richard Burden: In terms of the level of that support, if a case were made that increases in that would be consistent with the objectives, would that be something that we would be prepared to look at?

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We have increased our aid programme to Zimbabwe over the last 12 months from £49 million to £60 million. Of course, we are looking for the measures that can have most impact most quickly in terms of helping the Zimbabweans get access to better services. Clearly, helping key ministries be better functioning so that they can drive that process, is sensible. When a prime minister or other key minister asks for assistance, of course we always look at that sympathetically. We would have to make a judgment about its relative merit as against other programme asks, but we certainly would not rule it out by any means.

Q60 Richard Burden: What kind of conditionality would be applied if funding were to be extended?

Mr Thomas: We would want to make sure that the assistance that is offered is being used to help promote reform, is being used to help deliver pro-poor services. Those would be the key conditions, as such. “Conditions” is probably the wrong phraseology to use in that sense, in that it has a resonance of the bad old days of Structural Adjustment Programmes. “Conditions” is not a term we would use, in that sense. Certainly, in terms of the decisions we might take about how we allocate aid in future, be it by a minister’s office or for a big programme of humanitarian assistance, we would want to be convinced that it was helping to deliver a pro-poor agenda, that it was going to lead to significant reforms in the way services are delivered. Those would be, if you like, the guiding principles for the decisions we might take.

Q61 Hugh Bayley: I want to ask a question about support for a free and independent media. I should preface my remark by saying that, if any government anywhere in the world funds the media, you need to ensure that that there is editorial independence and no control from the funder, as, for instance, with the BBC World Service. I recall in the run-up to liberation in both Namibia and South Africa there was British funding for the Namibian newspaper, possibly for The Sowetan, and it was seen as important to have some forums which were not under state control disseminating information. The print media in Zimbabwe is very strongly controlled by the state. I wonder what thought both of your Departments have given to ensure that, in the run-up between now and elections, whenever they come, there is fair and unbiased information about electoral registration, about the platforms of relative parties, the achievements of ministers and their ministries. Is that something which your Department should be funding or possibly the Foreign Office should be funding, or both?

Mr Thomas: First, there is no doubt that we would want to see reforms in the way the media operate and are organised to allow more independent activity by different media operations of one sort of another. The return of the BBC is undoubtedly a positive step. Key to wider change in how the media sector operates is the establishment of the media commission as heralded in the GPA. Again, like the Electoral Commission, it has not yet started doing its work, and that will be a key issue for the international community to continue to watch. It is certainly a key issue set out in the GPA where progress is needed. In terms of the run-up to free and fair elections, absolutely. A substantial programme of voter education would be required, the media clearly would have an important role in that. If we were asked to be part of a multi-donor group supporting an election process, of course we would want to consider doing that. Again, where we have been asked to enable elections to take place in a free and fair way, we have provided support in other countries to election funding arrangements. As I say, we would be happy to look at that, if we were asked, when the time came.

Q62 Hugh Bayley: Given that the barriers to the dissemination of information and the history of intimidation are probably greater in rural areas than in urban areas, I would have thought radio was a particularly important medium. Are you satisfied that there is wide access to radio giving independent and unbiased news across the country?

Mr Thomas: It is not just radio where there is an issue; it is the media in general. There is not free and fair access to the media in any way in which any of us in the room would recognise. That is clearly one of the areas, as set out in the GPA, where substantial reform is necessary. Like others in the international community, we would want to see progress in that area, not just so that elections can take place but, also, so that the executive can be held to account regardless of their political affiliation in that sense.

Hugh Bayley: One final question on culture. DFID does not normally make the promotion of culture a priority: you would defer, I suppose, to the British Council or others. We held a reception at the Bookshop Café and that seemed to me to be an oasis of free expression.

Chairman: From time to time. When it was not being disrupted.

Q63 Hugh Bayley: Relative free expression, yes. There is a strong tradition throughout Africa of music – I think of Fela Kuti and Miriam Makeba – permitting things to be said which could not be published in a manifesto. Would either of your Departments – yours through the British Council, Mr Dennis, or DFID – think about providing unusually and atypically support for freedom of expression through culture or arts?

Mr Thomas: I do not know where the Foreign Secretary is on music. In terms of DFID, again it is about the balance and the opportunity cost of providing funding in one particular way as against others. You are right that freedom of expression is hugely important, whether it is through music, through media, through other sources of activity.

Q64 Hugh Bayley: We were given a couple of booklets published by the British Council, which I thought was quite a courageous bit of work.

Mr Thomas: Do not get me wrong, I think the British Council does hugely important work. We are contributing, along with others, in helping to promote freedom of expression through the constitution review process, where UNDP, with our support, have started to fund work that we hope will allow civil society to engage in thinking about the type of constitution and the type of state that Zimbabwe should have in the future. That is one of the few ways at the moment – though it is very imperfect, as you will, I am sure, have had a sense – in which civil society and Zimbabwean citizens can begin to air views and bounce ideas around about the future of their country. In that sense, it is a hugely important process. It is not just us who are funding it – it is being led, as I say, by UNDP – but it is one way in which we are beginning to see some signs of growing freedom of expression.

Chairman: Mark Lancaster.

Q65 Mr Lancaster: Thank you, Chairman. I want to explore slightly beyond Zimbabwe’s boundaries and its relationship with other countries in the region. Of course historically, before 1994, when we saw the end of apartheid, Zimbabwe was very much the centre for the region, but relationships with surrounding countries have deteriorated to a degree, particularly those with South Africa and Botswana because of the Zimbabwe diaspora. What do you think surrounding countries can do to help in assisting the development of Zimbabwe, not least when it comes to finding a permanent political solution?

Mr Thomas: SADC, in that sense, the group of Zimbabwe’s neighbours, has a key role to play and has accepted that role in terms of acting as guarantors of the Global Political Agreement. It is encouraging that there is a mediation process underway. It is a process I welcome but it is very much a process that we need to respect, as SADC leading on that process and fulfilling the role that it has. You asked me specifically about South Africa. South Africa is probably the country that has seen most migration of Zimbabweans who have fled the country or have left the country into South Africa. Zimbabwe is very much a domestic issue for President Zuma and the South African government, as it is an international or a regional issue. You are right to flag the continuing importance of the region for resolving the political tensions in Zimbabwe. It is a process that we are obviously monitoring closely, but SADC is very much in the lead in that process.

Q66 Mr Lancaster: I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I think SADC do have a key role to play, but, given the Chairman’s opening questions and the deterioration at the moment, and notwithstanding that it is right that SADC should take the lead, what more can we do in supporting SADC to try to resolve some of these situations? Or should we not do anything?

Mr Thomas: First, we have to respect the mediation process that President Zuma has put in place. He has appointed a high-level team with significant reputations themselves to lead on that mediation process and, despite moments of high tension, which we all recognise will occur as the GPA process moves forward, we have to respect that mediation effort that President Zuma’s team on behalf of SADC is leading. The other ways in which we can help are more direct, frankly, and that is through our development programme. It is important for the people of Zimbabwe that there has been economic progress, and I think the economic progress is beginning to throw the spotlight on to the lack of political progress that has taken place in Zimbabwe. Through some of the assistance to the Ministry of Finance and through our humanitarian programmes we have played a small role, but an important role, along with others in the international community, in helping the stabilisation of the economy, and in that sense allowing the issues around the political process and the lack of sufficient political reform to be further highlighted, both for SADC to continue to deal with and also for the government to continue to have to deal with.

Q67 Mr Lancaster: Is it quite a difficult tightrope to walk really? For example, when we were there, you will be aware from all the talk in the papers that they had seized on comments that the Foreign Secretary had made in the chamber and they were being spun one way by one party and the other way by the other. Is it quite a difficult tightrope to walk, where on the one hand, everybody in this room, I am sure, wants to see development and progression within Zimbabwe in helping to secure that political process, but, as soon as we are vocal, it can sometimes be counterproductive whilst at the same time trying to support this process? Is that tricky? How do we find that balance between the two?

Mr Thomas: That is not true just of Zimbabwe, it is true of a whole series of relationships that we have with countries. Sometimes, you are right, there is a tightrope to walk.

Q68 Mr Lancaster: Are we getting it right, I suppose is what I am asking?

Mr Thomas: Are we getting it right? I think we are getting the balance right. We have a rising development programme. We do continue to deliver tough messages to all members of the Zimbabwean government, regardless of their political affiliation, and we continue to look to the leadership of both South Africa and SADC more generally to provide that on-the-spot mediation work that they are doing.

Q69 Chairman: Taking The Economist article, it describes SADC as a fairly spineless 15-member regional group. Zimbabwe has already defied their court rulings. They have just adopted another racist agenda which presumably would fall foul of the South Africans. Mr Mugabe’s attitude seems to be: “I don’t recognise SADC. It doesn’t bother me. If it suits me, I will pray them in aid, otherwise I will ignore them.” What can we do to persuade SADC to stand up for what it says it believes in?

Mr Thomas: If SADC was not prepared to play the role that it is playing, we would not have seen President Zuma set up a high-level mediation group, and we would not have seen that mediation group engaging in the very direct way in which it has done. I do think we have to be careful not to respond to some of the bluster from particular politicians in Zimbabwe at the moment and allow the SADC mediation process to continue. On occasion, we deliver blunt messages to all the members of the Zimbabwe government when it is required, and we provide direct assistance to help the journey of reform where it is appropriate to do so. There is also this international effort through SADC, and we have to allow it to continue to do its work and not be put off, if you will forgive me for saying so, by particular articles or particular comments by particular leaders in Zimbabwe.

Chairman: Nigel Evans.

Q70 Mr Evans: Thank you, Chairman. President Zuma is in London next week for a State Visit. Do I assume that yourself and the Foreign Secretary will be meeting with him and, if so, that you will raise the mediation process?

Mr Thomas: It would be pretty odd if he came to the UK and there were not conversations with the Foreign Secretary and the Development Secretary. I am sure there will be a whole series of conversations about affairs in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe will inevitably be one of those areas that gets discussed, but there is a broad agenda for the State Visit, so it is not the only issue that will come up by any means.

Q71 Mr Evans: No, I assume that other things will be spoken about as well, but clearly his important role in Zimbabwe is fully recognised by the world community.

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We recognise that he is playing a key role and we respect that. The decision that he took to set up a three-member mediation team and to include in that team some people who are extremely well respected in southern African politics was a sign of the seriousness with which he views the situation in Zimbabwe, but those were decisions that he took and we have to respect his leadership, given the importance of South Africa to SADC. Obviously, as I say, we will talk inevitably about Zimbabwe. It is one of the issues that will be on the agenda, but there will be a whole series of other issues that we have to talk through as well.

Q72 Mr Evans: I want to touch on land reform, but before I do that the Chairman referred to The Economist piece about businesses having a 51% stake by black Zimbabweans. Does the Government see that as a racist policy?

Mr Thomas: With all decisions in South Africa, the key test is avoiding explosive language. The concern we would have is more about the impact of particular policies on the economy and on the people of Zimbabwe, so if it makes investment in Zimbabwe less likely, if it reduces the chance of jobs being made available, then of course it has to be a considerable concern. One of the issues, as the Committee will recognise, as to why so many people have left South Africa is the lack of job opportunities, so anything that prevents the private sector from beginning to develop, anything that further discourages private sector investment, is clearly going to be a major concern, but in the end this has to be a decision that Zimbabwe takes for itself.

Q73 Mr Evans: But clearly it is a racist policy. If you say that there are a lot of white Zimbabweans living there and people who are not black Zimbabweans living there, surely they should have an opportunity to be able to be a major partner in whatever businesses exist within a country. If any other country did this sort of thing, we would be banging the table and saying, “This is racist.”

Mr Thomas: We want everybody in Zimbabwe to have equal economic opportunities in that sense, quite clearly, but sometimes there is a way of recognising that a whole series of reforms are required. I appreciate, Mr Evans, that you might want me to use particular phrases to describe a particular set of policies but, with respect, I am not going to do that. The broad message is that there has been progress in terms of the economy. We do not want that progress put at risk. We want the economy to stabilise still further. That is going to require a whole series of political reforms now to take place to create the conditions for longer-term private sector investment to take place.

Q74 Mr Evans: That leads me on to land reform, which is part of the reforms that clearly are essential to get some sort of progress and stability within Zimbabwe. Have you seen the documentary Mugabe and the White African?

Mr Thomas: I have not, no.

Q75 Mr Evans: I would heartily recommend it because our Committee has had an opportunity to see it. It is quite startling exactly what pressures clearly are on white farmers who exist within Zimbabwe. It is an incredible and very moving documentary. Clearly a number of people have had their lands grabbed, basically in a way that is not helping Zimbabwe. One can understand the reason for reform – we talked to the Commercial Farmers Union when we were in Zimbabwe and they can understand the sense for reform too – but something that is not orderly, something that is not structured, and something that leads to so much farmland being taken out of production and, indeed, then handed over to the cronies of politicians or friends within Zimbabwe, clearly is not doing Zimbabwe any favours.

Mr Thomas: I would agree with that. I would go further and say that not only do we condemn the huge number of farm invasions that have taken place, but we have seen terrible human rights abuses committed as part of those invasions which are completely unacceptable, both on an individual basis, the individual rights of the people affected, but also, as you quite rightly describe it, in terms of the devastating impact it has had particularly on the rural agricultural economy. Frankly, “economic madness” would be an appropriate phrase to use to describe that. I hope that that situation will desist. We will continue to make that clear in our comments to the politicians in Zimbabwe. It is clear that we do need to see a land policy that is fair, that is pro-poor, that is transparent, because that will, as you say, help to revive the economy, particularly in rural areas. It would help to revive the agriculture sector. We are a long way from that point at the moment, but we would stand ready, as part of a wider donor group, to help in that process if the political conditions were right. I suspect, frankly, the first step would be for some sort of land audit to take place, if the Inclusive Government were so minded, but, at the moment, we are not seeing signs that there is a willingness by all the parties to the Inclusive Government for a fairer land policy to take place.

Q76 Mr Evans: They seem to be dragging their feet on doing anything about a land audit, but clearly that looks like being a necessary forerunner to making some real progress in that area. You have just mentioned the international community doing its bit, along with the United Kingdom, in trying to bring some sort of commonsense solution to this issue. What do you think the international community and Britain specifically can do in this area?

Mr Thomas: As I have said, we do stand ready to provide assistance, as part of a wider donor group, if we are asked to. As I have said, the first thing would be to conduct an audit of land. Frankly, we would only see a merit in such an audit taking place if we had confidence that the information that such an audit gleaned would be used to promote the type of pro-poor, sensible, transparent land reform policy that most people independent of some of those in Zimbabwe recognise as being necessary to revive the rural economy there. We stand ready to help as part of a wider international effort if the conditions are right. They are not right at the moment.

Q77 Mr Evans: Even with the hyperinflation that the country has gone through, a lot of white farmers have gone to neighbouring African countries, as I understand it, and set up businesses there and are doing rather well. I suspect that Zimbabwe is importing some of the produce now of the former white Zimbabwean farmers – which is clearly insane. Do you think we are getting any closer to the political reality within Zimbabwe that a solution should be found? Or do you think that the mentality is still: no, we wish to right the wrongs of many generations and we do not care about economic or humane consequences of what the policy is that we are now doing in Zimbabwe?

Mr Thomas: Unfortunately, land is one of those issues around which the political power continues to be very heavily contested. As I described in my comments earlier, whilst we have seen some progress in terms of the stabilisation of the economy in Zimbabwe, we have not yet seen the major political changes which the GPA has set out as being necessary. One of the areas where we are continuing to see (to use a diplomatic phrase) “unfortunate activity” is around land. I hope, as the economy has begun to stabilise, that there will be recognition in all parts of the Inclusive Government of a series of further steps that need to be taken to help that economic progress. If those political realities kick in, then perhaps we will get closer to the situation that you describe.

Q78 Hugh Bayley: Do you not think it would be helpful if the British Government were to acknowledge that the terms on which white settlers, many from this country, obtained land at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was not fair and did not follow the rule of law, and that the consequence for many indigenous people was that they were forced on to marginal land and suffered enormously? If we were to say that, then perhaps we would be in a better position to oppose the wrongs of fast-track land reform and to move the debate on to a position you were talking about, of pro-poor, rural development – which is what Zimbabwe clearly needs – rather than a return to settler plantations.

Mr Thomas: With respect, Mr Bayley, I am not sure it would be helpful. I think I should take responsibility for what we as a party have done since we took power in terms of our aid programmes and our foreign policy since 1997. I am not sure we should try to reach back all the time into history to look at what happened a very long time ago. We need to deal – forgive me for saying so – with the realities on the ground at the moment. In that sense, the report that your party group produced was very helpful in trying to put to bed some of the misnomers that have existed around what happened in 1980, but, despite the importance of that report, we should rather think ahead. We should recognise, as Mr Evans has described, the continuing adverse implications of the land policy which particular elements in the government are pursuing from time to time and recognise that there needs to be a comprehensive change in terms of land policy at some time which needs to be led by the government in Zimbabwe, but which, if the conditions were right, we would stand ready to support.

Q79 Hugh Bayley: I think you are right to want to see a land audit, but if British money alongside money from other donors is to go towards establishing land title for poor landless Zimbabweans, how would you see that process unfolding? In other words, how would you select the landless poor? Who would get land? Who would you compensate?

Mr Thomas: Mr Bayley, with respect, I am not going to go down that particular route. That is a process that the government of Zimbabwe has to lead, and I hope it is a government that would be elected in free and fair elections so that it had a clear mandate. I have said that we would be ready to help as part of a series of donors with such an audit if we could be convinced that the information from that audit was going to be used properly. We do not have those conditions at the moment. We do stand ready to help, as I say, but we are not going to put money on the table when, frankly, we know that there is a series of other priorities where we can have a sense that our money were to achieve good outcomes for the poor in Zimbabwe more immediately. But we recognise the importance of the land issue and staff and ministers will be ready to respond if the political conditions changed.

Q80 Chairman: We agreed, anyway, that, whilst we would refer to the land issue, it was not going to be central to our report because it is such a major issue, but I think Mr Bayley has put his finger on some of the background to it. You just mentioned about effective DFID programmes. Indeed, DFID is doing a lot of the co-ordination on the ground and that seems to be welcomed by a number of the NGOs and charities. Two things were said to us: one was that if things improve a lot more donors are likely to come in and it is important that co-ordination is established in advance, otherwise it could get chaotic. That, on the other hand, may be too optimistic in terms of what is likely to happen. But you cannot give the funding directly to the government in most cases. Does that make it much more difficult to co-ordinate? Clearly other donors may not be very keen to hand it over to one lead donor, so what mechanisms do you need to have in place, or what could you do to ensure that the relationship between donors and the government is more direct than it is now? What are the criteria that would need to be met?

Mr Thomas: We are a long way away from having confidence in the systems of the government of Zimbabwe, so it is a long way off before we would want to be putting money directly into the government of Zimbabwe’s budget. Nevertheless, there are a number of ministries which are developing plans which are pro-poor, which are designed to help all communities across Zimbabwe and behind which we feel we can align some of our support, so there are discussions with government about their future plans and we are trying, as you say, to work with other donors where we have confidence in those plans or in the merits of those plans to put our financial assistance to support the achievement of those plans. In terms of the broader issue about donor co-ordination, you are right that donors are co-ordinating in general fairly well, particularly those which are traditional OECD Development Assistance Committee donors. There could still be better co-ordination with the World Bank and others within the UN system. In the longer term, if we can draw some of the non-traditional donors into the donor co-ordination process, players like China, like South Africa, like Brazil, that would clearly be an aspiration that we would want to have, not just in the Zimbabwe context but in a whole series of other developing country contexts too. Also, the donor co-ordination mechanisms are relatively informal at the moment. As you say, if conditions continue to improve and other donors were to come in, then we would need perhaps to formalise some of the donor co-ordination structures that are there at the moment, but, in general, relations between the main donors are very positive, as you describe.

Q81 Chairman: You have increased the programme in recent years in difficult situations. If you were going to put more money in, are you satisfied that the mechanisms you have in place would be effective, or would you need to find different or better ways of delivering it?

Mr Thomas: We are comfortable that the mechanisms we have available at the moment are strong enough and robust enough to ensure that the money that we are spending in Zimbabwe is going to where it should go. Clearly, if you increase your aid programme into a country, you have to think through what implications that has for the particular funding instruments that you use. We work, as you know, with UN agencies and NGOs but also with a number of private sector organisations which manage particular programmes of aid for us. As I say, we have a strong process for monitoring how our money operates. Thus far, we are confident that we have managed to make a significant difference with our money. If we were to increase funding substantially, then clearly we would look at the mechanisms we had available to us.

Chairman: If we are moving on to that, I will bring in John Battle.

Q82 John Battle: In a sense, the real issue is governance, from my experience of the visit we did, in particular the field visit. I would like to express gratitude to the staff at DFID who took us out of Harare to Bulawayo. I went with some of our colleagues to Tsholotsho and I was very encouraged and impressed by work on the ground, not least around the Protracted Relief Programme. All these things have great titles, but I found a programme there to reach to people who were poor, the poorest of the poor, the people who were landless, to try to get back their livelihoods, with a whole range of activities from home care right the way through. I was very, very impressed by that programme. I just want to ask you a couple of questions about it. If that has gone in the right direction, can it be amplified and done elsewhere? The programme has two phases, as I understand it, and we have just entered Phase II. Phase I was going for a few years. I am lost at the scale of it. As I stood in a field in Tsholotsho with those older women, trying out new cultivation techniques for getting more water into their plants so that their fields of maize and cowpeas would look rather healthier than the ones across the way, I asked whether there was just one field or thousands of fields like that. In the DFID letter it says that the programme is reaching over two million poor and vulnerable people, but the plan for Phase II is to reach two million people, and sometimes we include the two million that we have not quite yet reached. I want to know the extent of the programme. Is it really being disseminated across? Do you have just one field in Tsholotsho or do you have programmes elsewhere in the country? Can it be scaled up? I know the programme is working with other donors as well, but is the scaling up happening and is it possible for it to happen? Can you find the land? Can the people respond to it? Can it be a much more mobile programme than just one or two little pivotal projects?

Mr Thomas: I will bring in Mr Lowcock in just a minute, but, first, thank you for your comments about DFID staff in Zimbabwe. If I may, I will to put on record my appreciation for the work they do. They have had to operate in some extremely difficult circumstances in the past.

Q83 John Battle: Indeed.

Mr Thomas: As Members will recognise, we have some of our most talented staff deployed in Zimbabwe, given the importance of the work we are doing there. The Protracted Relief Programme has expanded. It is not just that one field that you were sent to, but let me bring Mr Lowcock in to amplify on that.

Mr Lowcock: It is a long time since I have been in Tsholotsho, so I am glad to hear that particular report. The programme covers 300,000 households, which is about two million people, which is probably 20%.

Q84 John Battle: At present?

Mr Lowcock: At present, yes.

Q85 John Battle: The target for Phase II was to reach two million people.

Mr Lowcock: I think that is the current coverage.

Q86 John Battle: So you are already well ahead.

Mr Lowcock: I think that is the case, Mr Battle, yes.

Q87 John Battle: Good. What about the range of activities? Many of the NGOs praise the programme for its innovation in reaching from home care, and quite personal support, to innovative agricultural techniques, including community participation. While we sometimes focus on, as I said, governance at the government level, the new engagement of the people is the real innovative work that DFID and other NGOs are leading internationally. Is that integration being extended? Is that development of those kinds of participatory tools able to take place? I felt the local officials were not resisting it at the local level, which augured well for the future of Zimbabwe if it could be scaled up from the bottom. Is that the view of the Department in the work that is going on at field level, at floor level?

Mr Thomas: Absolutely. We would want to continue to see that programme scaled up. There is a series of developing countries – and I think of Afghanistan – where we have similar grassroots programmes. We are particularly fortunate in Zimbabwe to have very many committed civil society organisations which are playing, as you describe, a crucial role in helping to identify who needs the support that the PRP programme can give in communities most. As you say, the range of support we are able to give is a particularly important feature of the programme, from the very direct assistance, be it seeds and fertilizers or home care, to some of the more technical assistance, to help NGOs help the individual farmers understand what they have to do to increase their yields. As you say, it is an innovative programme and we have been encouraged by the international community’s response to that programme. As you know, Phase I was very much a programme that DFID initiated. Phase II has had much broader donor support and in that sense has become a proper multi-donor programme.

Q88 John Battle: What struck me as well was that perhaps with the word “farmer” in English we think of some strapping young man who is ultra-fit out there in the fields, but there were women who were older than I am and what impressed me immensely was they have not had the benefit of my education but their knowledge of agriculture and agricultural techniques was incredible. I was quite excited by this new conservation agriculture method and I wonder whether your Department is able to feed that into DFID and some of the climate change discussions and see if those methods can be tested out elsewhere in Africa and South East Asia so that the learning from innovation can be passed on? I thought as well as the process of engagement with the people there may be some good agricultural science in there that could be very helpful as well.

Mr Thomas: Far be it from me to suggest recommendations to the Committee but drawing that particular point out would certainly help us continue to spread some of the lessons from the Zimbabwe programme across our other country programmes. As you quite rightly said, the lessons in terms of climate change, in terms of the particular farming environment, if you like, in which our programme operates does potentially give information that would be useful in a whole series of other developing countries – Sedex – particularly in the climate change context. As you know, one of the priorities that the Secretary of State set out in last year’s White Paper was for us to do more on climate change in developing countries. Learning the lessons from successful programmes such as the PRP where there is a climate element is exactly the type of thing that we need to continue to spread across the Department.

Q89 John Battle: It was noticeable that we were speaking directly with the women, the farmers themselves, not through an intermediary, an agent, the NGO’s leader or even the DFID person. DFID is actually involved in the programming. If I can put it to you this way: I understand DFID now uses managing agents and some of the conversations suggest that using agents can become bureaucratic and can tie up resources of the partner NGOs having to fill in analyses and sometimes the direct link with DFID is not quite there, as it were. Although we had the experience of talking to someone in the field, when the process is taking place on a daily programme basis is the use of managing agents causing delays in the transaction between DFID and the work on the ground? Is it sometimes holding up the provision of DFID support?

Mr Thomas: We need to recognise that there was a substantial difference between Phase 1 of the PRP and Phase 2. Phase 2 is inevitably much more ambitious and involves a series of other donors. In a sense, what you want from your staff is that they make things happen on the ground in terms of developing countries. Our staff initiated this programme and as others come onboard the pressures on those staff and their ability to do other things would inevitably have been much more constricted if they had continued to run the programme direct, so we took the decision to bring in a private sector operator and there was an international tender, as I understand. Inevitably, when you have that sort of change there are one or two bumps along the process. What the head of the DFID office in Zimbabwe is making sure happens is that there are regular, I believe quarterly, meetings with the heads of civil society groups in Zimbabwe to make sure that we continue to have good coordination with civil society. That will clearly be of importance, not just in terms of the PRP programme but also in terms of the other programmes that we have.

Q90 John Battle: I will pass to Andrew in a second. It was expressed to us that there could be a distancing built in. What would worry me is that what seems to be really radical – to use a word, I think it is connected to the word “roots” – about DFID’s work is that ability to reconnect at the ground floor level and get the pro-poor development going on there and then feed it back up through. If you build a layer in that cuts them off again it could undermine some of the good work that has been done. I think Andrew wanted to follow through on this.

Mr Thomas: May I just pick that point up and bring Mr Lowcock in in a second. I think if there was not regular communication with civil society then, you are right, that would be a concern. In order specifically to avoid any suggestion that we are getting remote we wanted to set up a proper process for communicating with key players in civil society, and that is what we have now initiated.

Mr Lowcock: I would just like to put on the record that we have three members of staff in the Harare office who still work primarily on this programme and they are spending less of their time on the routine administration and more of it on the strategic dialogue and, indeed, at least once a month going out to regions like Tsholotsho and seeing what is happening. In terms of the objectives of making sure we stay in touch with the goals and the delivery of those goals, the way we have organised the work is an improvement on the past arrangement.

Q91 Andrew Stunell: If I could just pick up where John finished. First of all I want to say that we saw some excellent on the ground projects which will be the anecdotes and illustrations of my presentation about the work the Department does for a long time. They were very good projects.

Mr Thomas: But.

Q92 Andrew Stunell: The “but” is that there are so many levels between the money going in from the office in Harare to the wheelchair-bound lady with her four chickens in the compound outside Bulawayo that we have paid for. There is the managing agent, there is the Zimbabwe-wide NGO and there is civic society. When we pour £100 in at the top in Harare, how much goes out and buys chickens at the bottom, where does the other money stop on the way and what is the value of that other money on the way in terms of the investment in civic society and so on?

Mr Thomas: I would have to get you the exact breakdown in terms of the portion of what we put into the PRP programme that is taken up, if you like, as administration costs. We need to be careful and to recognise that those different layers, as you have described them, also play a key function in helping us to account for how the money is spent, making sure that money goes to the most needy people in Zimbabwe but also that we have proper accounting processes in place. I can see that as the programme has got bigger certainly one or two people have raised concerns, but I do think it is important that we have that administration element in there so that we do have proper checks and balances. We will very happily provide for the Committee, Mr Stunell, a more detailed explanation of what portion of the PRP programme goes as administrative costs if that would be helpful.

Mr Lowcock: May I make an additional point? As well as the cost of delivering the programme we need to think about what the returns and benefits of the programme are. It costs about $70 per household to provide the assistance we provide under the PRP and the value of the production that is generated by that $70 is about $140, it is a very high rate of return. The alternative to providing some of the inputs that we have provided would be in many cases to provide food aid which would cost us between $700 and $1,000. The opportunity saving of this programme is very high and the rate of return on the programme is also very high. The numbers I have given you reflect the administration costs as well as the costs of the inputs. We honestly think that in terms of value for money this is a very effective programme.

Q93 Chairman: I think it is a very important question that Mr Stunell is asking. As you will know, Minister, we are up against rather tight timetables. The constitutional requirements tell us that we have to have this report done in a very short space of time, so if you are able to give us that breakdown we need it very soon. I think it would be very helpful.

Mr Thomas: Okay. We will see if we can do that.

Q94 Andrew Stunell: I just want to underline that point. To give us real confidence that Mr Lowcock’s presentation is resilient, it would be helpful to have an additional report and note from you.

Mr Thomas: Okay. We will get that to you even quicker than usual.

Q95 Richard Burden: This is really on the same subject. From what we saw, I think we do understand why managing agents are used and the good pressures that lead DFID to go down that road. It is also fair to say that in terms of the projects we saw in Tsholotsho and the engagement of the women from GRM there it appeared to be good. However, I think the uncertainty that some of us still feel is whether we will get to a stage where the tail starts to wag the dog. If the need to have those managing agents is because of their expertise and they get such expertise that they are used not just by DFID but other partners as well, the danger is that they could then become intermediaries that start determining what happens rather than intermediaries that do what is required from the grassroots or reflecting policy. I do not think we are saying that is what is happening but we see there is a danger that could happen. The question really is, is it right that could be a danger and, if so, how do you guard against it?

Mr Thomas: Let me bring Mr Lowcock in in a second. When we take a decision that we want to contract out, if you like, the management of a particular programme there are a whole series of well-established processes which we follow. We are very happy to provide some further information to the Committee if that is what you need to give you some confidence that the tail will not wag the dog in this particular context. There is good donor coordination in Zimbabwe and, as I say, we have some very experienced staff operating in our office, so I do not believe, if you like, the worst case scenario that you are posing would happen. Let me bring Mr Lowcock in to give you some further detail.

Mr Lowcock: I think you are exactly right, Mr Burden, that in principle the problem you have described could be one we face. We have tried to describe how we are mitigating it in this case. The Committee knows very well the staff of the Department is quite stretched. If we had more staff available to us in Zimbabwe my own view would be that are were other things I would rather they did next before more administration and more detailed monitoring and engagement on the PRP. I am satisfied with the approach that we have to the management of the PRP at the moment.

Mr Thomas: Just one other point to make. It is not just us as one donor who plays a role in this, there are a series of other donors who also are funders of the PRP. In a sense, it is a shared process for looking at the administrative cost element and taking decisions about tenders, et cetera, which in that sense I hope gives further confidence and further checks into the system.

Q96 Andrew Stunell: I would like to hear from Mr Lowcock that if he did have those extra staff and it is not what Mr Burden was postulating, what would it be that the extra staff would be dedicated to?

Mr Lowcock: One of the issues that came up in discussions yesterday with the finance minister in Harare was follow-up to a discussion he had in Washington last week when the board of the IMF restored Zimbabwe’s voting rights. He had some discussions with the staff of the IMF about what it would take for Zimbabwe to move towards fuller normalisation of its relations with the international financial institutions, including potentially debt relief. We have a very good economist, who I am sure you met, in our office in Harare, who is one of a rather small number – I think I could count them on my fingers, excluding the thumb, of one hand – of international macroeconomists in Harare at the moment. That is a big prize for Zimbabwe to normalise its relations to that degree, an awful lot has to be done to secure that prize, but that would certainly be an area where it would be worth putting additional professional resources in. We will find ways to do that. That is one example I would give in answer to your question.

Q97 Mr Lancaster: We will move on to health, if we may. The Committee visited two hospitals, the Mpilo Hospital in Bulawayo and a hospital in Harare. We saw the maternity unit and we saw programmes associated with HIV/AIDS which Mr Evans will ask questions about in a moment. What we saw was very good. One of the key points that was put across to us, and perhaps we should not be surprised at this given the diaspora and the migration, was that there is a real shortage of skilled health workers, many of whom have gone abroad. For example, in the hospital in Bulawayo they had only recruited approximately 50% of midwives, although there is a midwife shortage in the UK so perhaps that is a bad example. What are we doing to try and recruit and retain health specialist staff in Zimbabwe?

Mr Thomas: One of the things, as I suspect the Committee will be aware of, that has, if you like, continued to focus our attention on the health sector was the cholera crisis in 2008/09 where the crisis was sparked by a long-term lack of investment in water and sanitation, but also the substantial deterioration in the health sector which was caused by many health workers wanting to migrate or simply not coming into work because they were not being paid. What we have done is to ensure that there is an allowance paid directly into health workers’ bank accounts to provide that direct incentive for them to turn up to work and to go about their business. We can provide direct assistance in that way, but in the end there has got to be further economic stabilisation and a further reduction in the political instability that exists in Zimbabwe. We can make a difference in terms of public services, but to get anything like the type of public services that we would recognise here in the UK those broader economic and political changes are going to have to happen. As I say, we are making a difference in terms of the allowances we fund directly into health workers’ bank accounts which has helped recruitment to pick up. We are also helping to fund the supply of crucial drugs. If you look at the government of Zimbabwe’s budget, they simply cannot afford to pay all the salaries of health workers that are required or all the needs for drugs, so it is the donor community which has to plug that gap. It is not just us, it is a number of other donors too that are playing a role.

Q98 Mr Lancaster: You say the government cannot really afford to pay the wages, so given that we have strikes at the moment in Zimbabwe, and I think they are currently paid $200 a month and they are demanding $500, is that realistic? What effect would that have? What can we do?

Mr Thomas: One of the things we can do is not to get involved in what is a conversation that has to take place between those workers themselves with their own government. What we can do, as I have said, is to respond to the requests that we have had from the government, the Inclusive Government, to provide support to the health sector, and through the continuation of these allowances that is what we are doing and by making further money available to target, for example, maternal health and to continue our different aid programmes.

Q99 Mr Lancaster: Workers’ pay and drugs to one side, I suppose the other key element to try to improve the health structure in Zimbabwe will be infrastructure. I know that we are investing in six hospitals in Zimbabwe at the moment. Can you perhaps outline what the aims of that programme are and whether or not you intend to increase it, or how you see it us moving forward in that area?

Mr Thomas: Obviously we want to move from, if you like, the crisis phase of the health support to getting a longer term plan in place for the health sector, one that can tackle all the different health challenges that the people of Zimbabwe face. I would not want to underestimate to you the scale of the challenge that there still is, we are still in a situation where I think substantial humanitarian assistance will have to be provided for Zimbabwe. The scope to dramatically expand our health programme, whilst I think it is there, is perhaps more limited than we would like. You are right, we have to continue to invest in infrastructure but continue to make sure there are health workers in place and that those health workers are being paid and, crucially, that the basic drugs and other supplies that they need to go about their business are in place. If you like, the next ambition that we have is to try to reduce maternal and child mortality where there has been a substantial deterioration in Zimbabwe more recently. We have recently committed some £25 million over the next five years to help people continue to get better access to family planning services, to antenatal care, to obstetric services and newborn care services. If you like, that is the next iteration of our support to the health sector.

Q100 Mr Evans: Another health subject is HIV/AIDS, which you have already touched on. We all had an opportunity to see some of the projects involved with that and I think we were all impressed with what we saw. It is tremendous if one considers that in parts of Zimbabwe some of the aid is somewhat thin. Certainly where we were in Bulawayo and Harare we saw some tremendous projects, so I was very pleased with that, but still last year 140,000 people died in Zimbabwe of AIDS. Compared to other countries, Zambia for instance, where the amount of money spent is way above, I think it is US$187 per person as opposed to Zimbabwe where it is $4, why is there such a staggering disparity?

Mr Thomas: I think often the disparity, frankly, relates to the political situation in Zimbabwe and the ability for the international community to spend money effectively to tackle HIV/AIDS. With our programmes on the health sector we have wanted to get to a stage where other players in the international donor community would support it. The Global Fund are now funding the health workers’ support programme. As I say, I think as the economic situation stabilises there will be more opportunities to do more on healthcare, of which HIV/AIDS will continue to be a priority for ministers. Nevertheless, I think the UK can take some pride in the success that there has been, notwithstanding the significant levels of death because of AIDS that there is in Zimbabwe, for the fact that it has not been even higher. HIV prevalence has come down, it has halved over the last ten years, and our aid into the sector over that period has been absolutely pivotal to helping those who wanted to make a difference in this area in Zimbabwe be able to do so.

Q101 Mr Evans: I have got no doubts about that whatsoever. We went to see one of the hospitals there where the storeroom had eight months’ worth of supply whereas two years ago they would have had nothing.

Mr Thomas: That is right.

Q102 Mr Evans: Getting the capacity and getting those drugs out into the villages and into the more rural areas is clearly something that needs to be done. Within the infrastructure that exists there, are we able to target some of the high risk groups like sex workers, children and, indeed, gays and lesbians?

Mr Thomas: We have a behaviour change communications programme which is run by an organisation, Population Services International, who are very well established in this field who are doing hugely important work in terms of getting those prevention messages out on AIDS. There is a whole programme of work around voluntary counselling and testing which has also been very important in making a difference. I am sure the Committee will be familiar with the way in which those who have migrated from Zimbabwe potentially would not get access to information about how to avoid becoming HIV positive, but through funding we give to the International Organisation on Migration we have been able to provide support for them to get help and information to those migrating from Zimbabwe to avoid the obvious risks at transit points, et cetera. One of the keys in terms of preventing the spread of AIDS and HIV infection is making sure there is good access to condoms and that is something we have continued to be in the lead on in the provision in Zimbabwe.

Q103 Mr Evans: One other area which helps greatly is male circumcision which apparently improves the rate of protection to 60%. The target is to circumcise 80% of the males within Zimbabwe as soon as they possibly can. Apparently the cost of that will be around $140 million but they will save over $3 billion if that could be achieved. We visited one of the clinics and talked to a couple of people who had gone through it, so they were acting as peers to encourage other males to go through the procedure. Do you envisage upping the amount of money that we will be directing towards male circumcision within Zimbabwe over the coming months?

Mr Thomas: Rather than just focusing on one specific intervention in response to one specific disease, however important that disease is, and I have a longstanding interest in HIV/AIDS, I think the challenge for us, both in DFID and the wider donor community, is how do we get more support more generally into the health sector in Zimbabwe and get a clear coordinated plan that looks at maternal health, that looks at HIV/AIDS, that looks at a range of other diseases too. Many of the responses that you need to tackle HIV/AIDS or to tackle maternal health are common across the piece in terms of having good health workers and good infrastructure in place. The challenge is to continue that process of coordination under good leadership from the government of Zimbabwe to get a series of clear health priorities in place which the international community could get behind. That is certainly what our ambition would be to support. Whether it has to be just DFID upping our funding levels on healthcare or whether there are other players in the international community, such as the Global Fund, who can take up that extra financial need is something that we need to continue to review. Health is certainly one of the areas that we watch very closely.

Q104 Mr Evans: Clearly all the donor organisations talk to one another anyway and that is important to make sure there is no duplication or people working against one another. When we visited the clinics we saw a number of posters with famous Zimbabwean footballers who were saying that they were getting this procedure and encouraging others to do so. It does seem to me to be economic commonsense, never mind humane commonsense, to ensure that as many people as possible have this particular procedure to better protect the nation, particularly when you look at the colossal number of deaths. This is a bit of a lobbying plea really. All I would ask is that you look at this again and make absolutely certain that not for the want of directing the money there, which as I say will pay dividends in the short and medium-term, we support this procedure as much as we possibly can.

Mr Thomas: I recognise both the lobbying plea and I fear one of the specific recommendations that will emerge from your report, and will obviously respond to the report in the usual way and no doubt faster than we would normally.

Q105 Chairman: I think it might be the next government that has to deal with that.

Mr Thomas: Mr Evans, I think your point in general about support for HIV/AIDS is well made, not only in the context of Zimbabwe but actually in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. We are five years on from Gleneagles where that commitment to try to deliver universal access to anti-retroviral drugs was one of the pivotal elements of the Gleneagles Agreement. We are probably two-thirds of the way towards achieving that commitment, so massive progress has been made but the target has not yet been reached. One of the issues that ministers in DFID are looking at is how we can use the international meetings that are taking place this year to refocus attention on that commitment to universal access, to look at what has worked in Sub-Saharan Africa, what has not worked perhaps, and what else the donor community needs to do. There will be an international meeting that takes place in London very shortly that looks at exactly that question.

Q106 Mr Evans: Hopefully when President Zuma comes as well on South Africa, maybe pushing him a little bit more on that area.

Mr Thomas: I hear your message, Mr Evans.

Q107 Richard Burden: One of the other major health areas, and you have alluded to it yourself, is the issue of water and sanitation. Six million people still have not got access to clean water and sanitation and obviously there was the bad cholera outbreak just a little while ago. When we met the Mayor of Bulawayo during our visit, if there was one priority that he wanted to identify it was the issue of the water system in the city. He said it was close to collapse and that was not unique in Bulawayo and his plea was for donors to concentrate on trying to address that as an issue. Where would you see the issue of investing in the water and sanitation infrastructure to rank compared to other priorities in terms of health and so on?

Mr Thomas: That is a very difficult question to answer. In the longer term there is no doubt that for a series of economic and social reasons as well as health reasons we need to see more investment in water and sanitation in Zimbabwe. That is absolutely clear. Through some of the programmes that we already have, not least the Protracted Relief Programme, there is work taking place on water and sanitation, but I would not want to give you the sense that there is a clear long-term sector-wide plan on water and sanitation which we are leading. This is one of the issues where as the humanitarian situation stabilises and as hopefully too we see progress on the politics in Zimbabwe the donor community with the government can start to put together a plan for beginning to see much longer-term, more sustained investment in water and sanitation going forward. It might be one of the areas potentially that the Multi Donor Fund that we are in the process of trying to establish under the leadership of the World Bank can look at. In the same way that water and sanitation is a key long-term issue, so is investment in the road network in Zimbabwe and investment in access to electricity. These are long-term issues which we will have to address. However, given the humanitarian need that still exists, and I think will exist for at least another couple of years, the balance of our programme focusing on the delivery of basic services plus, where we can, targeted assistance to support reforms in key ministries is broadly right for the moment, but we have got to keep in view those longer term issues like the Mayor of Bulawayo has identified, I think that is absolutely right.

Q108 Richard Burden: When you mention the Multi Donor Trust Fund, are you saying that this is an issue they could look at?

Mr Thomas: Possibly, yes.

Q109 Richard Burden: Or that they are looking at?

Mr Thomas: The Multi Donor Fund is not up and running yet, there is still a series of preparatory meetings that are taking place to sort out how the fund will operate and what it will focus on. Exactly what it does we are still in discussion on, but it certainly could look at water and sanitation issues. Frankly, if you are looking at a series of other longer term issues, such as infrastructure, roads, et cetera, you have got to think about water and sanitation issues to some extent anyway.

Q110 Hugh Bayley: Could I come in on the issue of the diaspora before we move on to a different subject. There are many thousands of Zimbabweans in this country and they tend to be relatively better educated because the better educated migrants migrate longer distances. They are very committed to their country and because of human rights abuses or political or economic pressures they do not want to be there at the moment, but might well return if there was political change. When the Government is talking next week to President Zuma, will you be talking about the issue of a right to vote given particularly that South African citizens in this country are entitled to vote in South African elections?

Mr Thomas: I think the point you make about the issue of the right to vote for the diaspora has been recognised as one of the issues that the Electoral Commission when it gets on to do its work will have to address. We all want to see progress on those political parts of the GPA where progress has been much slower. I think the big ticket items are getting the Electoral Commission established so that it is in a position to do its work, of which looking at the voter roll and the issues around the diaspora is one of a series of issues that are key to getting free and fair elections to take place.

Q111 Hugh Bayley: One other thing I wanted to raise that affects the diaspora is this: there are circumstances, as you are acutely aware, where money from the UK may appear politically tainted in Zimbabwe. The diaspora traditionally sent a lot of money back through remittances which has played a vitally important part in allowing Zimbabwe to survive an economic collapse. When I met the Institute of Migration’s director of programmes in Zimbabwe, she talked about imaginative schemes that operate in other countries of the world whereby the government of the country in question from which the migrants have migrated and donors match dollar for dollar, pound for pound remittances that are sent back. Given that remittances tend to be spent locally, not by government agencies but by families on essential services, would your Department look at the feasibility of setting up a scheme both to encourage Zimbabwean citizens living in this country to remit money and to find a good channel for transmitting money from your Department? Is that something you would examine?

Mr Thomas: I am not sure we would want to look at a programme that matches exactly what one particular Zimbabwean living in the UK or elsewhere donates to his or her family as such. There are a whole series of obvious technical difficulties with such a scheme. We certainly do want to make it easier for remittances to get back. I would go along with the director-general of IOM in this regard: there are a whole series of innovative programmes around remittances and the use of technology making it easier and cheaper for people to get remittances back which are being deployed in other countries. One thinks of Kenya’s M-PESA programme, for example, where remittances are being sent using mobile phones from a whole series of countries, as I understand it, to the individual recipient in-country. We are looking at a programme of work to try and spread the benefits of that technological innovation around remittances. I would hope Zimbabwe would be a beneficiary in that regard. As you may be aware, we have tried to get much more information into the public sphere about the different rates of interest and different types of financial product that are available for people who want to remit money to be able to do so to try and create much greater competition and, as a result, drive the administrative costs, commissions, down for those sending money back.

Q112 Andrew Stunell: Children have certainly been victims of the current difficulties and it could be said probably that Zimbabwe used to have the best educational system in southern Africa, it has now probably got the worst, yet DFID is still only contributing about 2% of aid to education. I wondered if you could give us some account of how that priority was set and whether you feel it should be a greater contribution in the future.

Mr Thomas: We have a couple of programmes that are supporting the education sector. One is a programme of support to orphans and vulnerable children, which is managed by UNICEF which helps to pay the school fees of a number of the most vulnerable children in Zimbabwe. We estimate that we have helped almost 250,000 schoolchildren through that process and we are hoping that the programme will expand this year to reach almost 600,000 children directly. Some of the other benefits of that programme include better access to nutrition, to healthcare, to welfare and to psychosocial support services for those young people so that in turn they can benefit better from the education that is available to them. The other source of funding for the education sector is an Education Transition Fund which we launched the idea of back in June last year and pledged £1 million to it. Our interest has generated pledges now worth a total of $50 million and we are in the process of sorting out the procurement process to enable the purchase of substantial textbooks for schools in Zimbabwe. One of the problems in the education sector, as I suspect you will have seen, is as a result of the political instability there has been a substantial loss of good quality materials for teachers to use. We hope that this fund will be one opportunity to begin to restore that damage.

Mr Lowcock: Can I just clarify the point on your 2% figure, which I suspect we gave you.

Q113 Andrew Stunell: You did, yes.

Mr Lowcock: I think that refers to the £1 million towards the wider Multi Donor Fund programme the Minister has just described for textbooks in particular. Probably what we should also have explained is that the programme of support for orphans and vulnerable children, which again the Minister has described, is also that education dimension, so to give a fair overall summary of how much we are putting into education we should include that as well. I apologise that we did not do that the first time. I just wanted to correct that on the record.

Q114 Chairman: How much is that?

Mr Lowcock: I will have to calculate that for you, Chairman. It is significant, and we can do it quickly.

Q115 Andrew Stunell: Can I just pull out a couple of points from your two replies, if I may. The underlying problem is that a lot of schools have been lost to use and a lot of teachers have emigrated or fled from the country. Are there any specific plans that DFID is developing or working with the Zimbabwean government on to get the restoration of school buildings and bringing back teachers?

Mr Thomas: One of the things that the Inclusive Government did when they came to power was to offer a $100 allowance to all civil servants, including teachers, which has helped to see a series of teachers returning to post and in that sense has made a difference.

Mr Lowcock: The biggest issue in our opinion is teachers. I am afraid it is going to be a significant challenge for Zimbabwe to attract back many of the best teachers who have left the country. The thing that will attract them back over time is an improvement in the political and economic situation and confidence in the future of their country, so it all turns back on what the Minister was describing about the overall political situation. Clearly there is also a school infrastructure problem and textbook issue, but we think first teachers, second textbooks and probably third infrastructure would be the order of priorities.

Q116 Andrew Stunell: Can I just ask a question about textbooks? I asked a number of questions in Zimbabwe and we received representations from some of the witnesses there. My impression was that we had gone for a big bang solution to getting textbooks in which was leading to a substantial delay in getting any textbooks in, when it might have been better or more appropriate to have gone for a small-scale solution with more rapid results. We were told by an official from the Department of Education, I think, that they were still waiting for textbooks which were supposed to have been ready at the beginning of the school year, et cetera. I would be interested in your commentary on that situation and for some assurance about how the textbook programme, for which we appear to have set aside funds, is actually going to be delivered to a sensible timetable.

Mr Thomas: I think the first thing is that our initial interest back in June in making money available for the supply of textbooks has sparked considerable interest from the wider donor community, perhaps more than certainly I had expected. What we are trying to do is to make sure that money collectively is well spent by having a central procurement programme. We believe that will deliver substantial economies of scale. There has been a process by which the Zimbabwe Ministry of Education has been looking at trying to prioritise a particular core set of textbooks to be delivered across the country. I recognise the appetite inevitably for teachers to want to have access to those books, but it is right that we get the procurement process right and it is right that we try to deliver economies of scale. Given the size of the pot and the increase in the size of the pot it has clearly taken some time to get that right, but we hope we are close to achieving that and getting the textbooks out.

Mr Lowcock: I would, if I may, like to answer the question we promised you a subsequent answer to, which is the share if we had included the programme of support in our total programme in education. It would be about 6%, about £2.4 million going into education through the programme of support and then £1 million this year through the Education Transition Fund. As the Minister said, we were trading off speed with efficiency and value for money. We have got a much cheaper deal and, therefore, can buy many more textbooks in the way we have done the procurement, but I take the point you have made about needing to think carefully about that trade-off between speed and efficiency.

Q117 Andrew Stunell: So when do we now expect those books to be available to schools, bearing in mind the money was allocated back in July, August last year?

Mr Lowcock: We will need to check when we expect the first deliveries, but the procurement process is advanced now.

Q118 Andrew Stunell: And the schools have no books.

Mr Lowcock: Well, most schools have some books. Clearly, yes, there is an issue and that was the trade-off we were trying to manage. I will find out for you exactly when we expect the first deliveries.

Q119 Mr Lancaster: The Committee went to see some projects directed at orphans and vulnerable children and the Department estimates that more than 90% of the country’s orphans have been absorbed by the extended family. Indeed, 40% of households in rural areas actually care for orphans and vulnerable children but they have almost no financial assistance, so how do you feel that external donors can help in this process and support them?

Mr Thomas: There are a number of programmes that we contribute to which have an impact on orphans and vulnerable children and the financial needs either of the individual children themselves or those who are looking after them. I described the programme of support to orphans and vulnerable children in answer to Mr Stunell. Paying for education fees of the most vulnerable children is one obvious way in which we can help. The second is through the Protracted Relief Programme which we talked about in answer to questions from Mr Battle. That also provides support often to some of the young people of Zimbabwe who have lost parents and who perhaps head up households themselves because of the loss of parents. Many of those people who have taken in orphans and vulnerable children are beneficiaries of the Protracted Relief Programme and in that sense get support from the international community. As a Department we do not pick the individual recipients, that is done through the NGOs who, if you like, deliver the process and the support on the ground.

Q120 Mr Lancaster: I accept the answer, but I suppose what I am really pushing for is given the sheer scale and how a relatively small percentage are being reached given limited resources from the Department, how can we move forward perhaps in greater collaboration with others. That is really what I am asking.

Mr Thomas: I think the Protracted Relief Programme is expanding. It has gone from the first phase when it was largely just the UK funding it to a much bigger programme which is allowing us to reach many more people, including orphans directly or those who are looking after orphans. Similarly, the expansion of the number of children who will get support through the overseas programme up from about 250,000 so far to, we hope, 600,000 this year is an example of the way in which we are trying to expand the numbers that we can access. As we have discussed, in the end it does come back to the economic and political situation in the country moving forward and donors being willing to do more as a result and, frankly, more resources being able to be generated in-country.

Q121 John Battle: If I could just go back to the issue of food security. I think the UN at one point said five million people would be food insecure and the Crop and Supply Assessment Mission estimated around 2.8 million might need humanitarian assistance before the next harvest, which is this April. Some of the reports are suggesting that the weather has not been all that good and the harvest might not be that good. What is your latest prediction for food aid requirements that are coming up in the next year from April?

Mr Thomas: In terms of prediction in terms of hard numbers, I am not sure I can give you that specifically now. We share the analysis that you employed that there are some early indications that this year’s harvest is not going to be as good as in previous years. As I said, notwithstanding that sense of what this year’s harvest is going to be, I think we will have to provide humanitarian assistance anyway at least for the next two years.

Q122 John Battle: The next two years.

Mr Thomas: In recent years there has always been a substantial humanitarian component of our aid programme at different times, almost 50% or more. We work very closely with organisations such as the World Food Programme who deliver that food aid and humanitarian assistance. Frankly, the development of the Protracted Relief Programme is not only an attempt to meet the immediate food needs of those affected but is trying to get at some of the deeper roots of that humanitarian crisis. As well as giving the seeds and fertiliser programme direct support, we are also giving support to NGOs so that they can give actual guidance to people as to how to use those seeds and fertilisers to increase the yields that they do get.

Mr Lowcock: I was going to add a point on when we will have a better sense of this year’s harvest. It will be March-time probably. Most people think that it will be better than 2008 and possibly less good than 2009, so the numbers requiring emergency assistance will be in that range that you described.

Q123 John Battle: Can I thank you for the way in which you gave the answer to that longer term rather than immediate relief. Forgive me, I am not sure I clearly understand this. You provided £9 million to the World Food Programme in 2009 and that aid was mainly for food relief programmes. I wonder whether the World Food Programme itself has that longer term food programme development as well as relief. It is that distinction between your work on the programmes I referred to earlier that are getting sustainable agriculture again, but are you working with the World Food Programme itself on getting those longer term programmes in as opposed to just dishing out food aid, frankly?

Mr Thomas: We are, but it is important to recognise that the World Food Programme has particular expertise at getting food aid to those who need it instantly, who are hungry now in that sense. We are looking as a donor community, which includes WFP, at a cash transfer programme, in a sense, which helps people both to plan for a slightly longer term process as well as meeting their immediate needs now.

Q124 John Battle: If I could follow through from Mark Lowcock’s comment. When will the figures be available? We are in March next week, are we not, so is there a chance that an assessment could be included in our report? Have we got time to get that far?

Mr Lowcock: Normally it is sensible in Zimbabwe to make an assessment of the harvest level by late March. We will give you any update we can at the point at which you want to go to press, but late March is probably the earliest at which we can say something resembling an authoritative answer.

Q125 John Battle: If I can be absolutely clear, that is two things: one to get on to those longer term food development programmes, both our own and working with the World Food Programme, and the other is to look to cash transfers to stimulate that rather than going to handouts. Have I got that right?

Mr Thomas: That is effectively where we are now. Obviously if the harvest is better than anticipated then we can move further up that particular long-term process earlier.

Q126 John Battle: Also not to lose, and sometimes it is lost, may I say, and criticism is made of the UN and the World Food Programme sometimes. People standing in queues and just getting it dished out to them does not always encourage community participation, whereas other methods might include that engagement of development with the people at the local level, which is where I am hoping our programmes are geared towards now.

Mr Thomas: You have to use a range of ways of getting help to people and you have to look at the reality on the ground and adjust what you do to reflect that reality.

John Battle: The direction of the overall programme is very clear from that answer, thank you.

Q127 Richard Burden: Could we move on to the question of internally displaced people, which is clearly a very, very big issue. Estimates vary of IDPs making up between just over 4% of the population and 7.5% of the population. Yet there is also difficulty, there is quite a lot of evidence, a lot of concern being voiced that as far as the Zimbabwean Government is concerned, because they take the view that IDPs do not exist, IDPs are being fairly systematically excluded from a number of relief and humanitarian programmes. Some of the NGOs are saying that really the UN as an institution is not tackling this head on and that it needs to be a lot more assertive around the question of IDPs, both in terms of Zimbabwe’s own obligation under UN obligations but also from a straight humanitarian point of view; aid is not getting to where it should be getting. What is your response to that?

Mr Thomas: I think that was a situation that was certainly true of the previous Government. I think the Inclusive Government has been better at recognising both the existence of IDPs and their needs, but I would not want to downplay the challenges that still remain. I think many of our existing programmes upon which we have touched are also giving assistance to those who are internally displaced within Zimbabwe but who are perhaps living with other families or who are vulnerable in some other way. Clearly there is more we need to do, as we have described, across the range, but I do believe that our programmes and those of others in the international community, are helping to get aid to those who are internally displaced, albeit there is clearly a lot more that could happen.

Q128 Richard Burden: Certainly the impression we got was that a number of NGOs and others were saying that yes, whilst things may have improved since the formation of the Inclusive Government, the issue is still very much there as far as IDPs are concerned. Partly because of the nature of some of the security ministries, it is quite easy to get in the way of aid programmes where necessary.

Mr Thomas: In that sense, absolutely, I would agree with that. There is a huge problem in terms of the ability of IDPs to move around in terms of particular locations and the level of need that we have described in terms of humanitarian issues, in terms of children or young people, if they have been internally displaced, it is particularly acute in that sense. What I would want to avoid the Committee having the impression is that none of our programme is thinking through issues around IDPs; they very much are. However, as NGOs have described to you, certainly there are real difficulties for IDPs in terms of the security situation.

Q129 Chairman: The aid programme to Zimbabwe has more than doubled in the last four years. You said in a press release last August that the Department was willing to re-engage and support recovery in Zimbabwe provided the new Government can demonstrate: its commitment to sound economic management; the democratic process and respect for human rights; the rule of law; full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; and a timely election held to international standards. I would suggest none of those things is what is happening on the ground. The serious point behind that is, nevertheless, you have increased it. What capacity is there for increasing it further or perhaps, putting it the other way round, how do you assess your ability to deliver and whether you should do more or less? What is the process that goes round the Department in evaluating this?

Mr Thomas: We do look firstly at the humanitarian situation on the ground and we would provide humanitarian aid almost regardless of the political situation, and it is clearly right that we do get help to people who are in desperate need, despite the particular governments that they have. In terms of long-term development assistance, you are right, we will have to look at the political and economic conditions that are operating and are on the ground before we can make big decisions about be it substantial increases in aid or substantial changes in the nature of our programmes. I think there has been progress in Zimbabwe, in particular in terms of the economics of the country. Clearly the political progress in Zimbabwe has been much, much slower, and that certainly affects our ability to do more and more quickly; there is no question of that. If we were to see faster political progress, then there is no question that we could do more, and more quickly, and I am sure that others in the international community would probably see things in the same way.

Q130 Chairman: We were told, and indeed we saw for ourselves, that in spite of the migration of some of the brightest and best people from Zimbabwe, the administrative capacity to deliver services was one of the best in Africa. Even now we saw effective delivery. Do you envisage a situation, if the political background were transformed, where government support or sector support would be a possibility? Obviously it is not today but can you see a scenario where it would and how would you judge that? Is that something you could even incentivise?

Mr Thomas: I think it is a long way off. I would hope that we could get to a situation where the politics of Zimbabwe had moved so radically forward that we could have confidence in government systems or in the particular sector plans of particular ministries. I think we are a long way off from having confidence that the Government’s financial systems are strong enough and robust enough and would be free from political interference. Having said that, there are ministries that are committed to reform and who are starting to try and give direction to what should happen in their particular sectors, and where we have confidence in the plans of those ministries, then we are trying to align our support as a donor community behind those plans. I think moving down the route of sector support or budget support is a long way off. The first stage is what we are embarked on, which is where we have confidence in the plans of a particular ministry thinking through how, without going through government systems, we can support those plans and move forward.

Q131 Chairman: And if you were increasing the funding further, how would you allocate that between multilateral or donor partnerships as opposed to the bilateral work that the NGOs are doing, which, to be honest, is mostly what we were looking at, which was extremely good, but the question is whether it is best to expand that or would it be best to expand it through multilaterals or would it be a parallel process?

Mr Thomas: I do not think we have a fixed view, frankly, in that sense. We would want to spend money in a way that was going to have most impact most quickly and for which we can properly account. Whether that is through UN organisations or through civil society, I think in reality it will be through a mixture and quite what the balance of that mixture would be going forward, I do not think we are yet in a position to say. It does depend on how particular programmes work. I think the Protracted Relief Programme is a programme, for example, that has a mixture of a whole series of civil society organisations and is making a significant difference. If the humanitarian situation were to deteriorate, clearly using organisations like the World Food Programme would make a huge amount of sense, but they, too, use civil society organisations, as I understand it, so it is not a question of either/or. I think it will simply come down to a hard decision as to which particular organisations are going to get money on the ground where it needs fastest.

Q132 Chairman: In spite of the very heavy anti-British rhetoric, the general dynamic on the ground is the attitude between the Zimbabwean and British people is quite positive in terms of that underlying trend. It was suggested to us that Zimbabwe ought to be one of the overriding priorities for the UK, in other words one of the three or four countries in which we do most, not because of that particular British interest, which is just stated as a positive underlying fact, but because it would have such a dynamic effect on the whole dynamic of Southern Africa if it could be turned around. Do you accept that as a possible analysis and, if you do, what could DFID do more that would reflect that priority, taking on board entirely that it is complicated and unpredictable but the argument that so long as you were working in the right direction it justified that kind of prioritisation?

Mr Thomas: Zimbabwe takes up a significant amount of both ministerial and very senior official time in both Departments in that sense, so it is accorded a high level of priority. I think the analysis about the importance of Zimbabwe to sub-Saharan Africa is absolutely right. There is no doubt that if we were to see further economic stability and progress and further political progress, Zimbabwe’s recovery could help to drive progress towards the Millennium Development Goals across the whole of the region. I have a particular interest in regional integration and in the transport infrastructure that helps to drive, if you will forgive the pun, that integration, Zimbabwe has a pivotal place in the north-south corridor, a network of key roads, and therefore the investment, or lack of investment, that Zimbabwe puts into its road network has a fundamental impact on the capacity of sub-Saharan Africa to trade between the countries in that area. I think the analysis is spot on and that is why I hope that we will see the type of economic progress and political progress that I suspect all of us would want.

Q133 Chairman: Thank you very much. The Committee would want to repeat the thanks that have already been made to the DFID staff for the visit they organised. All eight members of the Committee who went on the visit came away with a much more positive impression of what is going on than we had anticipated, although I would hasten to add we are not naive enough not to realise the huge political difficulties and underlying tensions and threats that could blow it all away. We understood that. What we saw was impressive. Our report has to focus on the development agenda rather than the political agenda, but, again, you cannot deliver the one without the other. Our intention is to complete the report in advance of an Election unless we are ambushed.

Mr Thomas: With that in mind, I wonder if I can ask Mr Lowcock to give you the answer on the textbook delivery timescale. I think we have that information.

Q134 Chairman: Anything you have now and anything you do not have now if you can think days rather than anything else.

Mr Lowcock: Could I preface the answer to Mr Stunell’s question by saying that of course we are not in complete control of this because we are a tiny part of the financing. We have to get all the other players into place as well. The answer to the question is that the contract will be let in the next few weeks and the first books will be delivered from about eight weeks from then, so about 12 weeks from now the first books will be delivered.

Q135 Chairman: The Committee will obviously watch with interest the developments which obviously go through convolutions almost daily. Perhaps the one positive thing Mark said was that whilst nobody knows where it might head, the feeling was that things had got to the point where going back to a situation where there was no space was perhaps unthinkable unless the situation deteriorated beyond all hope. If I may say so, there were comments and compliments about DFID’s role, and indeed the Foreign Office’s role because it is important to recognise this is a joint operation, in doing that. I think it was the Dutch development representative who said specifically that he wanted to put on record his appreciation of the leadership role that was being provided by DFID in Zimbabwe and how important it was, both politically and in terms of development. I am happy to put that on the record and say that we appreciate it and we appreciate that the team there are doing really good work in difficult and challenging situations, but at the moment not unrewarding because there is something coming back for it. Can I thank you very much indeed for your evidence. I genuinely hope that our report is something that will make a useful contribution to both your work and a wider understanding of what we are trying to do.

Mr Thomas: Thank you, Mr Bruce.

Africa Briefing N°70

Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010

I. Overview

As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a unity government, the challenges to democratic transformation have come into sharp focus. Despite reasonable progress in restoring political and social stability, ending widespread repression and stabilising the economy since February 2009, major threats could still derail the reform process. In particular, resistance of intransigent and still powerful security sector leaders and fractious in-fighting between and within the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) must be addressed now. South Africa and other countries in southern Africa – who monitor the accord that guides the transition – must press the parties, and particularly President Robert Mugabe, to see the transition through to a successful conclusion. Donors should back their efforts.

The unity government, created under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by Mugabe and MDC factional leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, was born under a cloud of scepticism. Most observers gave it little chance, predicting that, even as prime minister, Tsvangirai would fall prey to Mugabe’s “divide, rule, co-opt and destroy” strategy. Against the odds, the government started well: schools and hospitals re-opened; civil servants were paid and returned to work; the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved; goods returned to store shelves; and a cholera epidemic was controlled. Human rights activists reported a significant drop in abuses. Donors generally received well an ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction program calling for $8.5 billion in foreign aid and investment.

But major concerns undermining the transition process have come to the fore. Hardline generals and other Mugabe loyalists in ZANU-PF are refusing to implement the government’s decisions, boycotting the new national security organ and showing public disdain for Tsvangirai. Farm seizures have continued virtually unabated. Most attention has focused on completing the GPA, but ZANU-PF has delayed or ignored important commitments in that document, while stalling constitutional reforms by insisting on preserving broad executive privileges. Key blocked steps include a land audit, appointment of MDC governors, an end of arbitrary detentions and arrests, regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations Command, public consultations on a new constitution and preparation for elections.

These delays reflect the two deeper challenges on which this briefing concentrates. First, a mature political system must develop, so that ZANU-PF and MDC engage as both competitors in the political arena and partners in the inclusive government. This will be difficult, especially under the divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU-PF leaders, including the factions led by Vice President Joice Mujuru, and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, know that their party has lost much popular support and needs a generational shift. For its part, the MDC must keep faith and engaged with its broad following in the transition process, including trade unions, human rights groups and women’s organisations. It must also show the country as a whole that it is a viable custodian of the state – competent, transparent, and capable of preserving social change since independence.

Equally challenging are security issues. A relatively small number of “securocrats” use their positions and symbiotic relationship with Mugabe to exercise veto power over the transition. They are motivated by differing factors: fear of losing power and its financial benefits, fear of prosecution for political or financial abuses, and a belief that they guard the liberation heritage against Tsvangirai and the MDC, which they view as fronts for white and Western interests. Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are quietly considering how to ease these officers into retirement, even at the cost of allowing them to keep their assets and providing them a degree of impunity from domestic prosecution, while simultaneously professionalising security forces respectful of human rights and a democratically elected government.

While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) must take seriously its GPA guarantor role. South African President Jacob Zuma’s activism as mediator must convey the message that the region will abide no alternative to the GPA. His recent actions, including appointment of three respected advisers to oversee the Zimbabwe account, are welcome indications he will be tougher vis-à-vis Mugabe on GPA obligations and respect for rule of law.

The broader international community, especially the UK, U.S., EU and China, should support and complement SADC’s efforts through careful calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress; maintenance of targeted sanctions on those thwarting the transition; and lifting of sanctions on entities key to economic recovery. Donors should provide new recovery and development assistance – including for rural development, health and education and strengthening of the judiciary, legislature and civil society – through transparent mechanisms, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

This briefing focuses on political party and security issues, as well as South Africa’s mediation. Subsequent reporting will analyse other topics vital to the transition, including constitutional and legal reform, justice and reconciliation, sanctions policies and security sector reform.

II. The INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT’s Mixed Record

Ten months after the violent and disputed 29 March 2008 elections that led to political stalemate with the long-time ruling ZANU-PF party of President Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai’s wing of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) announced it would enter the government alongside ZANU-PF and the splinter MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M) faction. This followed an extraordinary summit of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) on 26 January 2009, whose final communiqué called for Tsvangirai to be sworn in as the prime minister by 11 February and the remainder of the government two days later.[1]

The unity government was formed under the auspices of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which had been hammered out with SADC assistance during lengthy negotiations. The GPA spelled out a specific continuing role for the regional mediators in monitoring and supporting its implementation. This was especially important, since most observers believed that the agreement was essentially unworkable, having established two centres of power within a single government but leaving most real political and military authority with Mugabe, his party and the hardline security establishment.[2] Many considered that the African Union (AU), SADC, and the primary mediator, the then South African President Thabo Mbeki, had been too accommodating and respectful of Mugabe during the negotiation process. Additional concerns emerged after the GPA was signed, as Mugabe was allowed to ignore deadlines and otherwise repeatedly undermined the agreement without consequence.

Now into its second year, however, the inclusive government is making discernible, if slow and painful progress in a number of areas, bringing a degree of stability and predictability to a country that twelve months earlier was on the brink of collapse. Most notably, schools and hospitals have reopened, multi-million per cent inflation has come down to single digits, government revenue has begun to pick up and shops are fully stocked with food and other commodities.

Key Western donors have been slow to embrace the new government largely because of its failure to fully implement the GPA and their continuing antipathy toward Mugabe. For much of 2009, donors provided welcome expansion of humanitarian assistance, but generally adopted a wait-and-see posture on longer-term financial support for recovery and reconstruction. This risked thwarting the very changes the international community is seeking, both by weakening the hand of relative moderates in ZANU-PF and more generally by undercutting popular support for the reform process. More recently, the U.S., UK and European Union (EU), among others, have expanded the definition of “humanitarian assistance” to cover many important social and economic sectors, such as agriculture, health, sanitation and education.

A. Economic Reforms

Rebuilding a devastated economy with a 90 per cent unemployment rate is a daunting challenge for the inclusive government. Finance Minister Tendai Biti has won praise for his steps to restore a degree of confidence and fiscal stability, but the prospects for rapid recovery are weak, not least because the fragile inclusive government and incomplete GPA have caused investors to shy away. Recently, government workers have gone on strike to demand a pay increase beyond the $160 monthly stipend they are generally now receiving, which they point out is insufficient to cover even basic costs of living in Harare and other urban centres.

Nevertheless, there are some signs of recovery. GDP grew 4.7 per cent in 2009, the first positive totals in a decade. The 2010 budget aims for 7 per cent GDP growth, underpinned by 10 per cent growth in agriculture, as was already achieved the previous year, and 40 per cent growth in mining. Since the Zimbabwe dollar was suspended and the U.S. dollar and South African rand adopted as legal tender, inflation has fallen from an official 231 million per cent in July 2008 to a 6 per cent average in 2009 and is forecast at 5.1 per cent in 2010.[3] The International Monetary Fund extended $510 million to Zimbabwe as its share under an expansion of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) facility that was authorised as a response to the global economic crisis. This has been earmarked for debt clearance, support of the budget and productive sectors, and water and sanitation, health and education needs.[4]

The improved economy and donor pledges to cover half the $718 million required to cope with disease and hunger have been reflected in a lessening of the formerly dire humanitarian situation. Cholera, which had become rampant in late 2008, was brought under control in 2009, but there are warnings of a potentially new serious outbreak during the current rainy season.

B. Political Reforms

Ultimately, the economy cannot be restored to health through technical measures alone. The political reforms envisaged in the GPA are needed. Helped by the regional re-engagement that resulted from the SADC Maputo summit in November 2009, there has been some gradual progress on implementation since the MDC-T briefly suspended participation in the unity government the previous month to protest ZANU-PF’s intransigence in discussions to move forward on GPA requirements.

Independent commissions have now been formed to address media, human rights and election issues.[5] Notwithstanding statements to the contrary by senior ZANU-PF officials, a land audit may soon begin that would not just be a survey but rather an attempt to lay the groundwork for addressing this most sensitive reform area, including multiple farm ownership, production by new farmers, compensation for former white commercial farmers and an end to farm invasions. Arbitrary and politically motivated detentions and arrests have declined, though they have not ceased entirely, and the repressive Public Order Security and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Acts (POSA and AIPPA) remain on the books.

The challenges of completing the GPA, crafting a new constitution and moving toward elections could yet cause the inclusive government to collapse. A number of issues are still outstanding in the protracted negotiations over GPA implementation. Indeed, the six on the original agenda have ballooned to 27, as the MDC-T, MDC-M and ZANU-PF have brought in additional topics they considered had either been overlooked when the mediation began or had gained prominence during the course of the negotiations.

The negotiators have agreed to postpone to the end the especially contentious appointment of MDC-T’s Roy Bennett as deputy agriculture minister as well as the status of Mugabe stalwarts, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and Attorney General Johannes Tomana, whom the MDC believe were re-appointed to their positions unilaterally by Mugabe in violation of GPA provisions requiring consultations. Agreement has been reached on sharing provincial governors, though the dates of their appointments have not yet been determined.[6] How the new National Security Council (NSC) is to function as a successor to the infamous Joint Operations Command (JOC) is still sharply contested.

Controversial matters introduced by the MDC-T and remaining open include security sector reform and compliance with the National Security Act, a framework for government operations (including procedures for chairing of the cabinet when the president is not present) and rule of law topics such as freedom of assembly and association.[7] ZANU-PF has put forward for consideration such issues as removal of sanctions, donor-funded parallel government structures, the role and funding of non-governmental organisations, selective funding of ministries and other entities by donors and the functions of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, a basket fund coordinated by the international community to support the inclusive government.[8]

The constitutional reform outreach program intended to lead to a new constitution kicked off on 7 January 2010 but needs greater impetus.[9] There is a growing recognition that this process cannot be the exclusive preserve of government and legislative committees, but rather must be a national exercise with full participation of civil society groups. This is especially essential for the MDC, since there are concerns that the party is losing contact with its popular base. Civil society activists and unions have complained, however, that the process is being driven by political elites for their own purposes, and some have even called for the international community to withdraw support for the transition until a credible consultation process has been adopted.[10]

It is positive, nevertheless, that there is increasing acceptance across the political divide that the “Kariba Draft” – agreed by the inclusive government’s three parties under Mbeki’s mediation – cannot be the only reference for the new constitution, since it incorporates a number of potentially anti-democratic principles, most notably further enhancement of executive powers at the expense of legislative or judicial authority.

While many political figures believe a broadly acceptable compromise draft is likely by the end of the year,[11] sharp differences remain between the parties. A blueprint written by ZANU-PF strategists linked to the hardline camp around Emmerson Mnangagwa suggests that the party remains committed to an all-powerful presidency.[12] While the 41-page document – a comparative analysis of ZANU-PF and MDC-T constitutional positions – gives an insight into the long-time ruling party’s intention to preserve an authoritarian centralist government, the notion of an imperial presidency is not shared by the party wing around Vice President Joice Mujuru and her husband, ex-general, now prominent businessman Solomon Mujuru. The MDC-T wants executive authority to be shared between president, prime minister and cabinet, with internal checks and balances within the executive. ZANU-PF – arguing that the past year has shown two centres of power are unworkable – supports a presidential system of government.[13] The ZANU-PF document states:

The experience of the people of Zimbabwe with the inclusive government since February 2009 has shown that sharing of executive power by the President and Prime Minister will result in … always a fight for power rather than progress. If there has to be a Prime Minister, he [should] not have executive authority. He is only a senior minister appointed and accountable to the President. In the SADC region, the prevalent arrangement is Head of State and leader of government.[14]

Finally, preparations need to be made for presidential and parliamentary elections. There is much discussion of delaying these for several years, perhaps until 2013, so as to put electoral politics aside while the country copes with massive economic and social tasks. Many in Tsvangirai’s camp believe their party has not yet built a strong record in government and are equally concerned over how the military would react to a potential MDC-T victory.[15] Meanwhile, many ZANU-PF stalwarts believe their party would be convincingly defeated, since recent polls indicate its support is now less than 20 per cent.[16] Though it is still possible that Mugabe might dissolve the government in an attempt to catch the opposition off-guard with a rigged snap election as early as 2011, this seems unlikely at present, partly because of increased international scrutiny and engagement.

C. Threats to the Transition

Despite the current stalemate on outstanding GPA issues, there is some prospect that compromises can eventually be reached, though only with the help of intense mediation. However, security sector reform – firmly rejected by Mugabe – has emerged as a key challenge. Failure to initiate this process could unravel the inclusive government, prevent a smooth transition to the post-Mugabe era and raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying instability that would affect the whole region. A dozen or so “securocrats” – senior military and intelligence figures – are widely considered to hold de facto veto power over any real transition. A cabal of powerful generals, with the support of elements in ZANU-PF, still believes that Tsvangirai should not be permitted to lead the country, even if he wins an election. The MDC-T leadership has raised this implicit threat with SADC leaders. The issue is so sensitive that it was not addressed in the Mbeki-led GPA negotiations, but it has become a key agenda item for the new mediation team appointed by Jacob Zuma, his successor as South African president.[17]

Moreover, even if the inclusive government completes the GPA, achieves a new democratic constitution and addresses the electoral process, the transition will not be assured unless a broader challenge is met, namely development of the political system to ensure that ZANU-PF and the MDC-T balance political competition with cooperation in governance. This will be particularly difficult as long as the divisive Mugabe is at the helm. At the December 2009 ZANU-PF congress, he retained his party presidency unchallenged for an additional five-year term, thus positioning himself to contest another national election.

III. Political party strategies

The three principal parties to the GPA went into the inclusive government with a stated objective of securing political stability, initiating economic recovery and holding fresh elections under a new constitution within eighteen months, that is, by March 2010.[18] While that date is no longer realistic, the government’s perceived successes and failures have emerged as the key battleground between the parties as they position themselves for an eventual electoral test.

ZANU-PF – divided along factional lines on strategy, still seized with its Mugabe succession problem and battling to retain power that it has only reluctantly shared in the inclusive arrangement – comes close to unity only in its intent to frustrate reforms whose benefits would accrue primarily to the MDC-T. The MDC-T believes that success for the inclusive government in instituting political reforms and economic recovery would pave the way for it to win the right to form the next government after elections. MDC-M leaders, recognising their party lacks a solid base, are hedging their bets, seeking to keep the inclusive government functioning, while searching for an advantageous alliance ahead of a national vote.

A.    ZANU-PF’s Divisions

1.      The Mnangagwa camp’s hard line

ZANU-PF’s overall objective in the inclusive government is to undercut any major political and economic reforms associated with the MDC-T and Prime Minister Tsvangirai. Under Emmerson Mnangagwa, the defence minister and presidential hopeful, and with the support of military leaders, ZANU-PF’s participants in the unity government want to neutralise Tsvangirai and his party’s ministers, while taking advantage of the former opposition’s presence in government to push for the removal of targeted travel and related international sanctions on Mugabe and his party’s ministers.[19]

This approach has Mugabe’s backing but, for reasons related to ZANU-PF’s ongoing internal power struggle, not that of the Mujuru faction. Mnangagwa allies control the state bureaucracy, while Mujuru allies control what remains of grassroots support in those provinces the party dominates. Mugabe, conscious that neither faction commands overwhelming support within the party or sufficient national popularity to ascend to power on its own, plays them against each other in order to maintain his grip on the divided movement. While he has tended to side with Mnangagwa in dealings with the MDC-T, he has mostly favoured the Mujurus on internal ZANU-PF decisions.[20]

The attempt to frustrate the MDC-T includes at the national level:

• securing a five-year term for the inclusive government (to 2013), with Mugabe at the helm until then or he decides to retire, while making both it and the parliament dysfunctional; steps in this regard continue, including acts of lawlessness such as continued farm invasions, violations of property and investment rights, and resistance to political and economic reforms so as to discredit the MDC-T both nationally and internationally as an effective political force;
• retaining control of key state institutions and reducing Tsvangirai to a ceremonial prime minister, while discrediting, compromising and corrupting him and his party’s ministers;
• derailing the pace of the constitutional reform process; and
• inducing fears of a military coup should Tsvangirai win the election and attempt to take over from Mugabe.[21]

The plan is executed at government level by ZANU-PF permanent secretaries, whose appointments Tsvangirai accepted in the misguided belief that they would act as professional civil servants.[22] All these ZANU-PF loyalists selected by Mugabe were first recommended by Misheck Sibanda, chief secretary to the cabinet and a key Mnangagwa ally. In general, the permanent secretaries have taken advantage of the inexperience of MDC-T ministers to acquire free rein in determining the pace and implementation of government decisions and policies.[23] Permanent secretaries in education and public service ministries, for example, have in effect overturned decisions by their ministers with regard to new school fees structures and a manpower audit of the civil service, on whose payrolls ZANU-PF has placed more than 20,000 youth militia members.[24]

George Charamba, the influential permanent secretary in the information and publicity ministry, who doubles as Mugabe’s spokesperson, has denigrated the work of the government in which he serves, saying “I am in the kitchen; there’s lots of smoke but hardly much cooking going on”.[25] This characterisation suits those in ZANU-PF who fear that the electorate would credit successes primarily to Tsvangirai and the MDC-T.[26] Likewise, strategists aligned with Mnangagwa calculate, failures of the inclusive government are more likely to cast doubt on Tsvangirai’s capacity to provide effective national leadership.[27]

Tsvangirai is also being prevented from demonstrating authority. He has not been able to chair a single cabinet session,[28] even though the GPA makes him deputy chairman of cabinet as well as prime minister and leader of government business in parliament. He should normally exercise the chair function in the president’s absence, but ZANU-PF argues at the GPA negotiations that allowing him to do so would make the two vice presidents, Joice Mujuru and John Nkomo, redundant, causing further tension in the already fractious party.[29] Consequently, those senior ZANU-PF members alternate in chairing the cabinet when Mugabe is absent. On 25 January, Mugabe issued a written order for all ministers to report to the vice presidents and their permanent secretaries, not to Tsvangirai, on the execution of government business. While the order was subsequently withdrawn, the MDC-T considered it a blatant attempt to neuter the prime minister’s office.[30]

In addition to frustrating the constitutional reform process so as to extend the lifespan of the inclusive government, a second strand of the strategy involves ensuring that parliament does not pass laws that would affect ZANU-PF control of state institutions.[31] Even though the two MDC parties together constitute a small majority in the legislature, only eight bills have been passed in more than a year, two of which were meant to facilitate formation of the inclusive government, and the parliament has limited its work days due to inadequate funding.[32] While ZANU-PF’s bloc has used parliamentary procedures to stall movement, this meagre legislative record is also partly the result of the MDC-T’s own failings (see below).

Mnangagwa supporters believe that despite its problems, the inclusive government could well limp on for a full term until 2013, with Mugabe at the helm, as the constituent parties have no better alternative.[33] They consider that this would give their camp time to regroup from its failure to tilt the balance of power at the ZANU-PF December 2009 congress, when it supported the unsuccessful candidacy of ZANU-PF Women’s League chair Oppah Muchinguri to oust incumbent Vice President Joice Mujuru.[34] They hope also that, after elections, they can dominate a new coalition government through alliance with MDC-M and perhaps even some MDC-T elements.

The Mnangagwa camp and its military allies, led by Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga, was behind the resolution at the December congress instructing Mugabe to make no further concessions on outstanding GPA issues until the MDC-T provides satisfaction on a number of ZANU-PF demands, including the removal of targeted Western sanctions against party leaders.[35]

2.  The Mujuru camp’s pragmatism

The Mujuru camp believes the successes the inclusive government has achieved and its ability to put a crimp in Mnangagwa’s presidential ambitions at the December congress have strengthened its chances to control the party and retain significant national power when Mugabe eventually retires or dies. Its dominance in the new politburo announced on 10 February 2010 by Mugabe confirmed that it is tightening its grip on the party leadership.

Mujuru supporters no longer call for Mugabe’s early exit, instead supporting him to stay until a moment of his own choosing.[36] This shift results from a conclusion that he is too strong to be forced out at present and that his continued prominence provides cover for their largely behind-the-scenes manoeuvres to consolidate their position for the eventual showdown with Mnangagwa. Consequently, the Mujurus seek to promote further achievements for the inclusive government and building lines to Tsvangirai and the MDC-T that could eventually result in a coalition. They realise that it would be difficult in the immediate term for any ZANU-PF candidate to beat Tsvangirai and the MDC-T in reasonably free and fair elections[37] but conclude that Zimbabwe is likely to need an inclusive government for at least the next decade regardless of which party does best in a national vote.[38]

This strategy requires Joice Mujuru, 54, to retain the country’s senior vice presidency, a position that gives her the inside track to ascend to the presidency if Mugabe retires or dies before the end of his term.[39] The current constitution provides that in such a contingency the senior vice president acts as head of state for a 90-day period followed by elections. The GPA stipulates that ZANU-PF would appoint a successor for the remainder of Mugabe’s term.[40] Because of her seniority, that would also favour Joice Mujuru.

In either event, the Mujuru camp considers that an alliance with Tsvangirai would be necessary to solidify Joice’s position. She herself has privately told supporters she would have no problem working with Tsvangirai in the post-Mugabe period, though in public she talks tough about the MDC-T leader. A senior ally in the ZANU-PF politiburo said, “she recognises Tsvangirai as an undeniable key player in Zimbabwe politics and in any future arrangement, hence strategic political relations are being cultivated across the party divide using the platform of the inclusive government”.[41] Cabinet ministers linked to the Mujurus have established a degree of confidential collaboration with their MDC-T counterparts and Tsvangirai to promote the reform agenda. This is still mainly preparatory and has not yet produced concrete legislative achievements, however, because the Mujurus rightly fear that to come into the open now would leave them vulnerable to criticism from the hawks within their own party.[42]

The Mujuru camp advocates a constitution providing for an executive prime minister and a president with considerably less power than at present.[43] Its assessment is that there will need to be a second inclusive government of some kind after Mugabe leaves the scene[44] and that such a constitutional arrangement would be advantageous under the two likeliest scenarios – both of which acknowledge that it may have to be content with the junior role in a partnership with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T. If the Mujurus lose the internal party battle to Mnangagwa, they might throw their support behind MDC-T in the elections and Tsvangirai as a strong prime minister in exchange for the backing of Joice as a relatively weak president. Even if the Mujurus win control of ZANU-PF, however, they doubt they could defeat Tsvangirai nationally, so the presidential post would be a reasonable second best in a political settlement to which they would bring their presumed ability to placate a critical mass of the military.[45]

A close Mujuru adviser summed up: “Tsvangirai and MDC-T would be key in any future dispensation, and our political strategies are alive to that reality”.[46]

3.  Clan politics and the Mugabe succession – the “Zezuru mafia”

The December congress that retained Mugabe at the helm of the party for another five years appeared to confirm the view that the octogenarian wants to die in office rather than face an uncertain future in retirement. Barring any major midstream leadership changes, Mugabe, who turned 86 on 21 February 2010, now seems likely to stand for re-election.[47] However, clan and regional fault lines that will influence the question of his eventual successor as party leader were also highlighted at the congress.

While Mugabe has kept his authority in the party in part by skilfully playing the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions against each other, he has also relied heavily on the fact that the presidium – the party president, two vice presidents and the national chairman – is dominated by members of his Zezuru clan. He used that connection again in December 2009 to keep his position unassailable. In particular, the Zezuru line-up in both the presidium and politburo beat back relatively marginalised clans, mainly the Karangas led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, who believe it is their turn to have more power.[48] A key consequence of this latest round of clan politics was, therefore, the strengthening of the Mujurus’ position vis-a-vis Mnangagwa.[49]

The Zezuru dominance results from the 1980 division of Zimbabwe into ten provinces. Mashonaland (Zezuru) was cut up into four provinces: West, East, Central and Harare; Matebeleland (Ndebele) into three: North, South and Bulawayo; and Masvingo (Karanga) into only two, Masvingo and Midlands, while Manicaland (Manyika) remained undivided.[50] On any decision in ZANU-PF, the Zezuru grouping, now headed by the Mujuru camp, has a virtual veto and needs only two other provinces to carry the day. Moreover, the strength of the Mashonaland East and Central vote for ZANU-PF in past national elections has increased the leverage of the Zezurus generally and the Mujuru camp specifically.

The Karangas, who are 35 per cent of the national population to the Zezurus’ 25 per cent, received none of the top five party posts at the 2004 congress and were determined to do better in December 2009.[51] By the eve of the congress, however, it was apparent they would fail. Basil Nyabadza resigned as party chairman for Manicaland in protest at what he described as a flawed nomination process and told Crisis Group: “Some leaders are like UN permanent Security Council members”,[52] a reference to Mugabe’s rigid allocation of presidium positions based on the ZANU/ZAPU 1987 unity accord. While the congress’s rejection of the Karanga-Mnangagwa initiative and confirmation of Zezuru dominance within the party gave the Mujuru camp an edge in the succession struggle,[53] it at the same time exacerbated clan tensions that risk erupting into conflict at the national level in the post-Mugabe era.

4. Tsholotsho II

Mnangagwa, 65, has the support of the ZANU-PF leadership in Manicaland, Midlands, Masvingo and Matebeleland South, but these provinces have been MDC-T strongholds in recent elections. This suggests that he starts well behind in any three-way national contest against Tsvangirai and Joice Mujuru. He is a resilient politician, however. Despite a series of setbacks in the past ten years, he continues to marshal support and remains a serious contender for power. Having been thwarted in the campaign to bring down Joice Mujuru at the December congress, his camp is having more success in its current campaign, called Tsholotsho II,[54] to return key allies – suspended or marginalised in the aftermath of the 2004 congress defeat – to influence in party structures.[55]

A Mnangagwa supporter in the ZANU-PF politburo said, “we are creating our party within the main party – it’s one of the strategies which we are crafting to ready ourselves for the challenges ahead to win the presidency”.[56] Mnangagwa is also using his defence minister portfolio to strengthen ties to the security establishment,[57] and his emissaries have even begun to explore possible alliances with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T, or at least some elements of that party.

Nothing is impossible in politics. There are no permanent friends or enemies. All options are open for consideration. Our Plan A is for our preferred candidate to ascend to power on his own. Our Plan B is to consider how we can forge an alliance with MDC-T and Tsvangirai, though this is still a remote possibility at this juncture.[58]

B. MDC-T

1. Advancing the inclusive government

The MDC-T leadership believes that it will ultimately be judged by the electorate on its record in office. As a result, it has been focused over the past year on pushing implementation of the GPA and making the inclusive government functional. Thus, it has given relatively little attention to growing the party by building alliances and to shoring up its structures countrywide. Tsvangirai considers that a successful inclusive government would pave the way for the MDC-T to take responsibilities more firmly into its hands after fresh elections, since it can prove to sceptics that it is competent and can be entrusted with stewardship of the country. He told Crisis Group:

We are in this inclusive government to restore political and economic stability and give Zimbabwe hope for a better tomorrow and a chance for a fresh beginning, and we believe, besides the setbacks and frustration, we have managed to do that in the past year. … Zimbabweans have seen a modest peace dividend and want more. Our challenge is to deliver on that front.[59]

The decision to enter government was driven by a pragmatic assessment that Mugabe, ZANU-PF hardliners and the security forces held a monopoly of force, were willing to use it against opponents and were favoured by Mbeki, the SADC mediator. The MDC-T calculated that in those circumstances, its capacity to effect change would be greater inside than outside government, and it believes that events are proving it correct.

The party is proudest of the inclusive government’s ability to overcome obstacles put up by the ZANU-PF hardliners and its limited financial resources to record some impressive economic gains. Finance Minister Tendai Biti said the MDC-T had managed “to stop the bleeding and to bring sanity to the governance of economic affairs under very difficult circumstances. … An economy works on the basis of predictability and trust, and what we have done in the past ten months is to bring predictability, consistency and therefore some legitimacy”.[60]

Though Biti added that the recovery is fragile, and more donor support is needed to sustain the momentum for change and avoid a relapse, [61] economic stability has caused Tsvangirai’s popularity to rise. A poll by the reputable Harare-based Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) in September found that 57 per cent would vote for Tsvangirai, 10 per cent for Mugabe in new elections.[62]

Tsvangirai believes that the international community should reward progress by extending aid for reconstruction and development. “There is no dispute in everyone’s assessment that there is, indeed, progress being made in Zimbabwe, and how do you reward that progress? By moving away from just humanitarian aid to economic growth, development aid and ensuring that any existing restrictions are removed”.[63] Attempting to walk a tightrope with its ZANU-PF partners in the inclusive government, the MDC-T wants the lifting of “non-personal sanctions” – those impacting government entities vital to economic recovery, such as the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe – but targeted measures retained on individuals who continue to block meaningful political reforms.[64] Tsvangirai has written to EU leaders, including UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, urging a general review of restrictive measures, while Biti requested the EU to free eight government companies from its sanctions.[65] On 15 February, the EU responded by renewing the sanctions regime for a year, while dropping nine companies from the list.[66]

2. The Tsvangirai/Mujuru axis

The MDC-T originally anticipated that the inclusive government would last at most two years, during which rapid political and economic reforms would be followed by fresh elections.[67] This expectation has been modified by political realities, and a senior Tsvangirai aide summed up the frustration: “You really wonder whether Mugabe is in charge. Maybe we should have directly negotiated with the military during the mediation, because they appear to be the ones calling the shots”.[68] Tsvangirai has suggested publicly that an early election might be necessary to break the impasse,[69] but this appears to be a tactic to put pressure on ZANU-PF. He realises that more time is required to democratise state institutions and put a new constitution in place, so the MDC-T may be prepared to stay in uneasy harness with ZANU-PF in the inclusive government for a full five-year term.[70]

Tsvangirai and his team are consequently taking a two-pronged approach, pushing for incremental gains on political reforms through the negotiation process, while seeking to take full charge of the economy through Biti’s finance ministry. Jameson Timba, the MDC-T deputy information and publicity minister, told Crisis Group:

We have ring-fenced the ZANU-PF economic tsar, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, and our minister, Biti, is in control. On that front, we have made huge strides because the treasury has reclaimed its power, which was not the case before. Now we are going to pitch the fight to expedite political reforms.[71]

Party strategists worry that if the inclusive government collapses before meaningful political reforms are implemented, elections would be held under the current constitution in an even more hostile environment conducive to ZANU-PF rigging than March 2008.[72] ZANU-PF hawks are mainly responsible for frustrating reforms, but the MDC-T shares blame for failing to lead in parliament, where it has not used the speakership and its plurality to initiate progressive legislation to open political space. It has not moved aggressively, for example, against restrictive laws like AIPPA and POSA. The MDC-M leadership has threatened its legislators with party expulsion if they get too close to the Tsvangirai wing of the once unified movement, and, as noted above, the Mujuru camp of ZANU-PF is not yet prepared to cooperate openly. But some MDC-T leaders in government and parliament appear satisfied with the temporary arrangement and the accompanying perks it provides. There are also allegations, as yet unproven, of corruption involving ministers and local councils the party controls.[73]

The MDC-T constitutional proposal – an executive prime minister and a weaker president – is similar to what the Mujuru camp supports, and Tsvangirai, like Joice Mujuru, has privately indicated to confidantes a willingness to work together.[74] However, Tsvangirai seeks to maximise his leverage by keeping options open, since both ZANU-PF factions are privately reaching out to him about possible post-Mugabe alliances.

MDC-T insiders told Crisis Group the past year has convinced Tsvangirai he would still need to work with some ZANU-PF elements after an electoral victory “to complete the transition and neutralise hawks in ZANU-PF and some elements in the securocrats who still control most key institutions”.[75] A close adviser said, “we would need to form a second inclusive government with some elements in ZANU-PF out of our own magnanimity to complete the transition and soft-land the crisis, even if we were to win outright in the next election”.[76] But worry about a military coup explains much of the MDC-T leadership’s interest in exploring a second inclusive government, in particular with the Mujuru camp, which commands loyalty from some influential generals.

C. MDC-M

The MDC-M faction, which has ten members of parliament, exercises limited influence and recognises that its very survival is heavily dependent on the durability of the inclusive government. While publicly stating that an early election would favour ZANU-PF, its leader, Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, acknowledges that he needs the full five-year term to raise his political standing and give the splinter party time to forge new alliances that might allow it to stay relevant in the post-Mugabe era. Mutambara’s claim that he and the party play a critical unifying role in the GPA and keeping the government functional despite Mugabe’s and Tsvangirai’s often tense relationship is less than fully persuasive in view of their unhelpful role in parliament.[77] Without solid grassroots support, it is most likely that the MDC-M will eventually collapse, with some leaders rejoining the larger MDC-T, a revived ZAPU[78] or ZANU-PF, depending on which faction gains control of the old ruling party. Industry and Commerce Minster Welshman Ncube, the MDC-M power broker, would favour collaboration and an inclusive government pact with the Mnangagwa camp.[79]

IV.   The Securocrat Problem

A. Opposition to the Transition Process and Hints of a Coup

After almost a year in the inclusive government, senior MDC-T officials told Crisis Group that they believe the greatest threat to the power-sharing coalition and to the country’s stability will come from leaders of the national security services who are refusing to accept the new dispensation.[80] One said:

We can implement the GPA to the last line, but if we don’t deal with the contentious issue of the security leadership in this country, we will be haunted by it at the next elections. We will have a Madagascar-like situation if the military is left with free rein to dictate and influence key decisions with regards to political developments in the country, including national leadership.[81]

In private discussions in South Africa, Tsvangirai and other senior MDC-T officials highlighted the issue of “phased security sector reform” as his principal concern in the run-up to new elections.[82]

Most observers believe that up to twenty high-ranking security officials (the “securocrats”) maintain a de facto veto over the transition process. Among those frequently cited as hardliners are Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri and Central Intelligence Organisation Deputy Director General Maynard Muzariri.

In hushed conversations, MDC-T officials and civil society activists express fears that a coup could come shortly after an MDC-T electoral victory or should Mugabe die in office. Mugabe has fully backed the military leadership, his last remaining line of loyal support given his fractious party, in part by ruling out attempts to carry out a security reform program. He left no doubts about this symbiotic relationship in his closing remarks to the ZANU-PF congress on 19 December 2009:

ZANU-PF as the party of the revolution and the people’s vanguard shall not allow the security forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any negotiations for the so-called security sector reforms. …That is the most dependable force we could ever have, it shall not be tampered with”.

The issue of the military command was not specifically addressed in the GPA negotiations. Still, the parties agreed to establish a new coordinating body for defence and security policy, the National Security Council (NSC), that would include Tsvangirai and his two deputy prime ministers and replace the ZANU-PF-dominated, secretive and abusive Joint Operations Command (JOC).[83] Over the past decade, the JOC has been behind the strategy of repression to keep Mugabe and ZANU-PF in power. It is the instrument through which Mugabe has masterminded the rigging of elections and the continuing wave of violent farm seizures. The fact that the NSC has met only once in the past year while the supposedly defunct JOC holds numerous weekly sessions with no MDC-T participation is deeply worrying. Most recently, the JOC was reportedly behind the January decision by the ZANU-PF politburo to make no further concessions to implement the GPA until sanctions are lifted.[84]

A number of generals are now contemplating moving into full-time politics in ZANU-PF, including Chiwenga, who is eyeing a leadership position in the party’s campaign in the new elections. This pattern underlines their determination to remain at the centre of national political and economic life.[85]

B. “Soft Landing” Considerations

The motives driving the senior security leaders to undermine the transition process and the inclusive government are diverse. In the past, they have reportedly benefited from packages administered by Reserve Bank Governor Gono through so-called “quasi-fiscal measures”, as well as largesse channelled through Mugabe’s wife, Grace, and Chiwenga.[86] A number of generals have reportedly built up substantial landholdings, either personally or through family members and other proxies, as a result of farm seizures ostensibly designed to assist the rural poor. Their desire to protect these holdings is a key reason ZANU-PF is opposing implementation of the GPA requirement to conduct a comprehensive land audit, since that exercise would expose these ownership patterns. Mugabe is reportedly still sustaining the livelihoods and patronage network of a small group of generals, mainly through proceeds from the controversial private sale of diamonds being mined in abusive conditions from the Marange fields in eastern Zimbabwe and through loans extended to the military by the Chinese government.[87]

Some senior security officials fear prosecution for gross human rights abuses committed in recent repression campaigns, especially those associated with the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as decades-old abuses, such as the killing of over 20,000 mainly Ndebele-speaking people in Matebeleland in the 1980s in a campaign known as Gukurahundi. Amnesties have been granted frequently in the post-independence period, including in 1980, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995 and 2000. The amnesty provision in 1990 provided a full pardon for security force members for any offense committed during “anti-dissident” operations “if that offence was committed in good faith for the purpose of or in connection with the restoration or maintenance of good order and public safety in Zimbabwe”.[88] Still, a number of senior security officials have quietly expressed concerns that such amnesties could be revoked under an MDC-controlled government and legislature and that these provisions do not afford protection from international prosecution.[89]

Others generals are motivated by a continuing sense of ideological fervour, viewing their acts of repression against “dissidents” and white farmers over the past three decades as simply a continuation of the liberation struggle of the pre-independence period. In the extreme, they believe that Tsvangirai and the MDC-T are mere puppets for white farmers and business interests, as well as foreign interests, especially British. They see themselves as the bulwark and Praetorian Guard of the revolutionary struggle, and thus handing over power to Tsvangirai, who has no liberation war record, would amount to selling out. One implication of this attitude is that these security officials would be loath to appear before anything resembling a truth and reconciliation commission and acknowledge their abuses, since they believe that their acts were not crimes but heroic feats to protect Zimbabwe from its enemies.

Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are increasingly debating the question of how to secure the retirement of these security officials during the life of the inclusive government.[90] Many are highly reluctant to consider any concessions to the officials, viewing them as rewards for past abuses and undercutting rule of law in a future Zimbabwe. While even these individuals see the threat from the generals, they also believe that the threat can be minimised by playing on the growing divisions between senior security officials and the rank-and-file military and police, who have themselves suffered under the economic implosion brought about by Mugabe and his cronies. Further, they doubt that concessions would have the desired effect, given the varied motivations of the generals and their scepticism regarding the permanence and utility of past amnesties.

Some suggest that security sector reform, leading to higher salaries, improved housing and educational benefits and a greater sense of pride in a professional security service, would better undercut the capacity of senior officers to use troops against a democratically-elected government.[91] Expanded international pressure on Mugabe and ZANU-PF to ensure the full functioning of the National Security Council, truly disband the Joint Operations Centre and proceed with the land audit to settle issues of ownership and compensation, if necessary, would go a long way toward diminishing the threat of the security officials.

At the same time, a number of MDC-T and MDC-M officials and human rights activists, including some who have suffered the worst of the abuses, have raised the possibility of arranging “soft landings” for the securocrats.[92] Persuading them to retire peacefully will not be easy, given their fears of the post-Mugabe era. Among the ideas being discussed is a new domestic amnesty for acts committed since the last amnesty in 2000, in exchange for the retirement of the officials, but revocable should they be found to be engaging in actions to thwart the transition to democratic governance. In keeping with past Zimbabwean practice, such an amnesty would not apply to so-called “specified offences”, such as murder, rape and theft of public property, nor would it protect the officials from international prosecution for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

Another idea being discussed is to allow the generals to keep their assets, including perhaps even their farmlands, by arranging legal transfer to them as retirement compensation, but also providing compensation to those illegally dispossessed. The U.S., EU and others could sweeten the deal by removing targeted sanctions on those who comply with its terms, since they would no longer be thwarting the transition.

It is unclear whether these measures, even in combination, would be sufficient to remove the threat posed by many of the incumbent leaders of the security forces. Having always associated the exercise of power with the use of force, they may never be satisfied that their economic interest and personal security could be adequately protected after they surrender their power.

V. The role of South Africa and SADC

Zimbabwe’s economic implosion and Mugabe’s increasingly authoritarian rule have had wide regional implications. The country traditionally was Southern Africa’s bread-basket, and its relatively modern infrastructure, extensive mining and manufacturing sectors, prosperous tourism and well-trained labour force helped anchor the region. With the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, many envisaged South Africa and Zimbabwe driving a broad regional market, complete with extensive energy and transport links. Instead, Harare has become a regional crisis and embarrassment. Up to four million Zimbabweans[93] – roughly a third of the population – have flooded across national borders due to political repression and absence of economic opportunities, affecting the stability of particularly South Africa and prompting xenophobic attacks by those fearing loss of jobs or a drain on social spending.[94] Similarly, South African business grew deeply concerned over the collapse of Zimbabwe’s mining, manufacturing, tourism and agriculture sectors and infrastructure, in all of which it has major investments.[95]

A month after the failed March 2008 elections and acting on behalf of SADC and the African Union, Thabo Mbeki launched the mediation that produced the GPA in September of that year. As described above, this mediation remains essential, because of the difficulties that immediately developed with GPA implementation and the operations of the inclusive government. Facing a political crisis at home that eventually led to his resignation as president, Mbeki did little further, but the advent of Jacob Zuma as his successor has changed the situation. While Zuma carefully refrained from challenging Mugabe or the new SADC president, the Congo’s Joseph Kabila, during the early September 2009 Kinshasa summit, he has subsequently displayed a refreshing engagement and toughness on the Zimbabwe account.[96]

In a clear break with the Mbeki team, Zuma appointed three of his most trusted and powerful advisers – international relations specialist Lindiwe Zulu, anti-apartheid veteran Mac Maharaj and former cabinet minister Charles Nqaqula – as his point-persons for the mediation process. Significantly, at SADC’s special summit on Zimbabwe in Maputo in November 2009, following the MDC-T’s suspension of its participation in the inclusive government, Zuma was reportedly firmer with Mugabe than anyone had been during the lengthy crisis, reaffirming that there was no alternative to the GPA and that a tough response would be forthcoming against any party that derailed it. “He told the three principals, including Mugabe, that with him at the helm of the mediation, it was no longer business as usual”.[97]

There is growing impatience among the South Africans with the slow pace of reform. Though it looks improbable, the mediation team indicates that all main outstanding issues should be resolved before June, when the football World Cup begins in South Africa: “We don’t want trouble in our backyard, especially this year when we host the World Cup, and our mediation team will work hard to ensure that key issues are out of the way before mid-year”.[98] The South African intelligence leadership has reinforced this message with all principals in the inclusive government,[99] and Zuma has publicly urged the three political parties in the power-sharing arrangement to resolve remaining issues in time for elections in 2011.[100]

The Zuma team considers that ZANU-PF and MDC-T have both been guilty of adding peripheral items to the negotiating agenda. Zuma has called on the principals to be more flexible and “park” a number of topics for the time being to allow progress.[101] A senior ANC executive member told Crisis Group:

The heart of the crisis in Zimbabwe centres around security issues which have closed political space and yielded disputed election outcomes for the past ten years. That’s what should consume our time in the mediation process. Getting Reserve Bank Governor Gono out today or arguing about the prime minister’s residence is not going to result in a free and fair election and a smooth transition”.[102]

Zuma’s mediation also includes an effort to deal with the securocrat problem. A selected group of retired generals from South Africa and other SADC countries are to hold discussions with senior Zimbabwean officers about the role of the military in a civilian-led government.[103] At the same time, Pretoria is working on issues related to a possible amnesty or other forms of immunity for the current security leadership in the post-Mugabe era. A senior official in the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s ruling party, explained:

The way the security leadership in Zimbabwe is handled is crucial to how a smooth transition process can be achieved. Our mediation process, as well as the main parties to the negotiations, cannot turn a blind eye to that critical element given Zimbabwe history. We can complete all the elements as outlined in the GPA, but if we don’t work on and begin to engage that sensitive issue now, it could create great instability and roll back all the gains which we would have achieved. We are very aware that is the crux of the matter, and we are exploring ways to delicately engage on this sensitive issue.[104]

In order to influence the emerging power dynamics in Zimbabwe, the Zuma administration has also deepened its relations with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T, while privately urging ZANU-PF to consolidate and clarify its own party succession plan.[105] A member of the ANC executive told Crisis Group that because his party was doubtful there would be a smooth political settlement after another round of elections or a Mugabe exit, it was drawing on its experience in ending apartheid to encourage a private dialogue between moderates in ZANU-PF and the MDC-T with a view to building support for a coalition government after the polls regardless of who wins.[106]

SADC as an organisation has continued to defer to South Africa on Zimbabwe policy, while calling for strict adherence to the GPA, continued negotiations on outstanding issues, new foreign assistance and investment and a lifting of Western sanctions. Many in Zimbabwe believe that only Zuma, among current southern African leaders, has the mix of political stature and revolutionary credentials to take a tough, effective line with Mugabe. While Mugabe is reportedly surprised and angered at his treatment by Zuma, recent progress, though slow and inconsistent, suggests the approach can work. Aware of the impact of Zimbabwe’s continuing crisis on his own country’s economic and social conditions, there are strong reasons for the South African president to remain engaged once the World Cup is over and indeed to adopt the even more assertive approach to the mediation and the parties that may be necessary to resolve the crisis.

VI. Conclusion

Zimbabwe remains at risk from the long legacy of misgovernment that produced the interlocking political, economic and humanitarian crises of the past decade. In addition to the challenges of governance and security highlighted in this briefing, any of a wide range of problems, singly or in common, could return it to the edge of collapse, particularly as long as Robert Mugabe remains head of state and his long-time ruling ZANU-PF party maintains its intransigent stance. The reformist MDC, split into sharply opposed factions, has performed reasonably in government, but has not seized the impetus for reform that seemed possible after it gained a parliamentary majority in 2008.

But despite its internal contradictions, the widely divergent ambitions of its three participating parties and the reluctance of donors to fully embrace it, the unity government has important achievements to its credit. The economy has gained a degree of stability, arbitrary political violence has been reduced, and a dialogue continues, with South African mediation, on the major political, constitutional and electoral issues. Even a bitterly divided ZANU-PF implicitly acknowledges the need for a generational change, and at least one of its two main contenders for Mugabe’s mantle is well into exploration of ways to come to terms with the main MDC wing and the transition process.

South Africa’s role remains vital, especially now that Jacob Zuma is bringing to it a more even-handed and energetic quality of engagement. Western governments need to offer complementary financial as well as political assistance, including the maintenance of targeted sanctions on the spoilers and the selective removal of corporate sanctions that stand in the way of economic growth. Above all, Zimbabweans themselves – both the parties in the inclusive government and broader civil society – must put the legacy of “divide-and-rule” politics behind them and learn basic lessons of cooperation essential for a successful democratic transition.

Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010

[2] The Global Political Agreement (GPA), which gave birth to the formation of the inclusive government, was signed on 15 September 2008. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°59, Engaging the Inclusive Government, April 2009.

[3] Zimbabwe Budget Statement 2010, 16 October 2009.

[4] “Biti allocates IMF U.S. $510 Million to Fiscus, Productive Sector”, The Herald, 30 September 2009.

[5] “Principals agree on Commission”, The Herald, 11 December 2009. Commission memberships were announced four days later.

[6] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF lead negotiator and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[7] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Harare, 6 January 2010.

[8] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF lead negotiator and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[9] “Constitutional outreach kick off”, The Zimbabwe Standard, 10 January 2010.

[10] Crisis Group interview, Ernest Mudzengi, coordinator, National Constitutional Assembly, Harare, 8 January 2010.

[11] Crisis Group interview, Paul Mangwana, ZANU-PF co-chairman, Constitutional Review Committee, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[12] Booklet on ZANU-PF position on the constitution-drafting process, February 2010, shown to Crisis Group.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Crisis Group interviews, senior MDC-T officials, 4-8 January 2010.

[16] A Gallup International poll released on 18 January 2010 indicated that Mugabe’s support is only slightly greater: 25 per cent.

[17] See Sections IV and V below.

[18] See GPA, preamble, p. 2.

[19] Crisis Group interviews, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 23 December 2009; intelligence official, Harare, 21 December 2009.

[20] Mugabe and the Mujurus belong to the same Zezuru clan. As discussed below, this clan, and not Mnangagwa’s Karangas, tends to dominate key ZANU-PF offices and institutions. Solomon Mujuru also played a vital role during the liberation struggle in persuading fighters to accept Mugabe’s rise to the party leadership.

[21] Crisis Group interviews, ZANU-PF politburo members and intelligence and military officers, Harare, 9-29 September 2009, 23 December 2009-10 January 2010.

[22] “Principals agree on appointment on Permanent Secretaries”, The Herald, 30 March 2009.

[23] Crisis Group interview, MDC-T cabinet minister, Harare, 21 November 2009.

[24] “Permanent Secretaries usurp Ministers Powers”, ZimOnline, 10 January 2010.

[25] “When leaders prove they are a big joke”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 8 October 2009.

[26] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[27] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF member of the commissariat department, Harare, 17 September 2009.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Pretoria, 12 January 2010.

[30] “Tsvangirai rejects Mugabe directive”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 4 February 2010.

[31] Crisis Group interview, senior military official, Harare, 2 January 2010.

[32] Crisis Group interview, Speaker of Parliament Lovemore Moyo, Harare, 17 September 2009.

[33] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 2 January 2010.

[34] “Mnangagwa faction crushed”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 19 December 2009.

[35] “Congress resolves that our negotiators cease to entertain any discussion on or negotiation of the resolution relating to the appointment of the governor of the Reserve Bank, Attorney General and the provincial governors as these issues fall outside the purview of the Global Political Agreement and have their solid statutory origins that protect them. There should be no movement on the concerns of the MDC formations without corresponding and simultaneous redress of ZANU-PF’s concerns such as the illegal western sanctions, western funded radio broadcasts and western interference in Zimbabwean internal politics through the funding of parallel government structures”. ZANU-PF Congress Resolutions, 13-15 December 2009. “No more outstanding issues”, The Herald, 10 August 2009. Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 25 September 2009.

[36]?Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 23 September 2009; “ZANU-PF endorses Mugabe for President”, The Herald, 12 September 2009.

[37] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member and adviser to Mujuru faction, Harare, 11 September 2009.

[38] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mujuru faction, Pretoria, 11 February 2010.

[39] At the ZANU-PF congress, the Mujurus obtained the endorsement of all the party’s provincial leaders for Joice to keep her position in the face of the Mnangagwa-Muchinguri challenge.

[40] See GPA, p. 3.

[41] Crisis Group interview, senior ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mujuru faction, Harare, 2 January 2010.

[42] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF cabinet minister linked to Mujuru camp, Harare, 17 September 2009.

[43] Crisis Group interview, member of Mujuru advisory group, Harare, 21 September 2009.

[44] “Given the political dynamics evolving, it is inevitable that there would be need for a second inclusive government post-Mugabe, regardless of which party or faction wins [elections]”. Crisis Group interview, member of Mujuru camp advisory group, Harare, 22 September 2009.

[45] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mujuru faction, Harare, 16 September 2009.

[46] Crisis Group interview, member of Mujuru camp advisory group, Harare, 22 September 2009.

[47] The ZANU-PF constitution states that the president of the party is automatically its candidate for the national presidency in an election called during his or her tenure, though the individual can choose to step down rather than perform this obligation.

[48] The Zezuru, Karanga and Manyika clans make up the Shona-speaking bloc in Zimbabwe. The other major linguistic grouping is that of the Ndebele from the Matebeleland provinces.

[49] The politburo is the party’s supreme policy-making body, made up of 40 members appointed by Mugabe in consultation with the presidium. Joice Mujuru is a leading member of both the presidium and the politburo. In addition to her and Mugabe, the other members of the presidium are Vice President John Nkomo and National Chairman Simon Moyo, both Ndebeles who owe their positions to the ZANU-PF/ZAPU 1987 Unity Accord.

[50] See “Zimbabwe National Geographical Map”, p. 11, local government and rural development ministry.

[51] Mugabe also regularly gives members of his tribe a large portion of key government, military and parastatal positions.

[52] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 22 December 2009.

[53] The Mujuru camp, with all four Zezuru-speaking Mashonaland provinces voting as a bloc, created alliances with the Matebeleland provinces to control the presidium elections.

[54] Tsholotsho I is the name given to the effort that former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo reportedly spearheaded in 2004 to defeat Joice Mujuru’s nomination to the ZANU-PF presidium.

[55] Among those in key party positions are former ZANU-PF lead negotiator and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa; former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo; Manicaland provincial chairman Mark Madiro (Nyabadza’s successor); former Matebeleland North Chairman Jacob Mudenda; Headman Moyo; Midlands Central Committee member and key adviser July Moyo; Deputy Minister for Energy Power Development Hubert Nyanhongo; war veterans leaders Jabulani Sibanda and Joseph Chinotimba; youth leader Edison Chakanyuka; former Masvingo provincial governor Josiah Hungwe; and Women’s League leaders Oppah Muchinguri, Shuvai Mahofa and Mabel Chinomona. A majority of key government bureaucrats are also linked to Mnangagwa including the chief secretary to the president and cabinet, Misheck Sibanda.

[56] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member linked to Mnangagwa, Harare, January 2010. An intelligence officer offered a slightly different take, saying that Mnangagwa seeks to weaken Tsvangirai’s presidential chances by forging an alliance with the MDC-M and splitting the MDC-T. Crisis Group interview, Harare, 9 January 2010.

[59] Crisis Group interview, Johannesburg, 30 November 2009.

[60] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 22 September 2009.

[61] Ibid.

[62] See Mass Public Opinion Institute Survey, September 2009.

[63] Crisis Group interview, Johannesburg, 10 October 2009.

[64] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Pretoria, 7 November 2009.

[65] Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Harare, 8 January 2010.

[66] “EU renews sanctions on Mugabe and his cronies”, voanews
.com, 15 February 2010. The EU cited lack of speed in implementing the GPA and reforms as the basic for retaining the sanctions regime. The U.S. announced on 1 March that it would also continue its sanctions regime for another year. “U.S. extends Zim sanctions for another year”, Agence France-Presse, 2 March 2010.

[67] Crisis Group interview, Johannesburg, 10 October 2009.

[68] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 9 October 2009.

[69] “Tsvangirai says early elections could solve Zimbabwe’s political problems”, voanews.com, 5 February 2010.

[70] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Harare, 3 January 2010.

[71] Crisis Group telephone interview, 6 January 2010.

[72] Crisis Group interview, member, MDC-T National Executive Council, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[73] “MDC-T Ministers under probe”, The Zimbabwe Independent, 15 January 2010.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 24 September 2009.

[76] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 10 October 2009.

[77] Crisis Group interview, Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, Harare, 21 November 2009.

[78] ZAPU is led by Dumiso Dabengwa, a former ZANU-PF politburo member who quit the party to revive the movement that was once led by the late Joshua Nkomo and merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

[79] Crisis Group telephone interview, MDC-M National Executive Council member, 20 January 2010. An electoral alliance with ZAPU to undercut MDC-T support in Matebeleland provinces is also said to be under consideration.

[80] Crisis Group interview, Harare, 4 January 2010.

[81] Ibid. The Madagascar military forced the elected president, Marc Ravalomanana, from office in 2009 and installed opposition leader Andry Rajoelina.

[82] Crisis Group interview, senior official, South Africa international relations and cooperation department, 11 December 2009.

[83] Crisis Group interview, intelligence officer, Harare, 7 January 2010. The JOC is a national security organ chaired by Mugabe. Its membership includes the two vice presidents, the heads of the army, air force, intelligence, police and Reserve Bank, and the defence, state security, and home affairs ministers. It was inherited at independence from the Smith regime.

[84] “No further concessions until sanctions lifted”, The Herald, 1 February 2010.

[85] Crisis Group interview, senior military official, Harare, 8 January 2010.

[86] Crisis Group interview, senior military officer, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[87] Crisis Group interview, senior official, finance ministry, Harare, 3 January 2010.

[88] See “Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace”, The Legal Resources Foundation and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), a March 1997 report on the 1980-1989 disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands.

[89] Crisis Group interviews, senior military officer, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 7 January 2010.

[90] Crisis Group interviews, senior MDC-T, MDC-M, ZANU-PF and civil society leaders, Harare, December 2009, January 2010.

[91] Crisis Group interview, member of MDC-T National Executive Council, Pretoria, 11 February 2010.

[92] Crisis Group interviews and discussions, Zimbabwe, November 2009, January 2010.

[93] “Four million Zimbabweans living in diaspora”, The Business Day, 16 December 2009.

[94] “Xenophobic attacks ignite in Cape Town”, The Star, 27 November 2009.

[95] “South Africa seeks investment protection with Zimbabwe”, The Business Day, 11 December 2009.

[96] Crisis Group interview, senior official, South Africa international relations and cooperation department, Pretoria, 21 December 2009.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Crisis Group interview, senior official, South Africa international relations and cooperation department, Pretoria, 12 January 2010.

[99] Ibid.

[100] “Zuma pushes for early election”, The Zimbabwe Standard, 10 January 2010.

[101] “Zuma calls for Tsvangirai to be flexible”, The Pretoria News, 15 January 2010.

[102] Crisis Group interview, member, ANC national executive, Pretoria, 16 January 2010.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 20 December 2009.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Crisis Group interview, Pretoria, 15 January 2010.

Harare, 24 November, 2009 and 26 January 2010

Facts of the Case

This case was an application for the Registration of the SADC Tribunal Judgement in the matter of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and others versus the Republic of Zimbabwe by 2 out of the 77 applicants in that case. This case found that the rights of white farmers to approach a court for redress and not be discriminated against on the basis of race in Zimbabwe were unreasonably denied by Constitutional amendment number 17 which provides the entire legal basis for the Land Reform Programme. (The SADC treaty, whilst holding that the decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding, prescribes that enforcement and domestication of inter alia, judgments of the Tribunal must take place in accordance with the local laws of the relevant member states. Member states are obliged to ensure that their local laws provide for the domestication of SADC Tribunal decisions.) Zimbabwean common law allows for applications for the registration of international judgments not covered by the Civil Matters (Mutual Assistance) Act [Chapter 8:02].

Questions to be determined by the Court

The Court summarised the questions before it as follows:

1. Whether the SADC Tribunal was endowed with the Jurisdictional Competence to rule over the case before it in the Campbell matter; and
2. Whether the enforcement of the SADC Tribunal decision in that case would be contrary to public policy in Zimbabwe.

Judgment

With regard to the first question, the court held that the SADC Tribunal did have the jurisdictional competence to adjudicate over the Campbell case and further recognized the legitimacy of the SADC Tribunal.

With regard to the second question the application for registration was dismissed. The court held that this was contrary to public policy in Zimbabwe.

Reason for the court’s decision (ratio dacidendi)

Interestingly, the court cited the fact that Zimbabwe as well as other SADC member states had fully participated in the Toika system and the business of this newly constituted organ whose legal basis is the same as that of the Tribunal (namely the Amendment to the SADC Treaty of 2001)

The rationale behind dismissing the application for registration seems to be that foreign judgments could not be recognized if they were contrary to “public policy” and “prior judicial precedent” (referring specifically to a judgment by the Supreme Court in the Campbell case). The court held that it was not good public policy to undermine the authority of the Courts in Zimbabwe.

Addressing the argument that the applicants had a reasonable expectation that the Zimbabwean Government would abide by its international obligations the court held that the beneficiaries of land reform had a reasonable expectation that Government would effectively implement land reform which outweighed the other conflicting expectation.

However, the SADC Troika undoubtedly had not been told that most of the Zanu-PF appointees to the CCP outreach teams are no more than a bunch of political terrorists.

The list below indicates the crimes of violence and torture perpetrated by Zanu-PF members and officials who have been assigned to teams on the Constitutional outreach programme. They have committed state sponsored and sanctioned crimes against anyone perceived to be in opposition to Zanu-PF over a number of years. Now they are tasked with this important and supposedly impartial, outreach work?

We maintain that Zanu-PF’s participation in the Inclusive Government and the GPA is both cynical and an outright sham. SADC should recognise the machinations of a dictatorship bent on clinging to power, and take the necessary disciplinary action.

List of Constitutional Outreach Programme Members who are perpetrators of political violence

Katsiru, Lawrence
Lawrence Katsiru a prominent member of the Vapostori faith Church in Marondera, has over the years ordered all the followers of his church to support and attend all Zanu-PF meetings and rallies,. He was imprisoned (9 years) for raping a minor (13 years old) in Marondera it appears he never served his time but was released from prison after a short while. He has led a campaign of violence against MDC supporters and is feared by many activists in Marondera.

Baloyi, Ailess
Chiredzi South MP, in 2008 organised political violence against MDC supporters, is mostly feared by victims of violence from that constituency.

Beremauro, Godfrey
Godfrey Beremauro sponsored militia bases in the Hurungwe central constituency; many MDC supporters were abducted and tortured; some murdered by youths following his instructions.

Chaderopa, Fungai;
Chaderopa working in conjunction with the ZRP officer in charge of Sanyati police station unlawfully detained MDC supporters in 2008, for periods ranging from three days to 2 weeks without charge, these people were tortured and denied food during their detention.

Chanetsa, Peter Tapera
Peter Chanetsa provided transport and food to Zanu-PF youths in bases set up in Hurungwe North; he gave the group led by Jawet Kazangarare a party truck that was used in the abduction torture and murder of MDC supporters.

Chindori Chininga, Edward;
Chindori Chininga masterminded the assault and destruction of homes belonging to MDC supporters in Guruve – he was referred to as the commander in chief of the bases in Guruve in the run up  to the Presidential election run off in 2008 .

Chinomona, Mabel Memory;
Mutoko North MP, In the run up to the 2008 elections Mabel moved around the constituency in the company of uniformed soldiers setting up bases, she threatened MDC supporters with death, many MDC supporters were assaulted during her meetings in the constituency.

Chihota, Phineas Chivazve
During the campaign period for the presidential run off elections in 2008 he addressed rallies around Seke district threatening MDC supporters with death if they did not vote for president Mugabe. His vehicle was used by a group led by Joseph Mutongoreya that abducted people on 16 June 2008 and took them to Marikopo base where they were tortured.

Hlongwane, Makosini;
Makosini Hlongwane is the MP of Mberengwa East, in 2008 elections he moved in the company of CIO agents based at Mataga Growth point terrorising MDC supporters in the area, he was personally involved in the assault and torture of MDC supporters at Chingechuru Prim School on 22 June 2008.

Kachepa, Newton;
Kachepa the MP of Mudzi North constituency led a ruthless campaign of violence against the MDC, he was involved in the murder of Peter Tom Butao on 28 April 2008, Temba Muronde on 14 April 2008, Kingswell Mateta in July 2008, he directed the abduction and torture of many MDC supporters in his constituency, he currently threatens people with death if they continue supporting the MDC.

Katsande, Aqualinah;
She is the MP of Mudzi West constituency; she led a reign of terror against MDC supporters in 2008. Aqualinah accompanied by Zanu PF youths attacked and killed Lever Katsande at Zanza village, Mudzi district , on 27 April 2008. On 8 July 2008 and assisted by Peter Nyakuba, killed Gwindiri Mutadza in Mudzi West.

Madubeko, Josephat;
Madubeko is the MP of Vungu, he encouraged Zanu PF supporters to attack and chase away MDC supporters from their areas, several people were assaulted as a result of his campaigns.

Matonga, Bright;
MP Mhondoro -Ngezi, Bright Matonga led a group of youths to Dadidrayi Chipiro’s home looking for her husband Chipiro who is an MDC activist and chairperson of the area when they did not find him they started beating her then chopped off her hand and both feet, they threw her into her hut and threw a petrol bomb into the hut setting it on fire. She was burnt to death. The gang was driving in two vehicles belonging to Brighton Matonga (Zanu-PF MP) (June 8 2008).

Mazikani, Paul Hebert;
Mazikani and a group of Zanu-PF youths assaulted Wanzirai Magodo and destroyed his home including a tractor, they took away his clothes and money amounting to Z$900 Million. He led the gang that killed Titus Goho on June 12, 2008 at their base they assaulted him until he died they accused him of supporting the MDC T. A militia gang led by Paul Mazikani killed Biggie Zhuwawo in April 2008.

Mhandu, Cairo;
Cairo Mhandu the MP for Mazowe led groups of youths and war veterans who killed, Gibbs Tawengwa and Hama Ngowani on June 30, 2008. On May 5, 2008 Mhandu in the company of uniformed soldiers led a big group of youths into the Chaona area of Chiweshe communal lands where many MDC supporters were assaulted; He was personally involved in the killing of Alex Chiriseri, Joseph Madzuramhende, Godfrey Jemedze, Author Matombo, Patson Madzuramhende and David Tachiwa Mapuranga.

Moyo, Jonathan;
MP Tsholotsho North; Jonathan Moyo is the architect of AIPPA and POSA, two pieces of legislation that were used to close media houses. Opposition party activists and leaders have suffered at the hands of security agents and the police using POSA to justify their ruthless campaign of terror against the opposition supporters. Jonathan Moyo has since 1999 churned out hate speeches that has encouraged the spirit and culture of violence within his Zanu-PF militia, many people have lost their lives, property and thousands have been maimed and tortured as a result.

Mutinhiri, Ambrose;
Ambrose Mutinhiri MP Marondera West: personally led a campaign of violence against MDC supporters in the Mahusekwa area of Marondera   West constituency, he would order the detention of MDC supporters for no apparent reasons. He set up and supported Zanu PF Militia bases in the Chihota communal lands where many MDC supporters were assaulted and tortured.

Muza, Isheunesu;
Muza is a Zanu-PF official feared by many MDC supporters, he moves around the Redcliff town in the company of CIO agents have always threatened MDC activists with death if they do not change.

Parirenyatwa, David Pagwesese;
MP Murehwa North ; In June 2008 towards the presidential run off Dr Parirenyatwa held a rally at  Mukarakate Business Centre in Murehwa where he threatened all MDC supporters with death if they voted for Morgan Tsvangirayi, several MDC supporters where severely assaulted at this meeting and at the other rally he held at St Peters. He was witnessed branding an AK 47 at meetings. He organized and visited torture bases at night in Murehwa north. His vehicle was used by gangs who murdered Edward Pfukwa on June 17, 2008 and Alloys Chandisareva Sanyangore in November 2008.

Pasiwomusha, Matiza Biggie;
Biggie Matiza organised all the bases that were set up in Murehwa West and South, He was present when a lot of MDC supporters were assaulted at St Peters in the Mukarakate area. He used to supply the youths in these bases with food and money and he supervised their work during the night. These gangs killed Edward Pfukwa on June 17, 2008 and Moses Nyada on June 19, 2008.

Raradza, Edward;
Edward Raradza is a notorious perpetrator of violence in the Muzarabani and Chiweshe areas, he was present on May 5, 2008 when many people were attacked and some killed at Chaona in Mazowe North.

Shaddy, Sai;
The senator of Gokwe Sengwa who brought in hundreds of Zanu-PF militia from other areas to assault MDC supporters in the Chief Sai area of Gokwe in 2008, many people were assaulted and reports from the areas note that some are still nursing their injuries.

Zhuwawo, Patrick;
Zvimba East MP, He terrorised MDC supporters in the farming community around Norton, he was always accompanied by CIO agents based in Norton, he threatened to chase away all new farmers from their plots if they supported the MDC.

Dinha, Martin;
The Governor of Masholand Central Province, famous in his Zanu-PF circles for his hatred of white commercial farmers, in September 2009 ,he ganged up with Masanzu also a senior civil servant and some CIO agents and forced former commercial farm workers in the Mateptepa farms to stop market gardening projects and start working full time for the new farmers.

Hungwe, Josiah;
The senator of Mwenezi -Chivi well known for his hate speeches, he encouraged the assault and eviction of MDC supporters in Masvingo.

Kabayanjiri, Oriah;
Kabayanjiri is the UMP senator who orchestrated a campaign of violence in 2008, he organised the gang that assaulted people in the UMP district, and his militia killed livingstone Dzenga on July 1, 2008 and Benson Tukaruza Karombe on May 11, 2008.

Katyamaenza, Virginia;
Makonde Senator: Victims of political violence report that in 2008 they were assaulted at Katyamaenza’s homestead which was sometimes used as a base by Zanu-PF militia.

Makunde, Tendai;
Tendai Makunde the Murehwa senator, set up bases at Waterloo farm, communities’ report that Makunde was involved in the abduction and subsequent murder of shepherd Jani the late MDC official who was Makunde’s business rival.

Mambo, Lot
Lot Mambo is the Bubi Umguza Senator, suspected CIO agent led Zanu-PF supporters in campaign of violence in the Umguza district.

Muchenje, Viginia;
Viginia Muchenje is the senator of Zvimba, Political violence victims from Zvimba report that they were assaulted and tortured after the perpetrators had been directed by Muchenje.

Sakupwanya, Stanley Urayayi;
Makoni Senator he wreaked havoc in presidential elections in Makoni district, his vehicle was used by Militia gangs in attacks against MDC supporters

Masimirembwa, G;
Former NIPC chairperson notorious for his hate speeches, blaming the MDC for price increases and economic distortions, who believes anyone who does not support President Mugabe is a saboteur.

Makova, Claudious (Col. Ret’d);
Victims of violence have reported him as the commander of the militia in Masvingo Province, known as the merciless killer.

Muchengeti, Clarissa Vonganai ;
Muchengeti supported Zanu-PF militia by providing food at the bases in 2008; she lost the senatorial election in Kwekwe and was bitter and very ruthless in presidential run off campaign.

Mandiitawepi, Chimene Mandi;
Lost the Mutasa-Nyanga senatorial elections and was very active in the violence before the presidential elections, reports note that Chimene funded some bases and identified some MDC supporters who were later attacked by soldiers and the militia.

Mahofa, Shuvai;
Shuvai Mahofa lost the house of assembly elections for Gutu South and led a ruthless trail of violence against MDC supporters her vehicles were reportedly used by the Militia in the abduction and torture of people.

Chinotimba, Joseph;
In 2008 election campaigns Chinotimba Led the youths who destroyed Admore Chibutu’s home and assaulted him on 11 May 2008.In the company of his cousin Chinotimba threatened Idah Munyukwi with a gun on 5 May 2008. and raped her twice. He kicked, stepped on and threatened Petros Murinda with a gun on 5 May 2008, accusing him of voting for MDC. His car was used in the attack of Choukuse Nyoka Mubango on 18 May 2008. Choukuse later died.Chinotimba in the company of army members and Zanu-PF youths attacked Tongeyi Jeremiah’s home on 15 May 2008. They went away with 7 cattle, 10 goats, and 6 sheep together with fowls. On 11 May 2008, he failed to get Mangwanani Zvichapera but he destroyed his home and confisticated his 5 chickens and 2 goats. He drove Jeremiah Tongeyi’s cattle to the business centre and forced him to vacate from his home on the 15th of May 2008. Chinotimba is notorius for having spearheaded the violent activities perpetrated by Zanu-PF supporters since 1999 especially violence linked to farm invasions.

Chapfika, David;
David Chapfika sponsored militia in 2008 by providing food and money to bases in the Hoyuyu area of Mutoko

Mliswa, Themba;
Themba Mliswa a well known Zanu-PF violent activist, he attacked and maimed white commercial farmers during the land invasions and has continued to terrorise the remaining commercial farmers in and around karoyi. In 2008 he personally assaulted many MDC supporters from those areas his attacks were described by his victims as vicious and severe.

Muzenda, Tsitsi Veronica;
Tsitsi Veronica Muzenda lost senatorial elections for the Gweru Chirumhanzu is reported to have supported the militia in Gweru with transport to carry out violent activities against supporters of the Late senator Kombayi.

Bhasikiti, Kudakwashe;
MP Mwenezi East, he organized the Zanu-PF militia gangs in Mwenezi to attack known MDC supporters; he provided the party vehicle that was used in the abduction and murder of a teacher Munguni at Neshuro Business Centre.

Mangami, Dorothy;
Senator for Gokwe, violence activities were planned from her home in Gokwe, she worked with Major Dalu Moyo assisting him in identifying MDC supporters who were later attacked by the militia under the command of major Moyo.

Mangena, Jabulani;
Jabulani Mangena MP Mberengwa North has been named in thirteen reports of political violence incidents as the main perpetrator during the 2008 June elections. Victims note that he was always in the company of armed CIO agents.

Mafios, Dickson Itai;
MP Mt Darwin North, in 2008 Mafios organised and commanded the militia in Mt Darwin many MDC supporters were assaulted, tortured and murdered, in some of his organised operations against MDC supporters they killed, Phanuel Mubaira, Fischer Chitese, Bright Mafuriro, and Abiya Chiparira. Some victims note that he is a CIO agent.

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This list has been compiled using information collected over the past 11 years by many different organisations involved in human rights and democracy, both inside and outside of Zimbabwe.

After the Zanu-PF Congress in December 2009, there was a meeting of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) – essentially, Robert Mugabe and the heads of Zimbabwe’s Security forces.

Among the resolutions taken at this meeting were the following:

- The GNU will be a year old in February, therefore no rush to implement outstanding issues.

- The January 2010 Constitutional Consultative Process will be disrupted by Zanu-PF (but spearheaded by the Army) using the excuse that money can’t be spent on the CCP when everyone in Zim has not been given agricultural inputs.

- ZR Police have been instructed not to attend to any reports of intimidation or violence during the CCP.

- Webster Shamu (Minister of Media Information and Publicity) recommended that no NGO’s or civic society be allowed to be involved in the CCP.

- When the Principals (to the GPA) meet again, Zanu-PF will agree to conditions, but will not implement them.

Negotiations between the principal signatories to the GPA are to resume tomorrow, Saturday. SADC, which has guaranteed the GPA, should recognise this deliberate stonewalling and sabotage by Zanu-PF, and support by every means, the efforts of the MDC to fully implement the agreement.